I wonder why Eliezer wants to keep causality. Is there some detectable difference if causality exists in the world, compared to the situation where it doesn't exist?

I might imagine that causality exists in my conscious experience: each configuration of particles in my brain "leads to" the next.

Or I might imagine that each configuration of particles in my brain exists as a momentary fluctuation in a universe already subject to heat death: yet each of the configurations is such that it seems to remember another configuration (which did not in fact produce it), and such that it seems to expect another configuration (which it will not in fact produce.

Obviously, there is in principle no way for me to detect a difference between these two situations. And if I extend the situation to include others, there will be no difference that anyone at all can ever detect, even in principle. By Eliezer's principles, should we not invent a new physics where the two possibilities are one and the same?