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Mark_Friedenbach comments on Timeless Identity - Less Wrong
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Yes, I'm not questioning whether a future simulation / emulation of me would have an identical subjective experience. To reject that would be a retreat to epiphenomenalism.
Let me rephrase the question, so as to expose the problem: if I were to use advanced technology to have my brain scanned today, then got hit by a bus and cremated, and then 50 years from now that brain scan is used to emulate me, what would my subjective experience be today? Do I experience “HONK Screeeech, bam” then wake up in a computer, or is it “HONK Screeeech, bam” and oblivion?
Yes, I realize that in both cases result in a computer simulation of Mark in 2063 claiming to have just woken up in the brain scanner, with a subjective feeling of continuity. But is that belief true? In the two situations there's a very different outcome for the Mark of 2013. If you can't see that, then I think we are talking about different things, and maybe we should taboo the phrase “personal/subjective identity”.
Non-running algorithms have no experiences, so the latter is not a possible outcome. I think this is perhaps an unspoken axiom here.
No disagreement here - that's what I meant by oblivion.
OK, cool, but now I'm confused. If we're meaning the same thing, I don't understand how it can be a question-- "not running" isn't a thing an algorithm can experience; it's a logical impossibility.