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TheOtherDave comments on Timeless Identity - Less Wrong
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The situation isn't analogous, however. Let's posit that you're still alive when the simulation is ran. In fact, aside from technology there's no reason to put it in the future or involve an AI. I'm a brain scanning researcher that shows up at your house tomorrow, with all the equipment to do a non-destructive mind upload and whole-brain simulation. I tell you that I am going to scan your brain, start the simulation, then don VR goggles and go virtual-bowling with “you”. Once the scanning is done you and your husband are free to go to the beach or whatever, while I go bowling with TheVirtualDave.
What probability would you put on you ending up bowling instead of at the beach?
Well, let's call P1 my probability of actually going to the beach, even if you never show up. That is, (1-P1) is the probability that traffic keeps me from getting there, or my car breaks down, or whatever. And let's call P2 my probability of your VR/simulation rig working. That is, (1-P2) is the probability that the scanner fails, etc. etc.
In your scenario, I put a P1 probability of ending up at the beach, and a P2 probability of ending up bowling. If both are high, then I'm confident that I will do both.
There is no "instead of". Going to the beach does not prevent me from bowling. Going bowling does not prevent me from going to the beach. Someone will go to the beach, and someone will go bowling, and both of those someones will be me.
Your probabilities add up to more than 1...
Of course they do. Why shouldn't they?
What is your probability that you will wake up tomorrow morning?
What is your probability that you will wake up Friday morning?
I expect to do both, so my probabilities of those two things add up to ~2.
In Mark's scenario, I expect to go bowling and I expect to go to the beach.
My probabilities of those two things similarly add up to ~2.
I think we have the same model of the situation, but I feel compelled to normalize my probability. A guess as to why:
I can rephrase Mark's question as, "In 10 hours, will you remember having gone to the beach or having bowled?" (Assume the simulation will continue running!) There'll be a you that went bowling and a you that went to the beach, but no single you that did both of those things. Your successive wakings example doesn't have this property.
I suppose I answer 50% to indicate my uncertainty about which future self we're talking about, since there are two possible referents. Maybe this is unhelpful.
Yes, that seems to be what's going on.
That said, normalizing my probability as though there were only going to be one of me at the end of the process doesn't seem at all compelling to me. I don't have any uncertainty about which future self we're talking about -- we're talking about both of them.
Suppose that you and your husband are planning to take the day off tomorrow, and he is planning to go bowling, and you are planning to go to the beach, and I ask the two of you "what's y'all's probability that one of y'all will go bowling, and what's y'all's probability that one of y'all will go to the beach?" It seems the correct answers to those questions will add up to more than 1, even though no one person will experience bowling AND going to the beach. In 10 hours, one of you will will remember having gone to the beach, and one will remember having bowled.
This is utterly unproblematic when we're talking about two people.
In the duplication case, we're still talking about two people, it's just that right now they are both me, so I get to answer for both of them. So, in 10 hours, I (aka "one of me") will remember having gone to the beach. I will also remember having bowled. I will not remember having gone to the beach and having bowled. And my probabilities add up to more than 1.
I recognize that it doesn't seem that way to you, but it really does seem like the obvious way to think about it to me.
I think your description is coherent and describes the same model of reality I have. :)
Yes. Probabilities aside, this is what I was asking.
I was asking a disguised question. I really wanted to know: "which of the two future selfs do you identify with, and why?"
Oh, that's easy. Both of them, equally. Assuming accurate enough simulations etc., of course.
ETA: Why? Well, they'll both think that they're me, and I can't think of a way to disprove the claim of one without also disproving the claim of the other.
Any of the models of consciousness-as-continuity would offer a definitive prediction.
IMO, there literally is no fact of the matter here, so I will bite the bullet and say that any model that supposes there is one is wrong. :) I'll reconsider if you can point to an objective feature of reality that changes depending on the answer to this. (So-and-so will think it to be immoral doesn't count!)
I won't because that's not what I'm arguing. My position is that subjective experience has moral consequences, and therefore matters.
PS: The up/down karma vote isn't a record of what you agree with, but whether a post has been reasonably argued.
As I alluded to in another reply, assuming perfectly reliable scanning, and assuming that you hate losing in bowling to MarkAI, how do you decide whether to go practice bowling or to do something else you like more?
If it's important to me not to lose in bowling, I practice bowling, since I expect to go bowling. (Assuming uninteresting scanning tech.)
If it's also important to me to show off my rocking abs at the beach, I do sit-ups, since I expect to go to the beach.
If I don't have the time to do both, I make a tradeoff, and I'm not sure exactly how I make that tradeoff, but it doesn't include assuming that the going to the beach somehow happens more or happens less or anything like that than the going bowling.
Admittedly, this presumes that the bowling-me will go on to live a normal lifetime. If I know the simulation will be turned off right after the bowling match, I might not care so much about winning the bowling match. (Then again, I might care a lot more.) By the same token, if I know the original will be shot tomorrow morning I might not care so much abuot my abs. (Then again, I might care more. I'm really not confident about how the prospect of upcoming death affects my choices; still less how it does so when I expect to keep surviving as well.)