michael_vassar3 comments on No Universally Compelling Arguments - Less Wrong

33 Post author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 26 June 2008 08:29AM

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Comment author: michael_vassar3 26 June 2008 12:34:15PM 0 points [-]

I honestly don't understand why the less severe version of the failure is less severe.

I'm also not convinced that we share a working definition of a mind. It sounds like you are saying that there are no arguments with which to compel arbitrary physical systems, but an upload of me plus a small voice recognition system that reboots me to the state I was once in after hearing "is the sky green" asked whenever it hears someone ask "is the sky blue" doesn't, IMHO, sound like something I would call a mind. Rather, I would call the upload a mind and the voice recognition and reboot system something external to that mind.