I have no idea what the conclusion of this article is. I suspect the author wants to argue for moral eliminativism, and hopes to support moral eliminativism by claiming that nothing would change if someone (or is it everyone?) was convinced their moral beliefs were wrong. I'm not sure how exactly the author intends that to work out.

But in any case, my comment only intended to criticise the methodology of the article, and was not aimed at discussing moral eliminativism. I simply pointed out that the question asked - what would happen is someone (or everyone?) was convinced their moral beliefs were wrong - was vague in several important aspects. And any results from intuition would be suspect, especially if the person holding those intuitions was a moral eliminativist. I was not "objecting" to anything, as the article didn't actually make any positive claims.

I might as well clarify and support myself by listing all the variations on the question possible.

(1) What would you personally do if you had no moral beliefs? (2) What would you personally do if you believed in (some form of) moral eliminativism - e.g. that nothing is right or wrong? (3) What would you personally do if you were convinced your moral beliefs were wrong? What would a randomly selected person from the populace of the Earth do if (1), (2) or (3) happened to them? What would happen if everyone in a society/ the world simultaneously had (1), (2) or (3) happen to them?