Peterdjones comments on Belief in Self-Deception - Less Wrong
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Comments (102)
I think Wittgenstein's point was that you're using 'believe' in a strange way. I have no idea what you meant by the above comment; you're effectively claiming to believe and not believe the same statement simultaneously.
If you're using paraconsitent logic, you should really specify that before making a point, so the rest of us can more efficiently disregard it.
He is illustrating that "belief" has more than one meaning, for all that he hasn't clarified the meanings.
A candidate theory would be belief-as-cold-hard-fact versus beliefs-as-hope-and-commitment.
Consider a politican fighting an election. Even if the polls are strongly against them, they can't admit that they are going to lose as a matter of fact, because that will make the situation worse. They invariably refuse to admit defeat. That is irrational if you treat belief as a solipsistic, pasive registration of facts, but makes perfect sense if you recoginise that beliefs do things in the world and influence other people. If one person commits to something , others can, and that can lead to it becoming a fact.
Treating people as nicer than they are might make them nicer than they were.
Of course , if "belief" does have these two meanings, the argument against dark side epistemolgoy largely unravels...