rkyeun comments on Where Recursive Justification Hits Bottom - Less Wrong

41 Post author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 08 July 2008 10:16AM

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Comment author: cole_porter 08 July 2008 01:01:23PM 1 point [-]

"There are possible minds in mind design space who have anti-Occamian and anti-Laplacian priors; they believe that simpler theories are less likely to be correct, and that the more often something happens, the less likely it is to happen again."

You've been making this point a lot lately. But I don't see any reason for "mind design space" to have that kind of symmetry. Why do you believe this? Could you elaborate on it at some point?

Comment author: rkyeun 30 July 2012 01:11:29AM 4 points [-]

Imagine a mind as already exists. Now I install a small frog trained to kick its leg when you try to perform Occamian or Laplacian thinking, and its kicking leg hits a button that inverts your output so your conclusion is exactly backwards from the one you should/would have made but for the frog.

And thus symmetry.

Comment author: wafflepudding 10 June 2016 11:17:11PM *  2 points [-]

Though, the anti-Laplacian mind, in this case, is inherently more complicated. Maybe it's not a moot point that Laplacian minds are on average simpler than their anti-Laplacian counterparts? There are infinite Laplacian and anti-Laplacian minds, but of the two infinities, might one be proportionately larger?

None of this is to detract from Eliezer's original point, of course. I only find it interesting to think about.

Comment author: rkyeun 12 July 2016 03:51:37PM 0 points [-]

They must be of exactly the same magnitude, as the odds and even integers are, because either can be given a frog. From any Laplacian mind, I can install a frog and get an anti-Laplacian. And vice versa. This even applies to ones I've installed a frog in already. Adding a second frog gets you a new mind that is just like the one two steps back, except lags behind it in computation power by two kicks. There is a 1:1 mapping between Laplacian and non-Laplacian minds, and I have demonstrated the constructor function of adding a frog.