So we agree that some people feel like the absence of objective values would be the end of the world, and some people seem not to care. I'm open to the possibility that the difference in perspective is due to differences in depth of understanding of the problem. That's why I began this thread asking what is the source of immunity. However, in response to my question, no one suggested any solutions or even acknowledged the problem independent of depression. For me, this was an alarm that people who have immunity to nihilist angst can't even relate to it, suggesting some kind of personality difference between those who have it and those that don't.
Gathering anecdotal evidence: Have you ever genuinely lacked for externally validated meaning?
This is an amazing question to me because I feel this lack pretty much constantly. (This commenter also seemed skeptical that people feel this lack.) Actually, I'm probably an extreme case.
I'm hesitant to take the conversation in this direction because maybe nihilist angst isn't always about personalities that require external validation. I would like to hear more from other people who experienced it.
Nevertheless, since it seems we first need to identify what it is like in at least one case, I'll say some things about the experience in my next comment.
Do you or anyone else know someone who became unhappy immediately after giving up theism and claimed that the reason was nihilism?
I thought this was a significant reason for resistance to conversion!
In my experience converted atheists seem to be about as happy as others in their social grouping (usually well-off but high IQ).
I would expect so, since I wouldn't expect someone to remain miserable in atheism indefinitely. I've heard atheists argue that once you don't believe in God, you can't go back to believing just because it would make you happier. I don't think it's so simple. If you stop believing in God and feel unhappy, this might (quite reasonably) be interpreted as an indication that atheism wasn't the right belief system for them.
But there are also cases (drawing mostly from fiction, I guess) where people lose their faith and walk around unhappy for a few years and then maybe place their faith again.
I thought this was a significant reason for resistance to conversion!
The anticipation of this experience is enough to make people resist becoming atheists. The reality of it is not at all obvious, nor necessary to explain the phenomenon to which you refer.
I don't think it's so simple. If you stop believing in God and feel unhappy, this might (quite reasonably) be interpreted as an indication that atheism wasn't the right belief system for them.
"The right belief system for them" implies that one prefers beliefs for reasons other than their...
Followup to: The Moral Void
A widespread excuse for avoiding rationality is the widespread belief that it is "rational" to believe life is meaningless, and thus suffer existential angst. This is one of the secondary reasons why it is worth discussing the nature of morality. But it's also worth attacking existential angst directly.
I suspect that most existential angst is not really existential. I think that most of what is labeled "existential angst" comes from trying to solve the wrong problem.
Let's say you're trapped in an unsatisfying relationship, so you're unhappy. You consider going on a skiing trip, or you actually go on a skiing trip, and you're still unhappy. You eat some chocolate, but you're still unhappy. You do some volunteer work at a charity (or better yet, work the same hours professionally and donate the money, thus applying the Law of Comparative Advantage) and you're still unhappy because you're in an unsatisfying relationship.
So you say something like: "Skiing is meaningless, chocolate is meaningless, charity is meaningless, life is doomed to be an endless stream of woe." And you blame this on the universe being a mere dance of atoms, empty of meaning. Not necessarily because of some kind of subconsciously deliberate Freudian substitution to avoid acknowledging your real problem, but because you've stopped hoping that your real problem is solvable. And so, as a sheer unexplained background fact, you observe that you're always unhappy.
Maybe you're poor, and so always unhappy. Nothing you do solves your poverty, so it starts to seem like a universal background fact, along with your unhappiness. So when you observe that you're always unhappy, you blame this on the universe being a mere dance of atoms. Not as some kind of Freudian substitution, but because it has ceased to occur to you that there does exist some possible state of affairs in which life is not painful.
What about rich heiresses with everything in the world available to buy, who still feel unhappy? Perhaps they can't get themselves into satisfying romantic relationships. One way or another, they don't know how to use their money to create happiness—they lack the expertise in hedonic psychology and/or self-awareness and/or simple competence.
So they're constantly unhappy—and they blame it on existential angst, because they've already solved the only problem they know how to solve. They already have enough money and they've already bought all the toys. Clearly, if there's still a problem, it's because life is meaningless.
If someone who weighs 560 pounds suffers from "existential angst", allegedly because the universe is a mere dance of particles, then stomach reduction surgery might drastically change their views of the metaphysics of morality.
I'm not a fan of Timothy Ferris, but The Four-Hour Workweek does make an interesting fun-theoretic observation:
I don't endorse all of the above, of course. But note the SolvingTheWrongProblem anti-pattern Ferris describes. It was on reading the above that I first generalized ExistentialAngstFactory.
Now, if someone is in a unproblematic, loving relationship; and they have enough money; and no major health problems; and they're signed up for cryonics so death is not approaching inexorably; and they're doing exciting work that they enjoy; and they believe they're having a positive effect on the world...
...and they're still unhappy because it seems to them that the universe is a mere dance of atoms empty of meaning, then we may have a legitimate problem here. One that, perhaps, can only be resolved by a very long discussion of the nature of morality and how it fits into a reductionist universe.
But, mostly, I suspect that when people complain about the empty meaningless void, it is because they have at least one problem that they aren't thinking about solving—perhaps because they never identified it. Being able to identify your own problems is a feat of rationality that schools don't explicitly train you to perform. And they haven't even been told that an un-focused-on problem might be the source of their "existential angst"—they've just been told to blame it on existential angst.
That's the other reason it might be helpful to understand the nature of morality—even if it just adds up to moral normality—because it tells you that if you're constantly unhappy, it's not because the universe is empty of meaning.
Or maybe believing the universe is a "mere dance of particles" is one more factor contributing to human unhappiness; in which case, again, people can benefit from eliminating that factor.
If it seems to you like nothing you do makes you happy, and you can't even imagine what would make you happy, it's not because the universe is made of particle fields. It's because you're still solving the wrong problem. Keep searching, until you find the visualizable state of affairs in which the existential angst seems like it should go away—that might (or might not) tell you the real problem; but at least, don't blame it on reductionism.
Added: Several commenters pointed out that random acts of brain chemistry may also be responsible for depression, even if your life is otherwise fine. As far as I know, this is true. But, once again, it won't help to mistake that random act of brain chemistry as being about existential issues; that might prevent you from trying neuropharmaceutical interventions.
Part of The Metaethics Sequence
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