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Wei_Dai comments on Existential Angst Factory - Less Wrong
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I think that nihilism may be viable as a moral philosophy, in the sense that it's the default position, if you find that you reject all possible values you could have as "crazy" under sufficient reflection.
Does anyone have an argument why this is impossible or unlikely? For example, can anyone exhibit a clearly defined value and explain why (with high probability) this value would be part of one's CEV?
I should acknowledge that at a low level of intelligence, nihilism (there are no values) may be indistinguishable from fragility-of-value (no value is valuable when considered by itself, but only in combination with other values). In other words, the fact that we can't exhibit a clearly defined value and explain why (with high probability) this value would be part of one's CEV can be explained by "value is fragile" as well as by nihilism. So I do not intend to demand that specific proof, and it's just an example of an argument that would work.