Peterdjones comments on Moral Error and Moral Disagreement - Less Wrong
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Comments (125)
I think the idea of associating the meaning of a word with a detailed theory of fine-grained set of criteria, allowing you to apply the term in all cases, has disadvantages.
Newtonian theory has a different set of fine grained criteria about gravity than relativistic theory. If we take those criteria as define the meaning of gravity, then they must be talking about different things. If we take that as the end of the story, then there is no way we can make sense of their being contrasting theories, or of one theory superseding another. The one is a theory of Newton-gravity, the other of Einstein-gravity. If we take them as both being theories of some more vaguely and coarsely defined notion gravity, we can explain their disagreement and differing success. And we don't have to give up on Einstein-gravity and Newton-gravity.
I don't see the point of this comment. No-one holds that the constraint that makes some sets of values genuinely moral is the same as the constrain that makes them implementable.
That are both in the superclass of optimisation processes. Why should they not both be in the class of genuinely moral optimisation processes?
Meta ethics can supply a meaning of should/ought without specifying anything specific. For instance, if you ought to maximise happiness, that doesn't specify any action without further information about what leads to happiness.