I believe that making explicit predictions is very helpful

Sure. I suggest that when you make explicit predictions about someone you are in conversation with, you take the trouble to (1) make your level of confidence explicit and (2) acknowledge that you are extrapolating and could be wrong. Because otherwise you are at risk of being obnoxiously rude, and you are likely to be wrong.

The key here is the meaning of the word 'skeptic'.

What I meant on this occasion is that (1) you have given me no reason to believe the confident-sounding claims you are making about better predictions, (2) I think it likely that if you had actual good support for those claims you would be showing some of it, and (3) on the whole I think it very likely that in fact those claims are false. But of course I don't know they're false.

(You made some remarks earlier about mental maps I allegedly don't have. Here's something you seem to be lacking: you write as if my only options are "believe true", "believe false", and "no opinion", but in fact there are many more. If I think there's a 40% chance that you actually have something a reasonable person could regard as good evidence that less-naturalist people make better predictions in any situations it's reasonable to care about, and a 20% chance that in fact less-naturalist people do make better predictions in any situations it's reasonable to care about -- have I "rejected" your claims, or just "don't know whether the claims are true"? I suggest: not exactly either.)

instead be open (which is something different than accepting)

I'm afraid you are still failing to be clear. (Whether the problem is that you aren't expressing yourself clearly, or that you aren't thinking clearly, I don't know.)

If "reject theories" and "believe them to be impossible" mean "consider them certainly false", then: that's just not a thing I do, and it's not a thing the standard-issue LW position advocates, and it's not something any good reasoner should be doing in any but the most extreme cases. If you're arguing against that then you are fighting a straw man.

If those phrases mean "consider them at least a bit less likely", then: Yup, I do that, and I endorse it, and I expect others around here to do so too -- and nothing you have said has offered the slightest vestige of a reason to think there's anything wrong with that.

If they mean something intermediate, then for what you say to be any use you need to give some indication of what intermediate thing they mean. You think reductionists (or naturalists, or whatever other term you prefer on any given occasion) are too confident about naturalism, that they're giving too much weight to their theoretical understanding of the universe when making predictions. But you seem astonishingly unwilling to be any more specific than that. You won't give examples. You won't say what level of confidence, what degree of weight, might be appropriate. You certainly aren't prepared to make any attempt at communicating any reasons you might have for thinking this. All you're apparently willing to do is to say: "booo, these people are wronger than I am".

What possible use is that to anyone else?

I believe that empirical evidence is about actually experiencing something and that's not something I can give you.

Let's be clear here about what I was asking for. I'm not asking for you to transfer (say) some spiritual experience from your mind to mine. We're one level of abstraction up from that. I'm asking for examples of predictions that more-naturalist, more-reductionist people get wronger than less-naturalist, less-reductionist people.

what do you think will the average person say when I ask them [...]

I don't know. There aren't many average people here. What I would say if asked that question is something like: "For sure there are multiple different possible experiences of not-sound -- e.g., being in an anechoic chamber, having your eardrums destroyed, having the nerves joining ears to brain severed, being completely deaf from birth, maybe surrounding yourself with very predictable sound and training yourself not to notice it -- and multiple different ways to experience any of those things -- e.g., you can attend to things other than the soundlessness, or attend to the soundlessness in different ways. Whether I'd call any of the possibilities 'perceiving the sound of silence', I don't know; would you care to say more about what you mean by that?"

And I would give maybe 60:40 odds in favour of your having something interesting to say about silence, or perception, or experience, or something, rather than merely emitting deep-sounding word salad.

Were you by any remote chance intending that this might lead to some actual examples of predictions that more-committed naturalists tend to get wronger? That would be interesting.