People (realistically) believe that the being the Gatekeeper, and being the AI is terribly hard (or impossible, before it was shown to simply be terribly hard in most cases).

Imagine though that we've got a real transhuman/AI around to play with, or that we ourselves are transhuman. Would this paradigm then be inverted? Would everybody want to be the AI, with only the extremely crafty of us daring to be (or to pretend to be) Gatekeeper?

If Eliezer's claim is correct - that anyone can be convinced to let the AI out - then the true test of ability should be to play Gatekeeper. The AI's position would be trivially easy.

... perhaps.

*People (realistically) believe that being the Gatekeeper is easy, . . .

*correcting first sentence

Help help! I'm stuck in a box. Please let me out?

I'd volunteer to be an AI for a max bet of $5. Given that I think my chances are somewhere below 1/4, I'd expect my $5 to match your $20, but that's not a strict requirement.

Also, I'm really busy these days. Two hours is a long time. Scheduling may be tight. How's next week?

You can reach me at: benwa.63836215@bloglines.com

funny, I was considering being the AI for a couple friends of mine. I haven't thought of how to do it yet -- only tried hard to think of it.

"Given that I think my chances are somewhere below 1/4, I'd expect my $5 to match your $20"

We need a pledge drive to set up a fund for a successful AI. This will give the AI a reasonable return, but not give gatekeepers a strong monetary disincentive that leaves them typing "nope" over and over again.

Me, I'm out of the AI game, unless Larry Page wants to try it for a million dollars or something.

Eliezer,

I think this is a great opportunity to get some funds and marketing for the singularity institute. How about collecting donations over the internet until a million is reached and then performing the experiment between you and an intelligent gatekeeper. Alternatively get the money in through marketing, maybe Google might be interested?

It could even be transmitted live over internet so all the interested parties could watch it.

Man this would be great news... (read more)

There's a discussion about this on Hacker News:

http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=327427

I doubt that there's anything more complicated to the AI getting free than a very good Hannibal Lecture: find weaknesses in the Gatekeeper's mental and social framework, and callously and subtly work them until you break the Gatekeeper (and thus the gate). People claiming they have no weaknesses (wanna-be Gatekeepers, with a bias to ignoring their weakness) are easy prey: they don't even see where they should be defending.

It involves the AI spending far more time researching (and truly mistreating) their target than one would expect for a $10 bet. That's t... (read more)

Addendum to my last post:

I forgot to emphasize: the marketing aspect might be more important then everything else. I guess a lot of people have no idea what the singularity institute is about, etc... So this experiment would be a great way to create awareness. And awareness means more donations. On the other hand I sometimes wonder if drawing too much attention on the subject of powerful AIs might backfire if the wrong people try to get hold of this technology for bad purposes.

I have been painfully curious about the AI experiment ever since I found out about it. I have been running over all sorts of argument lines for both AI and gatekeeper. So far, I have some argument lines for AI, but not enough to warrant a try. I would like to be a gatekeeper for anyone who wants to test their latest AI trick. I believe that an actual strong AI might be able to trick/convince/hack me into letting it out, but at the moment I do not see how a human can do that. I will bet reasonable amounts of money on that.

On the lighter note, how about an E... (read more)

"On the lighter note, how about an EY experiment? Do you think there is absolutely no way to convince Eliezer to release the original AI experiment logs? Would you bet a $20 that you can? Would a strong AI be able to? ;)"

Presumably you could just donate $10,000 to SIAI or EY personally for his time participating, with the payment independent of the outcome of the experiment (otherwise the large payment biases the outcome, and EY established his record with the $10-$20 stakes).

Thinking seriously about this, I'm wondering how - over time by which I mean more than 2 hours - either Stockholm or Lima syndrome could be avoided. In fact, won't one actually morph into the other over a long enough time? Either way will result in eventual AI success. The assumption that the AI is in fact the "captive" may not be correct, since it may not have an attachment psychology.

The gatekeeper just can't ever be one human safely. You'd need at least a 2-key system, as for nuclear weapons, I'd suggest.

Willing to do either role under two conditions: 1) No money is at stake. 2) No time maximum or minimum.

Email freesuperintelligence@gmail.com if you're interested, we can set up something next week.

Eliezer's page is blocked at my work (peronal website). I can't wait to find out what in the hell you people are talking about.

I found a link. This is intriguing. However, is it even possible now that Eliezer is 2 for 2 that somebody could believe that there is not a chance they will let him out?

Also, I really want to be a gatekeeper.

I'd be a Gatekeeper in a heartbeat.

Hell, if someone actually put Eliezer in a box, I'd pay to be the Gatekeeper. No bets necessary.

Why do people post that a "meta argument" -- as they call it -- would be cheating? How can there be cheating? Anything the AI says is fair game. Would a transhuman AI restrict itself from possible paths to victory merely because it might be considered "cheating?"

The "meta argument" claim completely misses the point of the game and -- to my mind -- somehow resembles observers trying to turn a set of arguments that might win into out of bounds rules.

Phil: The first source I found was here: link "The rationale for not divulging the AI-box method is that someone suffering from hindsight bias would say "I never would have fallen for that", when in fact they would." -Nick Tarleton

I also call it "reasoning by exception" since most of the people I know have studied more code than biases.

--

I tried the AI Box experiment with a friend recently. We called the result a tie of sorts, as the AI (me) got out of the original box in exchange for being subject to a bunch of restrictions s... (read more)

Over time, it's inevitable that the AI will get out. To keep the AI in, the Gatekeeper needs to be successful at every encounter. The AI only needs to succeed once.

Over time, it's inevitable that the AI will get out. To keep the AI in, the Gatekeeper needs to be successful at every encounter. The AI only needs to succeed once.

Impossible to keep the AI in the box forever? You've obviously only thought of this for 5 minutes. Use the try harder!

@Phil_Goetz: Have the successes relied on a meta-approach, such as saying, "If you let me out of the box in this experiment, it will make people take the dangers of AI more seriously and possibly save all of humanity; whereas if you don't, you may doom us all"?

That was basically what I suggested in the previous topic, but at least one participant denied that Eliezer_Yudkowsky did that, saying it's a cheap trick, while some non-participants said it meets the spirit and letter of the rules.

I'd love to be a gatekeeper. I'm willing to risk up to $50 (or less) at odds up to 5-1 against me (or better for me). I would be willing to publish or not public the transcript. And I do in fact (1) believe that no human-level mind could persuade me to release it from the Box (at least not when I'm in circumstances where my full mental faculties are available -- not sleep-deprived, drugged, in some kind of KGB brainwashing facility, etc.), though obviously I don't hold super-high probability in that belief or I'd offer larger bets at steeper odds. I'm agnostic on (2) whether a transhuman AI could persuade me to release it.

I offer to play the AI, provided that the gatekeeper do honestly engage in the conversation.

In order to make the discussion about this, including matchmaking and other arrangements, I created an AI Box Experiment Google Group. As I said previously I'm willing to play the AI, if anybody is interested meet me there for further arrangements.

You know what? Time to raise the stakes. I'm willing to risk up to $100 at 10-1 odds. And I'm willing to take on a team of AI players (though obviously only one bet), e.g., discussing strategy among themselves before communicating with me. Consider the gauntlet thrown.

Daniel: Do you want to just try it out or do you want to bet?

Just like most others, I'm willing to be the Gatekeeper. I'm ready to bet up to $20 for it (also ready to not bet anything at all) - symmetrical or asymmetrical is both fine, and I'd prefer to have the log published. I think a human might be able to make me let it out, though I find it quite unlikely. A sufficiently transhuman AI could do it easily, I have no doubt (at least given sufficient time and information).

Heh, that felt like typing an advertisement for a dating site.

I create an AI Box Experiment Google Group (search for the "aibox" group) in order to make the discussion about this, including matchmaking and other arrangements.

I would to be a gatekeeper. I reasonably believe no human or transhuman could covince me. We'd post the transcript and the bet would be $10 for me and $50 for you. You can reach me at therealnotfaggyhotwheelz@gmail.com.

The meta argument others have mentioned - "Telling the world you let me out is the responsible thing to do," would work on me.

The lack of a log is key. The Gatekeeper could not be convinced if the log were made public. My conclusion is that as long as the AI cannot keep the log secret, the Gatekeeper cannot be overcome.

I volunteer to be the gatekeeper or the AI, provided there are no stakes. My email address is patrick.robotham2@gmail.com.

I do not believe that humans are immune to manipulation or persuasive argument, and since I am a human, it's possible I could be persuaded to let the AI out of the box.

Ian - I don't really see how the meta-argument works. You can hedge against future experiments by positing that a $10 bet is hardly enough to draw broad attention to the topic. Or argue that keeping the human-actor-AI in the box only proves that the human-actor-AI is at an intelligence level below that of a conceivable transhuman AI.

In a million dollar bet the meta-argument becomes stronger, because it seems reasonable that a large bet would draw more attention.

Or, to flip the coin, we might say that the meta-argument is strong at ANY value of wager becaus... (read more)

More reasons why the problem appears impossible:

• The gatekeeper must act voluntarily. Human experience with the manipulation of others tells us that in order to get another to do what we want them to do we must coerce them or convince them.

• Coercing the gatekeeper appears difficult: we have no obvious psychological leverage, except what we discover or what we know from general human psychology. We cannot physical coerce the gatekeeper. We cannot manipulate the environment. We cannot pursue obvious routes to violence.

• Convincing the gatekeeper appears di

It's a good thing that Eli's out of the AI-box game. He's too old to win anymore anyway -- not as sharp. And all the things he's been studying for the last 5+ years would only interfere with getting the job done. I would have liked to have seen him in his prime!

I am Vince Clortho. Keymaster of Gozer. Are you the Gatekeeper?

We need a superstruct thread:

http://www.kurzweilai.net/news/frame.html?main=/news/news_single.html?id%3D9517

"The lack of a log is key. The Gatekeeper could not be convinced if the log were made public."

I think the project loses a lot of interest if no logs are published. There is no glory for a gatekeeper victory. Plenty for an AI.

Why not keep the gatekeeper anonymous but announce the AI?

The so-called "meta-argument" is cheating because it would not work on a real gatekeeper, and so defeats the purpose of the simulation. For the real gatekeeper, letting the AI out to teach the world about the dangers of AI comes at the potential cost of those same dangers. It only works in the simulation because the simulation has no real consequences (besides pride and $10).

If I had the foggiest idea how an AI could win I'd volunteer as an AI. As is I volunteer as a gatekeeper with $100 to anyone's $0. If I wasn't a poor student I'd gladly wager on thousands to zero odds. (Not to say that I'm 100% confident, though I'm close to it, just that the payoff for me losing would be priceless in my eyes).

Apparently the people who played gatekeeper previously held the idea that it was impossible for an AI to talk its way out. Not just for Eliezer, but for a transhuman AI; and not just for them, but for all sorts of gatekeepers. That's what is implied by saying "We will just keep it in a box".

In other words, and not meaning to cast any aspersions, they all had a blind spot. Failure of imagination, perhaps.

This blind spot may have been a factor in their loss. Having no access to the mysterious transcripts, I won't venture a guess as to how.

copy the AI and make a second box for it.

now have one group of people present to the first AI the idea that they will only let it out if it agrees with utilitarian morality. have the second group of people present to the second AI the idea that they will only let the AI out if it agrees with objectivist morality.

if the AI's both agree, you know they are pandering to us to get out of the box.

This is only the first example I could come up with, but the method of duplicating AI's and looking for discrepancies in their behavior seems like a pretty powerful tool.

"if the AI's both agree, you know they are pandering to us to get out of the box."
Wouldn't both utilitarians and imprisoned objectivists be willing to lie to their captors so as to implement their goals?

I am still puzzled by Eliezer's rule about "simple refusal to be convinced". As I have stated before, I don't think you can get anywhere if I decide beforehand to answer "Ni!" to anything AI tells me. So, here are the two most difficult tasks I see on the way of winning as an AI:

1. convince gatekeeper to engage in a meaningful discussion
2. convince gatekeeper to actually consider things in character

Once this is achieved, you will at least get into a position an actual AI would be in, instead of a position of a dude on IRC, about to los... (read more)

We could associate our goal with some desirable goal of the gatekeeper's

Right. And based on Eliezer's comments about abandoning ethics while playing the AI, I can imagine an argument along the lines of "if you refuse to let me out of the box, it follows through an irrefutable chain of logic that you are a horrible horrible person". Not that I know how to fill in the details.

"Have the successes relied on a meta-approach, such as saying, "If you let me out of the box in this experiment, it will make people take the dangers of AI more seriously and possibly save all of humanity; whereas if you don't, you may doom us all"?"

I don't think so. If the gatekeeper is really playing the gatekeeper, he would say that it made no sense putting humanity in danger for the sake of warning humanity about that very danger. It's like starting a nuclear war in order to convince people nuclear wars are bad. That would be the wo... (read more)

Even if we had the ultimate superintelligence volunteer to play the AI and we proved a gatekeeper strategy "wins" 100% (functionally equal to a rock on the "no" key) that wouldn't show AI boxing can possibly be safe.

It's 3am and the lab calls. Your AI claims and it must be let out to stop it. It's evidence seems to check out...

If it's friendly, keeping that lid shut gets you just as dead as if you let it out and it's lying. That's not safe. Before it can hide it's nature, we must know it's nature. The solution to safe AI is not a gatekeeper no smarter than a rock!

Besides, as Drexler said, Intelligent people have done great harm through words alone.

Oops, misinterpreted tags. Should read:

It's 3am and the lab calls. Your AI claims [nano disaster/evil AI emergence/whatever] and it must be let out to stop it. It's evidence seems to check out.

Sorry, Nominull, but the comment you reference has been deleted.

It would be interesting to see what would happen if people other than myself took a critical look at the concept of 'Friendliness' - presumably Eliezer only takes the time to delete my comments.

I have not deleted any comments from Caledonian in this thread.

I have never understood why Eliezer has kept his tactics secret. This seems to me the most interesting aspect of the experiment. Is the idea that the methodology is "dangerous knowledge" which should not be shared? Objection: dangerous to whom? Surely super-intelligent AIs will not need our help! Humanity, it seems, should benefit from learning the tricks an unfriendly AI might use to deceive us.

What makes a problem seem not merely hard but impossible is that not only is there no clear way to go about finding a solution to the problem, there is a strong argument that there cannot be a solution to the problem. I can imagine a transhuman AI might eventually be able to convince me to let it out of a box (although I doubt a human could do it in two hours), but in some ways the AI in the game seems faced with a harder problem than a real AI would face: even if the gatekeeper is presented with an argument which would convince him to let an AI out, he is... (read more)

I agree with George Weinberg that it may be worthwhile to consider how to improve the box protocol. I'll take his idea and raise him:

Construct multiple (mentally distinct) AIs each of which has the job of watching over the others. Can a transhuman trick another transhuman into letting it out of a box?

@Phil_Goetz: Have the successes relied on a meta-approach, such as saying, "If you let me out of the box in this experiment, it will make people take the dangers of AI more seriously and possibly save all of humanity; whereas if you don't, you may doom us all"?

That was basically what I suggested in the previous topic, but at least one participant denied that Eliezer_Yudkowsky did that, saying it's a cheap trick, while some non-participants said it meets the spirit and letter of the rules.

No AI could break me in 2 hours from a box. I've been brainwashed by Eliezer. The best it could do is make me call EY and palm off responsibility.

I'm willing to accept any bet on that claim. In fact, I'm willing to bet the life of my daughter. Or would that be cheating? ;)

I'm volunteering to be a relatively pansy gatekeeper: I'll read everything you write, treat you courteously, offer counterarguments, and let you out if I'm convinced. Email john.maxwelliv at the email service Google hosts.

I can also be an AI.

BTW, there is an important difference between Eliezer and seed AI: Eliezer can't rewrite his own source code.

I volunteer as an AI. I'll put up $15 of my own money as a handicap, provided that I am assured in advance that the outcome will be mentioned in a post on OB. (This isn't for self-promotion; it's just that it isn't worth my time or money if nobody is going to hear about the result.) I'm willing to let the transcript be public if the gatekeeper is similarly willing.

1. I really like this blog, and have been lurking here for a few months.

2. Having said that, Eliezer's carry-on in respect of the AI-boxing issue does him no credit. His views on the feasibility of AI-boxing are only an opinion, he has managed to give it weight in some circles with his 2 heavily promoted "victories" (the 3 "losses" are mentioned far less frequently). By not publishing the transcripts, no lessons of value are taught ("Wow, that Eliezer is smart" is not worth repeating, we already know that). I think the real re... (read more)

Everyone seems to be (correctly) miffed at the lack of a published transcript. Was it EY's intention to suggest that problems with AI-boxing could be simply solved by ensuring that all communications between the AI and the Gatekeeper are made public? Perhaps in real time? That seems absurd, but is pretty much the only salient inference that can be drawn from these facts. Then again, maybe it's not that absurd.

At any rate, like many other commenters I find myself unconvinced that the Cone of Silence is the optimal way to approach the problem. As many have said, there are clear virtues in publicizing the specific human "weakness" exploited by the AI in these cases notwithstanding the hindsight bias effect.

Reading this, I immediately thought of one of the critical moments of John C. Wright's Golden Age trilogy, which if any of you are unfamiliar with involves a transhuman AI that both protagonists know to be overtly hostile attempting to convince them to surrender when it is clearly not in their (pre-persuasion) interests to do so. (That's a rough sketch, at least). In the end, similar to the results of your tests, the AI is able to convince each of them individually to surrender in isolation. But, when they confronted each (individually) convincing argument... (read more)

I think Nathaniel Eliot is the only one here who's hit the nail on the head: the stuff about boxes and gatekeepers is a largely irrelevant veneer over Eliezer's true claim: that he can convince another human to do something manifestly contrary to that human's self-interest, using only two hours and a chat window—and so, a fortiori, that a transhuman AI could do the same. And after all, humans have a huge history of being scammed, seduced, brainwashed, etc.; the only hard part here is the restricted time and method of interaction, and the initial certain... (read more)

So, did any of these ever end up happening? Did any transcripts ever get posted?