Vladimir, many of these anthropic-sounding questions can also translate directly into "What should I expect to see happen to me, in situations where there are a billion X-potentially-mes and one Y-potentially-mes?" If X is a kind of me, I should almost certainly expect to see X; if not, I should expect to see Y. I cannot quite manage to bring myself to dispense with the question "What should I expect to see happen next?" or, even worse, "Why am I seeing something so orderly rather than chaotic?" For example, saying "I only care about people in orderly situations" does not cut it as an explanation - it doesn't seem like a question that I could answer with a utility function.

I have not been able to dissolve "the amount of reality-fluid" without also dissolving my belief that most people-weight is in ordered universes and that most of my futures are in ordered universes, without which I have no explanation for why I find myself in an ordered universe and no expectation of a future that is ordered as well.

In particular, I have not been able to dissolve reality-fluid into my utility function without concluding that, by virtue of caring only about copies of me who win the lottery, I could expect to win the lottery and actually see that as a result.

Robin, the disjunctive support in favor of a Big World is strong enough that I'm willing to call it pretty much a done deal at this point - the strongest pillar being MWI. With regards to MWI, I would suggest that the number of decoherent regions of the configuration space would be vastly larger than the space of possibilities for neurons firing or not firing.