Wright either didn't know or chose to ignore the thinking that led to Asimov's Three Laws. While the laws themselves (that robots must keep humans from coming to harm, obey human orders, and preserve themselves, in that order of priority) are impossible to codify, the underlying insight that we make knives with hilts is sound. Science fiction has a dystopian/idiot inventor streak because that makes it easier to get the plot going.
From another angle, part of sf is amplifying aspects of the real world. We can wreck our lives in a moment of passion or bad judgement, or by following a bad idea repeatedly.
Having to figure out the neuroscience by yourself is not an especially good protection against mistakes. Knowing how to make a change is different from and easier than knowing how to debug a change.
I don't think prohibiting textbooks is necessary or sufficient to give people the pleasure of making major discoveries. Some people are content to solve puzzles, but others don't just want being right, they want to be right about something new. My feeling is that the world is always going to be more complex than what we know about it. I'm hoping that improved tools, including improved cognition, will mean that we'll never run out of new things, including new general principles, to discover.
I agree with Psy-Kosh that advice should and would be available, and also something like therapy if you suspect that you've deeply miscalibrated yourself. However, there is going to more than one system of advice and of therapy because there isn't going to be agreement on what constitutes an improvement.
Excuse me if it's been covered here, but in an environment like that deciding, not just what you want, but what changes turn you into not-you is a hard problem.
An iota of fictional evidence from The Golden Age by John C. Wright:
Is this the best Future we could possibly get to—the Future where you must be absolutely stern and resistant throughout your entire life, because one moment of weakness is enough to betray you to overwhelming temptation?
Such flawless perfection would be easy enough for a superintelligence, perhaps—for a true adult—but for a human, even a hundred-year-old human, it seems like a dangerous and inhospitable place to live. Even if you are strong enough to always choose correctly—maybe you don't want to have to be so strong, always at every moment.
This is the great flaw in Wright's otherwise shining Utopia—that the Sophotechs are helpfully offering up overwhelming temptations to people who would not be at quite so much risk from only themselves. (Though if not for this flaw in Wright's Utopia, he would have had no story...)
If I recall correctly, it was while reading The Golden Age that I generalized the principle "Offering people powers beyond their own is not always helping them."
If you couldn't just ask a Sophotech to edit your neural networks—and you couldn't buy a standard package at the supermarket—but, rather, had to study neuroscience yourself until you could do it with your own hands—then that would act as something of a natural limiter. Sure, there are pleasure centers that would be relatively easy to stimulate; but we don't tell you where they are, so you have to do your own neuroscience. Or we don't sell you your own neurosurgery kit, so you have to build it yourself—metaphorically speaking, anyway—
But you see the idea: it is not so terrible a disrespect for free will, to live in a world in which people are free to shoot their feet off through their own strength—in the hope that by the time they're smart enough to do it under their own power, they're smart enough not to.
The more dangerous and destructive the act, the more you require people to do it without external help. If it's really dangerous, you don't just require them to do their own engineering, but to do their own science. A singleton might be justified in prohibiting standardized textbooks in certain fields, so that people have to do their own science—make their own discoveries, learn to rule out their own stupid hypotheses, and fight their own overconfidence. Besides, everyone should experience the joy of major discovery at least once in their lifetime, and to do this properly, you may have to prevent spoilers from entering the public discourse. So you're getting three social benefits at once, here.
But now I'm trailing off into plots for SF novels, instead of Fun Theory per se. (It can be fun to muse how I would create the world if I had to order it according to my own childish wisdom, but in real life one rather prefers to avoid that scenario.)
As a matter of Fun Theory, though, you can imagine a better world than the Golden Oecumene depicted above—it is not the best world imaginable, fun-theoretically speaking. We would prefer (if attainable) a world in which people own their own mistakes and their own successes, and yet they are not given loaded handguns on a silver platter, nor do they perish through suicide by genie bottle.
Once you imagine a world in which people can shoot off their own feet through their own strength, are you making that world incrementally better by offering incremental help along the way?
It's one matter to prohibit people from using dangerous powers that they have grown enough to acquire naturally—to literally protect them from themselves. One expects that if a mind kept getting smarter, at some eudaimonic rate of intelligence increase, then—if you took the most obvious course—the mind would eventually become able to edit its own source code, and bliss itself out if it chose to do so. Unless the mind's growth were steered onto a non-obvious course, or monitors were mandated to prohibit that event... To protect people from their own powers might take some twisting.
To descend from above and offer dangerous powers as an untimely gift, is another matter entirely. That's why the title of this post is "Devil's Offers", not "Dangerous Choices".
And to allow dangerous powers to be sold in a marketplace—or alternatively to prohibit them from being transferred from one mind to another—that is somewhere in between.
John C. Wright's writing has a particular poignancy for me, for in my foolish youth I thought that something very much like this scenario was a good idea—that a benevolent superintelligence ought to go around offering people lots of options, and doing as it was asked.
In retrospect, this was a case of a pernicious distortion where you end up believing things that are easy to market to other people.
I know someone who drives across the country on long trips, rather than flying. Air travel scares him. Statistics, naturally, show that flying a given distance is much safer than driving it. But some people fear too much the loss of control that comes from not having their own hands on the steering wheel. It's a common complaint.
The future sounds less scary if you imagine yourself having lots of control over it. For every awful thing that you imagine happening to you, you can imagine, "But I won't choose that, so it will be all right."
And if it's not your own hands on the steering wheel, you think of scary things, and imagine, "What if this is chosen for me, and I can't say no?"
But in real life rather than imagination, human choice is a fragile thing. If the whole field of heuristics and biases teaches us anything, it surely teaches us that. Nor has it been the verdict of experiment, that humans correctly estimate the flaws of their own decision mechanisms.
I flinched away from that thought's implications, not so much because I feared superintelligent paternalism myself, but because I feared what other people would say of that position. If I believed it, I would have to defend it, so I managed not to believe it. Instead I told people not to worry, a superintelligence would surely respect their decisions (and even believed it myself). A very pernicious sort of self-deception.
Human governments are made up of humans who are foolish like ourselves, plus they have poor incentives. Less skin in the game, and specific human brainware to be corrupted by wielding power. So we've learned the historical lesson to be wary of ceding control to human bureaucrats and politicians. We may even be emotionally hardwired to resent the loss of anything we perceive as power.
Which is just to say that people are biased, by instinct, by anthropomorphism, and by narrow experience, to underestimate how much they could potentially trust a superintelligence which lacks a human's corruption circuits, doesn't easily make certain kinds of mistakes, and has strong overlap between its motives and your own interests.
Do you trust yourself? Do you trust yourself to know when to trust yourself? If you're dealing with a superintelligence kindly enough to care about you at all, rather than disassembling you for raw materials, are you wise to second-guess its choice of who it thinks should decide? Do you think you have a superior epistemic vantage point here, or what?
Obviously we should not trust all agents who claim to be trustworthy—especially if they are weak enough, relative to us, to need our goodwill. But I am quite ready to accept that a benevolent superintelligence may not offer certain choices.
If you feel safer driving than flying, because that way it's your own hands on the steering wheel, statistics be damned—
—then maybe it isn't helping you, for a superintelligence to offer you the option of driving.
Gravity doesn't ask you if you would like to float up out of the atmosphere into space and die. But you don't go around complaining that gravity is a tyrant, right? You can build a spaceship if you work hard and study hard. It would be a more dangerous world if your six-year-old son could do it in an hour using string and cardboard.