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Eliezer_Yudkowsky comments on Free to Optimize - Less Wrong

25 Post author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 02 January 2009 01:41AM

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Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 04 January 2009 07:54:53PM 6 points [-]

Toby Ord: "Fun" in the sense of "Fun Theory" is about eudaimonia and value, so to me it seems quite fair to say that you can be in an identical brain-state but be having different amounts of Fun, depending on whether the girl you're in love with is a real person or a nonsentient puppet. This is a moral theory about what should be fun, not an empirical theory of a certain category of human brain states. If you want to study the latter you go off and do the neurology of happiness, but if that's your moral theory of value then it implies simple wireheading.

Comment author: diegocaleiro 22 November 2010 10:18:52PM 0 points [-]

If you know the girl is merely virtual, then you are not in the same brain state.

Fun is intrinsic, as opposed to Putnam's views on intentional states.

Comment author: CronoDAS 22 November 2010 10:50:40PM 4 points [-]

If you know the girl is merely virtual, then you are not in the same brain state.

That's true, but it's also irrelevant.

Comment author: diegocaleiro 22 November 2010 11:31:59PM 1 point [-]

It is not irrelevant for the point Toby Ord was making. He was considering it odd that Eliezer takes properties which are not intrinsic to one's brain states as increasing or decreasing the amount of fun.

Most people (myself included) consider that the amount of fun you are having is completely determined by the sum of brain states you have in a time interval.

So my comment is relevant in that if Eliezer had misconceived the possibility of having two different beliefs while having the same brain state (in which case I would recommend reading Dennett's "Beyond Belief" his best article) he can retract his misconception, state his new position, and give Ord a chance to agree or disagree with his coherent position.

Comment author: CronoDAS 23 November 2010 04:33:24AM 6 points [-]

Most people (myself included) consider that the amount of fun you are having is completely determined by the sum of brain states you have in a time interval.

Eliezer is using "Fun" to mean something other than what you are.

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 23 November 2010 02:27:36AM 10 points [-]

And if you don't know? I care about possibilities where bad things happen without my knowing about them, I would not choose to have the knowledge erased from my brain and call it a success.

Comment author: diegocaleiro 23 November 2010 02:42:54AM *  -1 points [-]

Yes, and so do I.

That means solely that your conception of success/failure does not overlap your conception of fun/not fun.

Which is great, though it makes FAI harder.

Personally, I value Fun, Individuality, and Complexity as primitively valuable.

Maybe a suggestion would be to dismember your conception of "success" into a part which is composed of fun, and a part composed of something else.

This would make it easier to know what else, besides Fun, is worth having in your own conception.

You've said "humanity coud, just, you know, live and have fun" but it seems here that you do value something else but your own fun, which is that your fun is about reality.