Hold on, Johnicholas, isn´t there a slip in the calculation concerning the third reader, case 4? You say
...but shouldn't this produce the answer (3:8) rather than (6:1)? The conclusion seems to be that as long as either the score is tied or "down" leads by one, readers will keep on voting according to their judgement, while as soon as either "up" leads by one or "down" leads by one, the next reader and all the following will ignore their judgements and follow suit.
Slightly more complicated, but still a great example!
You are ENTIRELY CORRECT! I am embarrassed and I apologize.
I juggled the numbers repeatedly, trying to get a brief example that only uses numbers, not symbols; when it seemed like I had succeeded, I stopped.
I'll think about how to correct the post.
An information cascade is a problem in group rationality. Wikipedia has excellent introductions and links about the phenomenon, but here is a meta-ish example using likelihood ratios.
Suppose in some future version of this site, there are several well-known facts:
Let's talk about how the very first reader would vote. If they judged the post high quality, then they would multiply the prior likelihood ratio (6:4) times the bayes factor for a high private signal (4:1), get (6*4:4*1) = (6:1) and vote the post up. If they judged the post low quality then they would instead multiply by the bayes factor for a low private signal (1:4), get (6*1:4*4) = (3:8) and vote the post down.
There were two scenarios for the first reader (private information high or low). If we speculate that the first reader did in fact vote up, then there are two scenarios for the second scenario: There are two scenarios for the second reader:
Note that now there are two explanations for ending up two votes up. It could be that the second reader actually agreed, or it could be that the second reader was following the first reader and the prior against their personal judgement. That means that the third reader gets zero information from the second reader's personal judgement! The two scenarios for the third reader, and every future reader, are exactly analogous to the two scenarios for the second reader.
This has been a nightmare scenario of groupthink afflicting even diligent bayesians. Possible conclusions:
Note: Olle found an error that necessitated a rewrite. I apologize.