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AdeleneDawner comments on A social norm against unjustified opinions? - Less Wrong
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Agreed, absolutely. I have nothing against hearing about people's half-baked theories - something about the theory or their logic may turn out to be useful, or give me an idea about something else, even if the theory is wrong. But it'd be nice to be able to ask "so why do you think that?" without risking an unpleasant reaction. It might even lead me to figure out that some idea that I would have otherwise dismissed is actually correct!
Most people don't derive their conclusions from reasons. They establish conclusions, then go searching for 'reasons' to cite.
Asking for the reasons for the conclusion, in a way that indicates the conclusion ought to follow from them, is perceived by most people as an attack.
The only way not to risk receiving an unpleasant reaction is to avoid talking to such people.
Yes, but maybe if there was a social norm such that if I asked that and they couldn't answer, they would take the social-status hit, instead of me, they wouldn't act that way.
Social pressure is pretty much the only thing that can force normal people to acknowledge failures of rationality, in my experience. In a milieu in which a rationalization of that failure will be accepted or even merely tolerated, they'll short-circuit directly to explaining the failure away rather than forcing themselves to acknowledge the problem.
Yeah, it'd be nice, but it's probably not going to happen.
Yes, I was giving people too much credit again, wasn't I?
It took me years to even recognize that I was doing that, and I still haven't managed to stop completely.
One obstacle: as long as they aren't expected to produce obvious results to meet your expectations, people really, really like being given too much credit. And they really, really dislike being given precisely enough credit when they're nothing special, even if it lets them off the hook.
Many of my social 'problems' began once I recognized that other people didn't think like I did, and were usually profoundly stupid. That's not a recognition that lends itself to frictionless interaction with others.
This little tidbit highlights so much of what's wrong with this community:
"Many of my social 'problems' began once I recognized that other people didn't think like I did, and were usually profoundly stupid. That's not a recognition that lends itself to frictionless interaction with others."
You'd think a specimen of your gargantuan brainpower would have the social intelligence to handily conceal your disdain for the commonfolk. Perhaps it's some sort of signaling?
I think you're underestimating the degree of social intelligence required. To pull that off while still keeping the rationalistic habits that such people find offensive, you'd have to:
You'd also probably have to at least to some degree integrate the idea that it's 'okay' (not correct, just acceptable) to be irrational into your general thought process, to avoid unintentional signaling that you think poorly of them. If anything, irrational people are more likely to notice such subtle signals, since so much of their communication is based on them.
Or, you could just treat the existence of irrationality as a mere fact, like the fact that water freezes or runs downhill. Facts are not a matter of correctness or acceptability, they just are.
In fact (no pun intended), assigning "should-ness" to facts or their opposites in our brains is a significant force in our own irrationality. To say that people "should" be rational is like saying that water "should" run uphill - it says more about your value system than about the thing supposedly being pointed to.
Functionally, beliefs about "should" and "should not" assign aversive consequences to current reality - if I say water "should" run uphill, then I am saying that is is bad that it does not. The practical result of this is to incur an aversive emotional response every time I am exposed to the fact that water runs downhill -- a response which does not benefit me in any way.
A saner, E-prime-like translation of "water should run uphill" might be, "I would prefer that water ran uphill". My preference is just as unlikely to be met in that case, but I do not experience any aversion to the fact that reality does not currently match my preference. And I can still experience a positive emotional response from, say, crafting nice fountains that pump water uphill.
It seems to me that a rationalist would experience better results in life if he or she did not experience aversive emotions from exposure to common facts... such as the fact that human beings run on hardware that's poorly designed for rationality.
Without such aversions, it would be unnecessary to craft complex strategies to avoid signaling them to others. And, equally important, having aversive responses to impersonal facts is a strong driver of motivated reasoning that's hard to detect in ourselves!
Good summary; the confusion of treating natural mindless phenomena with intentional stance was addressed in the Three Fallacies of Teleology post.
When it is possible to change the situation, emotion directed the right way acts as reinforcement signal, and helps to learn the correct behavior (and generally to focus on figuring out a way of improving the situation). Attaching the right amount of right emotions to the right situations is an indispensable tool, good for efficiency and comfort.
That's just what I was trying to get at. Thanks for the clarification.
The problems you cite in bullets are only nontrivial if you don't sufficiently value social cohesion. My biggest faux pas have sufficiently conditioned me to make them less often because I put a high premium on that cohesion. So I think it's less a question of social intelligence and more one of priorities. I don't have to keep "constant focus" - after a few faux pas it becomes plainly apparent which subjects are controversial and which aren't, and when we do come around to touchy ones I watch myself a little more.
I thought I would get away with that simplification. Heh.
Those skills do come naturally to some people, but not everyone. They certainly don't come naturally to me. Even if I'm in a social group with rules that allow me to notice that a faux pas has occurred (not all do; some groups consider it normal to obscure such things to the point where I'll find out weeks or months later, if at all), it's still not usually obvious what I did wrong or what else I could do instead, and I have to intentionally sit down and come up with theories that I may or may not even have a chance to test.
Social cohesion is one of the enemies of rationality.
It's not necessarily so in that it's not always opposed to it, but it is incompatible with the mechanisms that bring it about and permit it to error-correct. It tends to reinforce error. When it happens to reinforce correctness, it's not needed, and when it doesn't, it makes it significantly harder to correct the errors.
I disagree. It is rational to exploit interpersonal communication for clarity between persons and comfortable use. If the 'language of rationality' can't be understood by the 'irrational people', it is rational to translate best you can, and that can include utilizing societal norms. (For clarity and lubrication of the general process.)
Yes, I agree - my point was that the skill of translating is a difficult one to acquire, not that it's irrational to acquire it.
I agree here: Reading stuff like this totally makes me cringe. I don't know why people of above average intelligence want to make everyone else feel like useless proles, but it seems pretty rampant. Some humility is probably a blessing here, I mean, as frustrating as it is to deal with the 'profoundly stupid', at least you yourself aren't profoundly stupid.
Of course, they probably think given the same start the 'profoundly stupid' person was given, they would have made the best of it and would be just as much of a genius as they are currently.
It's a difficult realization, when you become aware you're more intelligent then average, to be dropped into the pool with a lot of other smart people and realize you really aren't that special. I mean, in a world of some six billion odd, if you are a one-in-a-million genius, that still means you likely aren't in the top hundred smartest people in the world and probably not in the top thousand. It kind of reminds me of grad school stories I've read, with kids who think they are going to be a total gift to their chosen subject ending up extremely cynical and disappointed.
I think people online like to exaggerate their eccentricity and disregard for societal norms in an effort to appeal to the stereotypes for geniuses. I've met a few real geniuses IRL and I know you can be a genius without being horribly dysfunctional.
Rationality and intelligence are not the same thing - I've seen plenty of discussions here despairing about the existence of obviously-intelligent people, masters in their fields, who haven't decided to practice rationality. I also know people who are observably less intelligent than I am, who practice rationality about as well as I do. One major difference between people in that latter group, and people who are not practicing rationality, no matter what the irrational peoples' intelligence levels are, is that those people don't get offended when someone points out a flaw in their reasoning, just as I don't get offended when they, or even people who are not practicing rationality, point out a flaw in mine. People who are less intelligent will probably progress more slowly with rationality, as with any mental skill-set, but that's not under discussion here. The irrational unwillingness to accept criticism is.
Being called 'profoundly stupid' is not exactly a criticism of someone's reasoning. (Not that anybody was called that.) I think we're objecting to this because of how it'll offend people outside of the 'in group' anyway. Besides that, As much as we might wish we were immune to the emotional shock or glee at our thoughts and concepts being ridiculed or praised. I think it would be a rarity here to find someone who didn't. People socializing and exchanging ideas is a type of system -- It has to be understood and used effectively in order to produce the best results -- and calling, essentially, everybody who disagrees with you 'profoundly stupid' is not good social lubrication.
Isn't it obvious? Almost everyone is a "useless prole", as you put it, and even the people who aren't have to sweat blood to avoid that fate.
Recognizing that unpleasant truth is the first step towards becoming non-useless - but most people can't think usefully enough to recognize it in the first place, so the problem perpetuates itself.
I know I'm usually a moron. I've also developed the ability to distinguish quality thinking from moronicity, which makes it possible for me to (slowly, terribly slowly) wean myself away from stupid thinking and reinforce what little quality I can produce. That's what makes it possible for me to occasionally NOT be a moron, at least at a rate greater than chance alone would permit.
It's the vast numbers of morons who believe they're smart, reasonable, worthwhile people that are the problem.
I was reading around on the site today, and I think I've figured out why this attitude sends me running the other way. What clued me in was Eliezer's description of Spock in his post "Why Truth? And...".
Eliezer's point there is that Spock's behavior goes against the actual ideals of rationality, so people who actually value rationality won't mimic him. (He's well enough known that people who want to signal that they're rational will likely mimic him, and people who want to both be and signal being rational will probably mimic him in at least some ways, and also note that the fact that reversed stupidity is not intelligence is relevant.)
It may come as a shock, but in my case, being rational is not my highest priority. I haven't actually come up with a proper wording for my highest priority yet, but one of my major goals in pursuing that priority is to facilitate a universal ability for people to pursue their own goals (with the normal caveats about not harming or overly interfering with other people, of course). One of the primary reasons I pursue rationality is to support that goal. I suspect that this is not an uncommon kind of reason for pursuing rationality, even here.
As I mentioned in the comment that I referenced, I've avoided facing the fact that most people prefer not to pursue rationality, because it appears that that realization leads directly to the attitude you're showing here, and I can reasonably predict that if I were to have the attitude you're showing here, I would no longer support the idea that everyone should have as much freedom as can be arranged, and I don't want to do that. Very few people would want to take the pill that'd turn them into a psychopath, even if they'd be perfectly okay with being a psychopath after they took the pill.
But there's an assumption going on in there. Does accepting that fact actually have to lead to that attitude? Is it impossible to be an x-rationalist and still value people?
Annoyance, you're still dodging the question. Joe didn't ask whether or not in your opinion everyone is a useless prole, he asked why it's useful to make people feel like that. Your notion that "social cohesion is the enemy of rationality" was best debunked, I think by pjeby's point here:
http://lesswrong.com/lw/za/a_social_norm_against_unjustified_opinions/rrk
more flies with honey and all that.
Or perhaps simply the recognition that it's sometimes impossible to fluff other people's egos and drive discussion along rational paths at the same time.
If people become offended when you point out weaknesses in their arguments - if they become offended if you even examine them and don't automatically treat their ideas as inherently beyond reproach - there's no way to avoid offending them while also acting rationally. It becomes necessary to choose.
Really? Have you tried, maybe, just not pointing out the weaknesses in their arguments? Mightn't that be the rational thing to do? Just a polite smile and nod, or a gentle, "Have you considered some alternative?" Or even, "You may well be right." (This is true of pretty much any non-contradictory statement.) Or there are many different ways to argue with someone without being confrontational. Asking curious-sounding questions works fairly well.
It's generally easy to recognize how well a person will react to an argument against him. If you have basic people skills, you'll be able to understand what type of argument/approach will communicate your point effectively, and when you simply don't have a chance. The idea that it's necessary to offend people to act rationally seems completely absurd (at least in this context). If it's going to offend them, it's going to accomplish the opposite of your goal, so, rationally, you shouldn't do it.
This whole discussion reminds me of the Dave Barry quote that may well have been used earlier on this site:
"I argue very well. Ask any of my remaining friends. I can win an argument on any topic, against any opponent. People know this, and steer clear of me at parties. Often, as a sign of their great respect, they don't even invite me."
This. Is. Not. Winning.
I was going to say "there are more workarounds than you think", but that's probably my selection bias talking again. That said, there are workarounds, in some situations. It's still not a trivial thing to learn, though.
It's not just nontrivial, it's incredibly hard. Engaging "system 2" reasoning takes a lot of effort, lowering sensitivity to, and acute awareness of, social cues and signals.
The mindset of "let's analyze arguments to find weaknesses," aka Annoynance's "rational paths," is a completely different ballgame than most people are willing to play. Rationalists may opt for that game, but they can't win, and may be reinforcing illogical behavior. Such a rationalist is focused on whether arguments about a particular topic are valid and sound, not the other person's rational development. If the topic is a belief, attempting to reason it out with the person is counterproductive. Making no ground when engaging with people on a topic should be a red flag: "maybe I'm doing the wrong thing."
Does anyone care enough for me to make a post about workarounds? Maybe we can collaborate somehow Adelene, I have a little experience in this area.
No kidding.
My sanity-saver ... but obviously not rationality-saver... has been to learn to encourage the people I'm dealing with to be more rational, at least when dealing with me. My inner circle of friends is made up almost entirely of people who ask themselves and each other that kind of question just as a matter of course, now, and dissect the answers to make sure they're correct and rational and well-integrated with the other things we know about each other.
That doesn't help at all when I'm trying to think about society in general, though.
And worse, they can cite completely incoherent "reasons", which can be observed by noting that the sequence resulting from repeated application of "what do you mean by X" basically diverges. It reminds me of the value "bottom" in a lifted type system. It denotes an informationless "result", such as that of a non-terminating computation.