Vladimir_Nesov comments on Post Your Utility Function - Less Wrong

28 Post author: taw 04 June 2009 05:05AM

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Comment author: pjeby 10 June 2009 03:14:40AM *  1 point [-]

I would choose (A) without hesitation.

Of course, because the immediate pain of the thought of choosing B would outweigh the longer-term lesser pain of the thought of losing contact with your sister.

This has nothing to do with whether the events actually occur, and everything to do with your mapping of the experience of the conditions, as you imagine them for purposes of making a decision.

That is, the model you make of the future may refer to a hypothetical reality, but the thing you actually evaluate is not that reality, but your own reaction to that reality -- your present-tense experience in response to a constructed fiction made of previous experiences

It so happens that there is some correspondence between this (real) process and the way we would prefer to think we establish and evaluate our preferences. Specifically, both models will generate similar results, most of the time. It's just that the reasons we end up with for the responses are quite different.

There's a very real and valid sense in which our minds oppose what they calculate (by the current map) to be divergences between the future map and the territory.

But calling that latter concept "territory" is still a category error, because what you are using to evaluate it is still your perception of how you would experience the change.

We do not have preferences that are not about experience or our emotional labeling thereof; to the extent that we have "rational" preferences it is because they will ultimately lead to some desired emotion or sensation.

However, our brains are constructed in such a way so as to allow us to plausibly overlook and deny this fact, so that we can be honestly "sincere" in our altruism... specifically by claiming that our responses are "really" about things outside ourselves.

For example, your choice of "A" allows you to self-signal altruism, even if your sister would actually prefer death to being imprisoned on Mars for the rest of her life! Your choice isn't about making her life better, it's about you feeling better for the brief moment that you're aware you did something.

(That is, if you cared about something closer to the reality of what happens to your sister, rather than your experience of it, you'd have hesitated in that choice long enough to ask Omega whether she would prefer death to being imprisoned on Mars.)

Comment author: Cyan 10 June 2009 03:49:29AM *  2 points [-]

That is, the model you make of the future may refer to a hypothetical reality, but the thing you actually evaluate is not that reality, but your own reaction to that reality -- your present-tense experience in response to a constructed fiction made of previous experiences.

I affirm this, but it does not follow that:

This has nothing to do with whether the events actually occur...

Just because the events that occur are not the proximate cause of an experience or preference does not mean that these things have nothing to do with external reality. This whole line of argument ignores the fact that our experience of life is entangled with the territory, albeit as mediated by our maps.

Comment author: pjeby 10 June 2009 05:25:17PM 2 points [-]

Just because the events that occur are not the proximate cause of an experience or preference does not mean that these things have nothing to do with external reality. This whole line of argument ignores the fact that our experience of life is entangled with the territory, albeit as mediated by our maps.

And a thermostat's map is also "entangled" with the territory, but as loqi pointed out, what it really prefers is only that its input sensor match its temperature setting!

I am not saying there are no isomorphisms between the shape of our preferences and the shape of reality, I am saying that assuming this isomorphism means the preferences are therefore "about" the territory is mind projection.

If you look at a thermostat, you can project that it was made by an optimizing process that "wanted" it to do certain things by responding to the territory, and that thus, the thermostat's map is "about" the territory. And in the same way, you can look at a human and project that it was made by an optimizing process (evolution) that "wanted" it to do certain thing by responding to the territory.

However, the "aboutness" of the thermostat does not reside in the thermostat; it resides in the maker of the thermostat, if it can be said to exist at all! (In fact, this "aboutness" cannot exist, because it is not a material entity; it's a mental entity - the idea of aboutness.)

So despite the existence of inputs and outputs, both the human and the thermostat do their "preference" calculations inside the closed box of their respective models of the world.

It just so happens that humans' model of the world also includes a Mind Projection device, that causes humans to see intention and purpose everywhere they look. And when they look through this lens at themselves, they imagine that their preferences are about the territory... which then keeps them from noticing various kinds of erroneous reasoning and subgoal stomps.

For that matter, it keeps them from noticing things like the idea that if you practice being a pessimist, nothing good can last for you, because you've trained yourself to find bad things about anything. (And vice versa for optimists.)

Ostensibly, optimism and pessimism are "about" the outside world, but in fact, they're simply mechanical, homeostatic processes very much like a thermostat.

I am not a solipsist nor do I believe people "create your own reality", with respect to the actual territory. What I'm saying is that people are deluded about the degree of isomorphism between their preferences and reality, because they confuse the map with the territory. And even with maximal isomorphism between preference and reality, they are still living in the closed box of their model.

It is reasonable to assume that existence actually exists, but all we can actually reason about is our experience of it, "inside the box".