Under the premise of spacetime being a static and eternal thing, doesn‘t any line of thought trying to answer this question necessarily make any intuitive notions of identity and the passing of time illusionary?
Illusory in what sense? The underlying laws of our universe are time symmetric, but the second law of thermodynamics means that entropy increases as you move away in time from a set low-entropy point (the big bang). This means that predicting bits at t+1 from bits at t tends to be a much more difficult exercise than predicting bits at t−1 from bits at t. Large amounts of detailed information (entropy) about t−1 can, with some tricks, often be read off from t with little computational effort. "Memory" is one way to do this.
There are fewer ways to read off lots of information about t+1 cheaply from t. It is only possible in some very specific situations. You could, for example, look at a couch in a windowless room at time t, and commit to look at that exact couch from that exact position at that exact angle again one week later. This would let you pretty reliably infer a large batch of future visual bits. But such techniques do not tend to generalise well, you can't do this for arbitrary future visual information the way you can use "memory" to do so for a wide class of past visual information. Thermodynamics means the trick only works one way, for bits that are closer in time to the big bang. To do the same for future bits is theoretically possible, but it typically requires different techniques and a far, far larger compute investment.
For an observer operating under such physics, it is useful to conceptualise the world as consisting of a "past" that has "already happened", and is thus amendable to inference through techniques like memory, a "future" that has "yet to happen" and is more uncertain, and a kind of "present", where these regimes meet, close to which techniques for inference from both regimes tend to be most efficient, and where information can be processed directly, because physics is local in time as well as space. Thus memory from t−ϵ with ϵ<<1 tends to be easier to protect from degradation than memory at t−1, computing bit predictions for t+ϵ tends to cost way less than for t+1, and so on.
If you look at an intelligence inside such local physics, you will see that its internals at any point in time t tend to be busy computing stuff about t, the "present moment" which the computation can locally operate on and affect, and which can often take in information from the "past", especially the "recent past" fairly easily, but has a harder time taking in information from the future, to the point that doing so usually involves totally different algorithms which feel totally different. So it feels to the computation at t that "it exists", "now".
I wouldn't really call this an illusion, except in the sense that "trees" are an illusion. A tree is fundamentally just some quantum field excitations from a particular class of excited states inside a finite 4D volume. But its medium scale, medium-range interactions with baryonic matter are often pretty well described by the human concept of "tree".
Likewise, dividing time into a "future", which has "yet to happen", a "past", which "has happened", and a "present", which "is happening", is a leaky abstraction of the underlying laws about performing inference and decision computations in a physics with locality, the second law of thermodynamics, and a low-entropy state at some t0 (big bang). It's not precise, but a good approximation under many circumstances.
Imagine someone in the desert thinks they see an oasis. If it is actually a mirage, I'd say it makes sense to call the oasis an illusion. If it is an actual oasis, I don't think the moniker illusion is apt just because oases are really an imperfect abstraction of particular quantum field configurations.
"Now" is the time at which you can make interventions. Subjective experience lines up with that because it can't be casually compatible with being in the future, and it maximizes the info available to make the decision with. Or rather, approximately maximizes subject to processing constraints: things get weird if you start really trying to ask whether "now" is "now" or "100 ms ago".
That's sort of an answer that seems like it depends on a concept of free will, though. To which my personal favorite response is... how good is your understanding of counterfactuals? Have you written a program that tries to play a two-player game, like checkers or go? If you have, you'll discover that your program is completely deterministic, yet has concepts like "now" and "if I choose X instead of Y" and they all just work.
Build an intuitive understanding of how that program works, and how it has both a self-model and understanding of counterfactuals while being deterministic in a very limited domain, and you'll be well under way to dissolving this confusion. (Or at least, I've spent a bunch of hours on such programs and I find the analogy super useful; YMMV and I'm probably typical-minding too much here.)
I could not really make sense of your comment, though I had actually done what you proposed a couple of years ago, until I had read Lucius Bushnaq‘s comment. Did that imply what you were trying to tell me or is there another aspect to what you call an intuitive understanding?