Eliezer, are you by any chance a fan of the Silent Hill videogame franchise? Those zombie nurses strongly remind me of those games.

This needs to be turned into a short film. Now!

Hopefully Anonymous, if you think a point should be addressed, make that point.

I say Eliezer has finally dealt with the zombie issue as it deserves.

It's a silly idea that invites convoluted discussion, which makes it look sophisticated and hard to refute.

You don't seem to be addressing the strongest discussions of uncertainty regarding the subjective conscious experience,

Oh? And what are those, exactly? Be specific.

Our universe does not contain 'subjective' things, at least in the formal sense of the word. It contains only objective things, some of which are more or less accessible to limited human perception / technological detection.

The zombie idea isn't only wrong. It's also stupid. If you can't inhibit your innate sense that "minds are magic" long enough to recognize that your intuition is baseless and rather silly, you have utterly failed as an intellectual being.

Oh, and before I forget: the definition of epiphenomenalism

Please note that by this definition, declaring an epiphenomenon to be real has absolutely no implications for 'material reality' that declaring it to be unreal doesn't also have, and vice versa. In other words, it doesn't exist relative to material reality at all.

Trying to use it to explain the properties of material reality is therefore pointless.

"There exist sophisticated arguments for philosophical zombies, but I won't tell you them!"

However, I also agree that enough attention has been paid to zombies, except for me it's on the basis that they're badly-founded from the start. However, a movie about an epiphenomenal virus is, in fact, far too funny not to enjoy. My only complaint is that the philosophers use real words, when we all know that real philosophers speak badly-mangled Latin mixed with made-up words.

This was very funny...

On more serious not, there is nothing wrong with zombie argument. It just says that physicalism claims that you can a priori deduce the facts about conscious experience (e.g. if there is conscious experience/exactly what kind of conscious experience there is) from the physical facts about the system. Notice that 'a priori'. So, it is not just that we can come to know which physical facts are correlated with what facts about consciousness, or which physical phenomenon gives rise to consciousness, but that we can deduce like we deduce m... (read more)

Best exchange:

GENERAL FRED: Are you sure?

SCIENTIST: As sure as we can be in the total absence of evidence.Brutal.

Tanasije Gjorgoski, I don't quite understand the argument. Science doesn't "a priori deduce facts." It generates and tests explanatory structures that purport to account for observed regularities. Physicalism (ontological naturalism) isn't an a priori theory of scientific methodology; it's an induction from the success of the scientific project. (Science generally proceeds within a physicalist framework because physicalism has worked... (read more)

Caledonian: "___ isn't only wrong. It's also stupid."

"If you can't _, you have utterly failed as an intellectual being."

Brian Jaress: "I say Eliezer has finally dealt with the ___ issue as it deserves. It's a silly idea that invites convoluted discussion"

Dan: "However, I also agree that enough attention has been paid to _, except for me it's on the basis that they're badly-founded from the start."

These type posts are part of why I suspect this whole string of posts has its root in foil-seeking, more than enlightenmen... (read more)

Hi Q,

Science doesn't, and naturalism doesn't (commit to the claim that one can a priori get from physical facts to the facts about consciousness). But that is THE commitment of physicalism. Physicalism is not equal to science. It is just yet another metaphysical position. Physicalist's position is usually defined that metaphysically there is no difference without metaphysical difference. And the metaphysical necessity is a priori necessity. (Some try to say that physicalism doesn't need to claim a priori necessity, but only Kripkean a posteriori necessity,... (read more)

Oops, that should be "metaphysically, there is no difference without physical difference". Sorry about that.

Laughed VERY loud here. And the zombie nurses picture was priceless. Big fan of Silent Hill here, as my nickname can attest...

HA: I think there's sort of a boundary between what you mean and what people are reading from your comments. Specifically, I don't know that you and the people you're arguing with mean the same things when you say "zombie", which kind of messes things up. Your definition of zombie appears to be nonstandard, and also really vague as expressed. I think the biggest problem, though, is that other people assume you mean one thing (basically the Chalmers version of "zombie") when I don't think that's precisely what you mean. If I've got your ... (read more)

Sorry Dan,

Let me try to explain those words, as they are very important for the zombie-argument to makes sense.

"Metaphysical" when talking about "metaphysical necessity" (or possibility), means that some claim is true, not because it happens to be a fact in this world, but that it is contradictory for it to be otherwise. An example would be e.g. that it is metaphysically necessary that if you have one and one more apple, you have two apples. So, when we talk about this kind of metaphysical necessities, we can have as examples truths fro... (read more)

"[Physicalism] is just yet another metaphysical position."

I don't think that's correct. Scientists presuppose naturalism when they study a phenomenon. For historical reasons, a special word has been coined for the standard presupposition when it is applied in the context of consciousness. That word is 'physicalism.' In this sense, physicalism is merely a sound methodological induction (as is the subsidiary induction that methodological naturalism tells us something about the likely ontological constitution of the world).

Alternatively, 'physicalis... (read more)

Q,

In most places I've seen where the physicalism was attacked or defended, it was in the terms of the supervenience (i.e. that metaphysically there is no difference without physical difference). Be it when physicalism is being attacked, or really defended by the physicalists. E.g. in relation to the zombie argument, or to the Jackson's knowledge argument.

But if you want to use "physicalism" synonymous with "naturalism", I can't really stop you. I guess we should then distinguish the discussions about "physicalism" in one sens... (read more)

I don't think that's correct. Scientists presuppose naturalism when they study a phenomenon.

What scientists DO presume is that the world can in some measure be described and understood.

Tanasije: That works, yes. Thanks for the clarification.

Grant: I call BS. I've been to open-source conferences, and I've never seen attractive women at them, zombie nurses or otherwise!

maybe Eliezer has acquired groupies?

Dan, If you reread my recent posts, I think you'll find I've already stopped using "zombie" to describe what I'm talking about. Although I suspect many of the posters here have latched onto Chalmer's definition of zombie, not because it makes the most sense or is the most practical definition of the term, but because it makes it an easy foil, for reasons I've described above.

Or maybe it's because that is what the word 'zombie' is used to refer to in philosophy, and trying to redefine the term arbitrarily is pointless.

If you have a different concept you'd like to discuss, use a different term - or provide some good reasons for why you must adopt an already-existing term with an already-existing accepted meaning.

Tanasije, I'd say "Quinean empiricism" plus scientific realism (if I may sum those two) gives you physicalism, or something near enough. In any case, what is "supervenience" if not an account of what metaphysical naturalism is, on the one hand, or an explanation for the success of methodological naturalism, on the other?

(Yes, some scientists are in a sense metaphysically pluralist, since they grant or pressuppose the nonmateriality of abstract objects like mathematical entities or theories [profigately, in my view]. The point here, though, is that with respect to the phenomena they study as scientists, they presuppose physicalism.)

Chalmers gets the attention because his type of argument is both popular with philosophers and full of implied dualism (boo! hissss! dualism!). It's not so much foil-seeking as chasing the red cape, in my opinion. I would choose a nicer metaphor, but I seriously doubt any philosophers involved would change their opinion on the matter for any reason that's anything short of earth-shaking. For instance, if Chalmers caught an epiphenomenal virus ... but, yes, you get the idea.

Q,

I'm not sure you insist of calling this combination "physicalism", contra all those discussions of physicalism in philosophy. First, one can be empiricist and scientific realist, and not be physicalist. For example there is nothing contradictory in thinking that the all the beliefs are revisable in the light of new empirical data, and also believe that sciences give us explanation of the real world, and still not believe that that the mental phenomena can be deduced from the physical facts. Of course you may be a physicalist, who also is scient... (read more)

I'll discuss this further on my blog, including addressing all of Caledonian's concerns in his latest post in this thread (actually, I think I've already done that on my blog), so as not to hijack/flood this thread with further posts.

Make this a South Park episode.

Is there a genre of Daniel Dennett fan fiction yet, or is it still in its infancy?

the story continued...

The XXII World Congress of Philosophy 2008 inaugurated emergency gathering to solve this philosophical zombie problem.

Chalmers: We must find the neural correlates of consciousness.

Searle: No, lock them up in the Chinese room and see if they "understand" Chinese.

Kim: No, we must find the condition for these zombies to supervene consciousness again.

Putnam & Fodor: No, we should make consciousness to be not reducible to physics. Let's make these philosophical zombies multiply realizable!

Paul & Patricia Churchland: It's ... (read more)

Tanasije, you said "Quinean empiricism," not empiricism simpliciter. Quine was at least epistemologically physicalist (to whatever degree physicalism can be so restricted), so I thought adding realism made the point cleanly enough.

Anyway, I'm arguing that the reason successful, productive scientists presume "the world can in some measure be described and understood" is that they presuppose a rough-and-ready physicalism with regard to the phenomenon they study. (As I see it, the lack of any scientifically productive appeal to "intri... (read more)

I think you need to explain what you mean by "physical" facts.

What are some examples of things that you consider physical, and what examples are not? What defines that category and contrasts it with things not within it?

Foil-seeking/attacking soft targets can be useful for clearly demonstrating a point (Follow The Improbability, here).

I still can't stop laughing at "BRIDGING LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY".

The current plotline of Battlestar Galactica is not entirely unlike this movie. Which is one reason I find this allegedly superior show rather unsatisfying.

Haha, this was great. I think you pulled the punch on one of your jokes, though. You should have added, "...at the middle of humanity as we know it."

You mean to tell me that I spent my entire weekend at PenguiCon with... Zombies?! Perhaps it's best that no one else knew, otherwise one particularly trigger-happy member of the panel on "Surviving a Zombie Apocalypse" probably would have shot all attendees in the head at least once, just to be safe.

'mute

It doesn't just appear to be nonsense. It actually is nonsense.

And that is the crux of the problem right there. The intellectual standards of academic philosophy are incredibly low, and as usual the Law of the Minimum applies. It takes real effort to exceed Sturgeon's Law, but the field of philosophy has managed to do so.

Actual philosophical thought, as opposed to mere sophistry with a new hat, comes from people working in disciplines that have high standards for consistency, coherence, and permittable evidence. Their professional work has illuminated ... (read more)

"In this manner, philosophers have demonstrated the dangers of being self-righteous[...]"

Cal, you're really not helping our cause here.

What? They're absurd! Why should we not point, and laugh, at their folly?

For the record, I am no kind of righteous, self- or otherwise.

@ mtraven; can you expand an the similarities between this blog post and BSG? That would be very interesting.

Caledonian, It's possible that you're right, but the evidence increasingly seems to be that you're pretending to knowledge and certainty about both academic philosophy and the physical sciences that's unjustified based on your level of competency or literacy in either field. In that sense, your skepticism about the level of useful contributions to enlightenment by recent academic philosophy could, by your own standards, be reasonably turned towards your skepticism about those claimed contributions.

As for me, I'm woefully illiterate about the recent work of... (read more)

It's possible that you're right, but the evidence increasingly seems to be that you're pretending to knowledge and certainty about both academic philosophy and the physical sciences that's unjustified based on your level of competency or literacy in either field.

Ah, I see where you've become confused. What you're asking for is credentials, not competency. Richard has credentials. I have competency.

The question them becomes: how can one demonstrate competence in the absence of credentials, when your audience doesn't have the level of competence to wh... (read more)

From what I can tell, you are completely ignorant of the field of philosophy and the work that goes on in it;

But you lack the authority to make mere assertions

Caledonian, perhaps if you had taken even a high school philosophy course, you would have learned that to dismiss the worth of philosophy is to engage in philosophy. I'm not sure whether your comments deserve to be ignored or mocked. They're that ridiculous.

OK Caledonian, I think it would help to make explicit your position (others too but first yours) tell me how much I have right....

1) you think that there can be philosophical progress (i.e. not the strong position being argued against above)

2) you think that progress tends not to happen in the field of philosophy (I presume because of how philosophy forms free floating ideas rather than ones 'grounded' by their attachment to empirical evidence)

• the practical implication being that philosophy should no expect answers to some questions before groundwork is

I think there is an equivocation being made between the various usages of 'philosophy', primarily between a type of thought and a profession, and my observation is that those who are professionals supposedly dedicated to that type of thought rarely even try to engage in it, and when they do they're not very good at it. If 'philosophy' is 'what philosophers do', I hold that philosophy is useless in every sense. If 'philosophers' are 'those that practice philosophy', the professionals are almost universally undeserving of that title. In that light:

Yes to #1, YES to #2, no to #3, yes to #4.

I stumbled upon this page, and am new to this site. I love the movie script, but it seems to me that qualiaphobes are making a difficult topic even more difficult than it needs to be. As I see it, 'qualia' is just a term that makes it easier for us to discuss the nature of our experiences. Experience is complex. At any given moment I am aware of many different colors, shapes, sounds, smells, etc. Complexity implies a multitude of elements that constitute a complex system. The constituent elements of a complex system (so far as we are able to identify them)... (read more)

I was just looking around for more Penguicon pictures, and came across this one.

I am amused by the responses to it. ^-^ (And yes, we are from Silent Hill.)

- Amanda, the Zombie Nurse on the right.

This post was just linked to from the Freakonomics blog: http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/17/the-social-upheavalzombie-movie-index/

This, of all the "directed to IQ greater than 125" entities of the world, is the funniest thing I have ever seen. The first time, I cried, fell, laughed, set myself straight, read more, woke up my father, and eventually offered hosting for life for Eliezer, in case he ever came to São Paulo. Now, reading it again, I have laughed, cried, contorted, and am wondering what to eat to celebrate.

Cylons

The front cover of Chalmers' new self-help book... http://www.lulztruck.com/42025/mommy-why-did-you-shoot-daddy-in-the-head-2/

Would David Chambers have written "A P-zombie in Carcosa"?

Personally I enjoyed the movie :) Just because I am consciousness ))

Yeah. This is basically a great summation to the philosophical zombie question; what does it even matter? It's as you mentioned with the dissolving the question posts: what do the pro-zombie people think a world in which they are correct looks like? What do we learn from this thought experiment which is just basically another flavor of solipsism?

I'd say "inevitably generates the worst sort of Mysterious Answer to a Mysterious Question" is pretty spot on. The Zombie thing doesn't really tell us anything new or let us predict anything. Just a bunch of sophistry really.

If you think P-zombies can be equivalent (behaviourally speaking) to conscious beings, try to imagine an 'army' of zombie philosophers like Sam Harris et al, arguing about the meaning and origins of consciousness. Why would zombie 'minds' even raise that topic when by definition don't have an experience of it?