Is there any erratum for the "From AI to Zombies" book? There are so many essays, and many of them are written more than 10 years ago. It seems very likely that since then the errors or imprecisions were discovered.
To be specific, I have a very low belief in the chapter on quantum mechanics. It discusses just Copenhagen and many-worlds interpretation, ignoring all others that were already existing at this moment. What about Quantum Bayesianism, for example?
And two more personal accounts:
1) A couple of years ago I was at the conference, where few talks discussed this quite famous gedankenexperiment. When they were looking at different interpretations, according to them the many-world one was quite vaguely formulated, not allowing to make a definitive answer in the problem they considered.
2) About five years ago I talked with my friend about "From AI to Zombies". He was studying interpretations of quantum mechanics way more than I did. He said something like "Great book but the quantum mechanics chapter is over-simplified".
I don't think he said it clearly, and I don't think he said anything else clearly. Believe it or not, what I am doing is charitable interpretation...I am trying to make sense of what he said. If he thinks Bayes is systematically better than science, that would imply "Bayes is better than science, so replace science with Bayes", because that makes more sense than "Bayes is better than science, so don't replace Science with Bayes". So I think that is what he is probably saying.
Maybe it's Sally Anne fallacy, maybe its charitable interperetation. One should only use charitable interpretation where the meaning is unclear. Sally-Anne is only a fallacy where the meaning is clear.
I am engaging in probablistic reasoning.
Why should I make any attempt to provide evidence, when you are going to reject it out of hand.
No, but he could do a lot better. (An elephant-in-the-room issue here is that even though he is still alive, no-one expects him to pop up and say something that actually clarifies the issue).
It's about the most basic principle of epistemology, and one which the rationalsphere accepts: lucky guesses stopped clocks are not knowledge, even when they are right, because they are not reliable and systematic.
Obviously, that would be the stuff that science is already doing, since EY has argued, at immense length, that it gets quantum mechanics right,.
If there is some objective factor about a person that makes them incapable of understanding Bayes , then a Bayesian should surely identify it. But where else has EY ever so much as hinted that some people are un-Bayesian?
Why do I have to tell you what I think in order for you to tell me what you think?
Here's the exchange:
Me: Do you think LessWrong-at-large currently thinks “individuals should be willing to trust in Bayes over science”?
You: Dunno if you think this either, also probably not super relevant.