This appears to me to be an instance of a common error: assuming that when someone says something, they intended every inference you find it natural to make from it.
It's a common error indeed, and one that is justifiable when enough other people draw that error. Yeah Hitler said to kill all the Jews, but he really meant to kill the Jew inside, not real Jews. If I may quote your other comment:
(I agree that private_messaging's comment is extremely silly, and I regret the fact that what I wrote seems to have encouraged it.)
Indeed.
If you don't especially care what I actually think, then what the hell are you doing putting words into my mouth about how librarians are uninteresting low-status unintellectual drudges? (Which, just in case it needs saying again, in no way resemble my actual opinion.)
Right, because you just threw that in for no reason...
I'm sure you can find definitions according to which Taube's work was "science".
And I even gave several. Feel free to deal with the examples; do you think computer science and AI are not 'science'?
Here's an extreme example: Richard Dawkins is on record as accepting the term "cultural Christian" as applying to him. I would accordingly not say that RD cannot be construed as 'Christian' no matter how broadly defined -- but, none the less, for most purposes describing him as a Christian would be silly.
I don't see what's the least bit silly about describing him a a "cultural Christian" especially if he accepts the label. He was indeed raised in a Christian culture and implicitly accepts a lot of the background beliefs like belief in guilt and sin (heck, I still think in those terms to some degree and say things like 'goddamn it'); even if we don't go quite as far as Moldbug in diagnosing Dawkins as holding to a puritanical secular Christanity, the influence is ineradicable. There is no view from nowhere.
Ian Bostridge has a doctorate in history, and spent some time as an academic historian. However, I would not now call him a historian but a singer. (Or, more specifically, a tenor.)
Wow, so not only is he a trained historian who has published & defended his doctorate of original research, you describe him as actually having been in academia post-graduate school, and you still won't describe him as a historian? Would I describe him as a historian? Heck yes. Because if I won't even grant that description to Bostridge, I don't know who the heck I would grant it to. You know, describing someone as a historian is not committing to describing him as a 'great historian' or a 'ground-breaking historian' or a 'famous historian'. You don't need to be Marvin Minsky to be called 'an AI researcher' and you don't need to be a pre-eminent figure to be described as a worker in a field. Even a bad programmer is still a 'programmer'; someone who has moved up into management is still a programmer even if they haven't written a large program in years.
Angela Merkel has a PhD in physics, but I wouldn't now call her a physicist but a politician (or, perhaps, some more august term along those lines).
From Wikipedia: "After being awarded a doctorate (Dr. rer. nat.) for her thesis on quantum chemistry,[17] she worked as a researcher and published several papers."
But no, all that is chopped liver because gjm doesn't think she's a physicist/chemist.
George Soros has a PhD in philosophy but I wouldn't call him a philosopher.
I imagine Soros would be disappointed to hear that; his Popperian philosophy grounds his 'reflexivity' on which he has written extensively and believes can significantly influence economics as it's currently practiced.
So: no, the fact that someone got a PhD in philosophy in 1935 is not sufficient reason to call them a philosopher in 1960.
It is more than sufficient, Taube had excellent training (the University of Chicago, especially in the 1930s thanks to Adler & Hutchinson, was a philosophy powerhouse, and still is to some extent - ranked #24 in the Anglosphere by Leiter), received his PhD, kept up with the issues both as a practitioner and commenter, and was reportedly working on a philosophy book when he died. He was a philosopher. And your other examples were hardly better.
On flipping the bozo bit
Before you bother to read any of what follows, I would be grateful if you would answer the following question: Have you, in fact, bozo-bitted me? Because I've been proceeding on the assumption that it is in principle possible for us to have a reasoned discussion, but that's looking less and less true, and if I'm wasting my time here then I'd prefer to stop.
On librarians and librarianship
Unless I misunderstand you badly, you are arguing either that I have been lying constantly about this or that I am appallingly unaware of my own opi...
In an erratum to my previous post on Pascalian wagers, it has been plausibly argued to me that all the roads to nuclear weapons, including plutonium production from U-238, may have bottlenecked through the presence of significant amounts of Earthly U235 (apparently even the giant heap of unrefined uranium bricks in Chicago Pile 1 was, functionally, empty space with a scattering of U235 dust). If this is the case then Fermi's estimate of a "ten percent" probability of nuclear weapons may have actually been justifiable because nuclear weapons were almost impossible (at least without particle accelerators) - though it's not totally clear to me why "10%" instead of "2%" or "50%" but then I'm not Fermi.
We're all familiar with examples of correct scientific skepticism, such as about Uri Geller and hydrino theory. We also know many famous examples of scientists just completely making up their pessimism, for example about the impossibility of human heavier-than-air flight. Before this occasion I could only think offhand of one other famous example of erroneous scientific pessimism that was not in defiance of the default extrapolation of existing models, namely Lord Kelvin's careful estimate from multiple sources that the Sun was around sixty million years of age. This was wrong, but because of new physics - though you could make a case that new physics might well be expected in this case - and there was some degree of contrary evidence from geology, as I understand it - and that's not exactly the same as technological skepticism - but still. Where there are sort of two, there may be more. Can anyone name a third example of erroneous scientific pessimism whose error was, to the same degree, not something a smarter scientist could've seen coming?
I ask this with some degree of trepidation, since by most standards of reasoning essentially anything is "justifiable" if you try hard enough to find excuses and then not question them further, so I'll phrase it more carefully this way: I am looking for a case of erroneous scientific pessimism, preferably about technological impossibility or extreme difficulty, where it seems clear that the inverse case for possibility would've been weaker if carried out strictly with contemporary knowledge, after exploring points and counterpoints. (So that relaxed standards for "justifiability" will just produce even more justifiable cases for the technological possibility.) We probably should also not accept as "erroneous" any prediction of technological impossibility where it required more than, say, seventy years to get the technology.