I think there may be something to consider in the idea of having
"Loans where society has promised to go to great lengths to enforce the will of the creditor, even if the debtor's reasons for nonpayment are convincingly sympathetic."
and
"Loans where society may forgive the debt, if the debtor offers a good reason to do so, even if the creditor disagrees with society's judgement on this issue."
be legally distinct types of lending, such that the creditor and the debtor can negotiate on which type it will be without society retroactively altering the agreement. Creditors will of course prefer the first class of loan, but society as a whole would have a preference that many loans of the second type be available for personal emergencies.
such that the creditor and the debtor can negotiate on which type it will be
Why wouldn't the market price these two types more or less efficiently meaning that the second type will have to charge a higher interest rate to compensate for the option of the politicians deciding not to pay the loan back?
Another month, another rationality quotes thread. The rules are: