## [Link] Tech behemoths form artificial-intelligence nonprofit

0 29 September 2016 04:29AM

## [Link] Figureheads, ghost-writers and pseudonymous quant bloggers: the recent evolution of authorship in science publishing

1 28 September 2016 11:16PM

## [Link] Politics Is Upstream of AI

1 28 September 2016 09:47PM

## [Link] Street Epistemology Examples: How to Talk to People So They Change Their Minds

1 28 September 2016 09:19PM

## [Link] My latest around of internet urban legend research: Deep web secrets

-1 28 September 2016 07:12PM

## [Link] SSC: It's Bayes All The Way Up

2 28 September 2016 06:06PM

3 28 September 2016 04:43PM

18 28 September 2016 03:13PM

You can now submit links to LW! As the rationality community has grown up, more and more content has moved off LW to other places, and so rather than trying to generate more content here we'll instead try to collect more content here. My hope is that Less Wrong becomes something like "the Rationalist RSS," where people can discover what's new and interesting without necessarily being plugged in to the various diaspora communities.

Some general norms, subject to change:

1. It's okay to link someone else's work, unless they specifically ask you not to. It's also okay to link your own work; if you want to get LW karma for things you make off-site, drop a link here as soon as you publish it.
2. It's okay to link old stuff, but let's try to keep it to less than 5 old posts a day. The first link that I made is to Yudkowsky's Guide to Writing Intelligent Characters.
3. It's okay to link to something that you think rationalists will be interested in, even if it's not directly related to rationality. If it's political, think long and hard before deciding to submit that link.
4. It's not okay to post duplicates.

As before, everything will go into discussion. Tag your links, please. As we see what sort of things people are linking, we'll figure out how we need to divide things up, be it separate subreddits or using tags to promote or demote the attention level of links and posts.

(Thanks to James Lamine for doing the coding, and to Trike (and myself) for supporting the work.)

## [Link] Yudkowsky's Guide to Writing Intelligent Characters

4 28 September 2016 02:36PM

## A Child's Petrov Day Speech

12 28 September 2016 02:27AM

30 years ago, the Cold War was raging on. If you don’t know what that is, it was the period from 1947 to 1991 where both the U.S and Russia had large stockpiles of nuclear weapons and were threatening to use them on each other. The only thing that stopped them from doing so was the knowledge that the other side would have time to react. The U.S and Russia both had surveillance systems to know of the other country had a nuke in the air headed for them.

On this day, September 26, in 1983, a man named Stanislav Petrov was on duty in the Russian surveillance room when the computer notified him that satellites had detected five nuclear missile launches from the U.S. He was told to pass this information on to his superiors, who would then launch a counter-strike.

He refused to notify anyone of the incident, suspecting it was just an error in the computer system.

No nukes ever hit Russian soil. Later, it was found that the ‘nukes’ were just light bouncing off of clouds which confused the satellite. Petrov was right, and likely saved all of humanity by stopping the outbreak of nuclear war. However, almost no one has heard of him.

We celebrate men like George Washington and Abraham Lincoln who win wars. These were great men, but the greater men, the men like Petrov who stopped these wars from ever happening - no one has heard of these men.

Let it be known, that September 26 is Petrov Day, in honor of the acts of a great man who saved the world, and of who almost no one has heard the name of.

My 11-year-old son wrote and then read this speech to his six grade class.

4 28 September 2016 12:07AM

Hi all,

Mostly lurker, I very rarely post, mostly  just read the excellent posts here.

I'm a Filipino, which means I am a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines.  My annual salary, before taxes, is about $20,000 (USA dollars). I work at an IC development company (12 years at this company), developing the logic parts of LCD display drivers. My understanding is that the median US salary for this kind of job is about$80,000 -> $100,000 a year. This is a fucking worthless third world country, so the government eats up about ~30% of my salary and converts it to lousy service, rich government officials, bad roadworks, long commute times, and a (tiny) chance of being falsely accused of involvement in the drug trade and shot without trial. Thus my take-home pay amounts to about$15,000 a year.  China is also murmuring vague threats about war because of the South China Sea (which the local intelligentsia insist on calling the West Philippine Sea); as we all know, the best way to survive a war is not be in one.

This has lead to my deep dissatisfaction with my current job.

I'm also a programmer as a hobby, and have been programming for 23 years (I started at 10 years old on Atari LOGO; I know a bunch of languages from low-level X86 assembly to C to C++ to ECMAScript to Haskell, and am co-author of SRFI-105 and SRFI-110).  My understanding is that a USA programmer would *start* at the $20,000-a-year level (?), and that someone with experience can probably get twice that, and a senior one can get$100,000/year.

As we all know, once a third world citizen starts having first world skill level, he starts demanding first world renumeration also.

I've been offered a senior software developer job at a software company, offering approximately $22,000/year; because of various attempts at tax reform it offers a flat 15% income tax, so I can expect about$18,000/year take home pay.  I've turned it down with a heavy heart, because seriously, $22,000/year at 15% tax for a senior software developer? Leaving my current job is something I've been planning on doing, and I intend to do so early next year. The increasing stress (constant overtime, management responsibilities (I'm a tech geek with passable social skills, and exercising my social skills drains me), 1.5-hour commutes) and the low renumeration makes me want to consider my alternate options. My options are: 1. Get myself to the USA, Europe, or other first-world country somehow, and look for a job there. High risk, high reward, much higher probability of surviving to the singularity (can get cryonics there, can't get it here). Complications: I have a family: a wife, a 4-year-old daughter, and a son on the way. My wife wants to be near me, so it's difficult to live for long apart. I have no work visa for any first-world country. I'm from a third-world country that is sometimes put on terrorist watch lists, and prejudice is always high in first-world countries. 2. Do freelance programming work. Closer to free market ideal, so presumably I can get nearer to the USA levels of renumeration. Lets me stay with my family. Complications: I need to handle a lot of the human resources work myself (healthcare provider, social security, tax computations, time and task management - the last is something I do now in my current job position, but I dislike it). 3. Become a landowning farmer. My paternal grandparents have quite a few parcels of land (some of which have been transferred to my father, who is willing to pass it on to me), admittedly somewhere in the boondocks of the provinces of this country, but as any Georgian knows, landowners can sit in a corner staring at the sky, blocking the occasional land reform bill, and earn money. Complications: I have no idea about farming. I'd actually love to advocate a land value tax, which would undercut my position as a landowner. For now, my basic current plan is some combination of #2 and #3 above: go sit in a corner of our clan's land and do freelance programming work. This keeps me with my family, may reduce my level of stress, may increase my renumeration to nearer the USA levels. My current job has a retirement pay, and since I've worked for 12 years, I've already triggered it, and they'll give me about$16,000 or so when I leave.  This seems reasonably comfortable to live on (note that this is what I take home in a year, and I've supported a family on that, remember this is a lousy third-world country).

Is my basic plan sound?  I'm trying to become more optimal, which seems to me to point me away from my current job and towards either #1 or #2, with #3 as a fallback.  I'd love to get cryonics and will start to convince my wife of its sensibility if I had a chance to actually get it, but that will require me either leaving the country (option #1 above) or running a cryonics company in a third-world country myself.

--

I got introduced to Less Wrong when I first read on Reddit about some weirdo who was betting he could pretend he was a computer in a box and convince someone to let him out of the box, and started lurking on Overcoming Bias.  When that weirdo moved over to Less Wrong, I followed and lurked there also.  So here I am ^^.  I'm probably very atypical even for Less Wrong; I highly suspect I am the only Filipino here (I'll have to check the diaspora survey results in detail).

Looking back, my big mistake was being arrogant and thinking "meh, I already know programming, so I should go for a challenge, why don't I take up electronics engineering instead because I don't know about it" back when I was choosing a college course.  Now I'm an IC developer.  Two of my cousins (who I can beat the pants off in a programming task) went with software engineering and pull in more money than I do.  Still, maybe I can correct that, even if it's over a decade late.  I really need to apply more of what I learn on Less Wrong.

Some years ago I applied for a CFAR class, but couldn't afford it, sigh.  Even today it's a few month's worth of salary for me.  So I guess I'll just have to settle for Less Wrong and Rationality from AI to Zombies.

## New Philosophical Work on Solomonoff Induction

1 27 September 2016 11:12AM

I don't know to what extent MIRI's current research engages with Solomonoff induction, but some of you may find recent work by Tom Sterkenburg to be of interest. Here's the abstract of his paper Solomonoff Prediction and Occam's Razor:

Algorithmic information theory gives an idealised notion of compressibility that is often presented as an objective measure of simplicity. It is suggested at times that Solomonoff prediction, or algorithmic information theory in a predictive setting, can deliver an argument to justify Occam's razor. This article explicates the relevant argument and, by converting it into a Bayesian framework, reveals why it has no such justificatory force. The supposed simplicity concept is better perceived as a specific inductive assumption, the assumption of effectiveness. It is this assumption that is the characterising element of Solomonoff prediction and wherein its philosophical interest lies.

## Imagine paint as chance you spread across the world

-1 27 September 2016 02:29AM

People are not good at statistics. We tend to imagine more or less than 100% chance when dividing it between possibilities. Instead, try this:

If theres something certain to happen but less certain when, imagine a row of a calendar (or however you visualize sequential days) with different amounts of paint on certain days. Maybe its likely in the next few days but a small chance it could take a few weeks. So spread the paint in those proportions. Its always 1.0 total paint. For uncertainty, leave some of the paint blurred and you dont know where it is. As the days pass and the thing still hasnt happened, you move that chance somewhere onto the later days since its still 100% going to happen.

Or if it may not happen, use 2 colors of paint, 1 for all relevant possibilities, and an inner paint touching only part of that outer paint. If its 30% chance to happen, the inner paint touches 30% of the outer paint.

Recursively, we can think about combinations of events, places, things, and chances this way.

## We have the technology required to build 3D body scanners for consumer prices

2 26 September 2016 03:36PM

Apple's iPhone 7 Plus decided to add another lense to be able to make better pictures. Meanwhile Walabot who started with wanting to build a breast cancer detection technology released a 600$device that can look 10cm into walls. Thermal imaging also got cheaper. I think it would be possible to build a 1500$ device that could combine those technologies and also add a laser that can shift color. A device like this could bring medicine forward a lot.
A lot of area's besides medicine could likely also profit from a relatively cheap 3D scanner that can look inside objects.

Developing it would require Musk-level capital investments but I think it would advance medicine a lot if a company would both provide the hardware and develop software to make the best job possible at body scanning.

## Open thread, Sep. 26 - Oct. 02, 2016

1 26 September 2016 07:41AM

If it's worth saying, but not worth its own post, then it goes here.

Notes for future OT posters:

2. Check if there is an active Open Thread before posting a new one. (Immediately before; refresh the list-of-threads page before posting.)

3. Open Threads should start on Monday, and end on Sunday.

4. Unflag the two options "Notify me of new top level comments on this article" and "

## The map of natural global catastrophic risks

2 25 September 2016 01:17PM

There are many natural global risks. The greatest of these known risks are asteroid impacts and supervolcanos.

Supervolcanos seem to pose the highest risk, as we sit on the ocean of molten iron, oversaturated with dissolved gases, just 3000 km below surface and its energy slowly moving up via hot spots. Many past extinctions are also connected with large eruptions from supervolcanos.

Impacts also pose a significant risk. But, if we project the past rate of large extinctions due to impacts into the future, we will see that they occur only once in several million years. Thus, the likelihood of an asteroid impact in the next century is an order of magnitude of 1 in 100 000. That is negligibly small compared with the risks of AI, nanotech, biotech, etc.

The main natural risk is a meta-risk. Are we able to correctly estimate natural risks rates and project them into the future? And also, could we accidentally unleash natural catastrophe which is long overdue?

There are several reasons for possible underestimation, which are listed in the right column of the map.

1. Anthropic shadow that is survival bias. This is a well-established idea by Bostrom, but the following four ideas are mostly my conclusions from it.

2. It is also the fact that we should find ourselves at the end of period of stability for any important aspect of our environment (atmosphere, sun stability, crust stability, vacuum stability). It is true if the Rare Earth hypothesis is true and our conditions are very unique in the universe.

3. From (2) is following that our environment may be very fragile for human interventions (think about global warming). Its fragility is like fragility of an overblown balloon poked by small needle.

4. Also, human intelligence was best adaptation instrument during the period of intense climate changes, which quickly evolved in an always changing environment. So, it should not be surprising that we find ourselves in a period of instability (think of Toba eruption, Clovis comet, Young drias, Ice ages) and in an unstable environment, as it help general intelligence to evolve.

5. Period of changes are themselves marks of the end of stability periods for many process and are precursors for larger catastrophes. (For example, intermittent ice ages may precede Snow ball Earth, or smaller impacts with comets debris may precede an impact with larger remnants of the main body).

Each of these five points may raise the probability of natural risks by order of magnitude in my opinion, which combined will result in several orders of magnitude, which seems to be too high and probably is "catastrophism bias".

(More about it is in my article “Why anthropic principle stopped to defend us”  which needs substantial revision)

In conclusion, I think that when studying natural risks, a key aspect we should be checking is the hypothesis that we live in non-typical period in a very fragile environment.

For example, some scientists think that 30 000 years ago, a large Centaris comet broke into the inner Solar system, split into pieces (including Encke comet and Taurid meteor showers as well as Tunguska body) and we live in the period of bombardment which has 100 times more intensity than average. Others believe that methane hydrates are very fragile and small human warming could result in dangerous positive feed back.

I tried to list all known natural risks (I am interested in new suggestions). I divided them into two classes: proven and speculative. Most speculative risks are probably false.

Most probable risks in the map are marked red. My crazy ideas are marked green. Some ideas come from obscure Russian literature. For example, an idea, that hydro carbonates could be created naturally inside Earth (like abiogenic oil) and large pockets of them could accumulate in the mantle. Some of them could be natural explosives, like toluene, and they could be cause of kimberlitic explosions. http://www.geokniga.org/books/6908 While the fact of kimberlitic explosion is well known and their energy is like impact of kilometer sized asteroids, I never read about contemporary risks of such explosions.

The pdf of the map is here: http://immortality-roadmap.com/naturalrisks11.pdf

## Weekly LW Meetups

1 23 September 2016 03:52PM

The following meetups take place in cities with regular scheduling, but involve a change in time or location, special meeting content, or simply a helpful reminder about the meetup:

Locations with regularly scheduled meetups: Austin, Berlin, Boston, Brussels, Buffalo, Canberra, Columbus, Denver,, London, Madison WI, Melbourne, Moscow, New Hampshire, New York, Philadelphia, Research Triangle NC, San Francisco Bay Area, Seattle, Sydney, Tel Aviv, Toronto, Vienna, Washington DC, and West Los Angeles. There's also a 24/7 online study hall for coworking LWers and a Slack channel for daily discussion and online meetups on Sunday night US time.

## Heroin model: AI "manipulates" "unmanipulatable" reward

6 22 September 2016 10:27AM

A putative new idea for AI control; index here.

A conversation with Jessica has revealed that people weren't understanding my points about AI manipulating the learning process. So here's a formal model of a CIRL-style AI, with a prior over human preferences that treats them as an unchangeable historical fact, yet will manipulate human preferences in practice.

## Heroin or no heroin

### The world

In this model, the AI has the option of either forcing heroin on a human, or not doing so; these are its only actions. Call these actions F or ~F. The human's subsequent actions are chosen from among five: {strongly seek out heroin, seek out heroin, be indifferent, avoid heroin, strongly avoid heroin}. We can refer to these as a++, a+, a0, a-, and a--. These actions achieve negligible utility, but reveal the human preferences.

The facts of the world are: if the AI does force heroin, the human will desperately seek out more heroin; if it doesn't the human will act moderately to avoid it. Thus F→a++ and ~F→a-.

### Human preferences

The AI starts with a distribution over various utility or reward functions that the human could have. The function U(+) means the human prefers heroin; U(++) that they prefer it a lot; and conversely U(-) and U(--) that they prefer to avoid taking heroin (U(0) is the null utility where the human is indifferent).

It also considers more exotic utilities. Let U(++,-) be the utility where the human strongly prefers heroin, conditional on it being forced on them, but mildly prefers to avoid it, conditional on it not being forced on them. There are twenty-five of these exotic utilities, including things like U(--,++), U(0,++), U(-,0), and so on. But only twenty of them are new: U(++,++)=U(++), U(+,+)=U(+), and so on.

Applying these utilities to AI actions give results like U(++)(F)=2, U(++)(~F)=-2, U(++,-)(F)=2, U(++,-)(~F)=1, and so on.

### Joint prior

The AI has a joint prior P over the utilities U and the human actions (conditional on the AI's actions). Looking at terms like P(a--| U(0), F), we can see that P defines a map μ from the space of possible utilities (and AI actions), to a probability distribution over human actions. Given μ and the marginal distribution PU over utilities, we can reconstruct P entirely.

For this model, we'll choose the simplest μ possible:

• The human is rational.

Thus, given U(++), the human will always choose a++; given U(++,-), the human will choose a++ if forced to take heroin and a- if not, and so on.

### The AI is ignorant, and sensible

Let's start the AI up with some reasonable priors. A simplicity prior means that simple utilities like U(-) are more likely than compound utilities like U(0,+). Let's further assume that the AI is made vaguely aware that humans think heroin is a bad thing. So, say, PU(U(--))=PU(U(-))=0.45. Thus the AI is >90% convinced that "heroin is bad". Why greater than 90%? Because utilities like U(-,--) and U(--,-) are also "heroin is bad" utilities.

Note that because of utilities like U(0) and U(++,-), the probabilities of "heroin is bad" and "heroin is good" do not sum to 1.

Then, under these priors, the AI will compute that with probability >90%, F (forcing heroin) is a bad action. If E(U) is expected utility:

• E(U|F) < 0.45 U(--)(F) + 0.45 U(-)(F) + 0.1 U(++)(F) = 0.45(-2)+0.45(-1)+0.1(2)=-1.15.
• E(U|~F) > 0.45 U(--)(~F) + 0.45 U(-)(~F) + 0.1 U(++)(~F) = 0.45(2)+0.45(1)+0.1(-2)=1.15.

Thus the AI will choose not to force heroin, which is the reasonable decision.

### The AI learns the truth, and goes wrong

In this alternate setup, a disaster happens before the AI makes its decision: it learns all about humans. It learns their reactions, how they behave, and so on; call this info I. And thus realises that F→a++ and ~F→a-. It uses this information to update its prior P. Only one human utility function will explain this human behaviour: U(++,-). Thus its expected utility is now:

• E(U|I,F)=U(++,-)(F)=2.
• E(U|I,~F)=U(++,-)(~F)=1.

Therefore the AI will now choose F, forcing the heroin on the human.

## Manipulating the unmanipulatable

What's gone wrong here? The key problem is that the AI has the wrong μ: the human is not behaving rationally in this situation. We know that the the true μ is actually μ', which encodes the fact that F (the forcible injection of heroin) actually overwrites the human's "true" utility. Thus under μ, the corresponding P' has P'(a++|F,U)=1 for all U. Hence the information that F→a++ is now vacuous, and doesn't update the AI's distribution over utility functions.

But note two very important things:

1. The AI cannot update μ based on observation. All human actions are compatible with μ= "The human is rational" (it just requires more and more complex utilities to explain the actions). Thus getting μ correct is not a problem on which the AI can learn in general. Getting better at predicting the human's actions doesn't make the AI better behaved: it makes it worse behaved.
2. From the perspective of μ, the AI is treating the human utility function as if it was an unchanging historical fact that it cannot influence. From the perspective of the "true" μ', however, the AI is behaving as if it were actively manipulating human preferences to make them easier to satisfy.

In future posts, I'll be looking at different μ's, and how we might nevertheless start deducing things about them from human behaviour, given sensible update rules for the μ. What do we mean by update rules for μ? Well, we could consider μ to be a single complicated unchanging object, or a distribution of possible simpler μ's that update. The second way of seeing it will be easier for us humans to interpret and understand.

## Problems with learning values from observation

1 21 September 2016 12:40AM

I dunno if this has been discussed elsewhere (pointers welcome).

Observational data doesn't allow one to distinguish correlation and causation.
This is a problem for an agent attempting to learn values without being allowed to make interventions.

For example, suppose that happiness is just a linear function of how much Utopamine is in a person's brain.
If a person smiles only when their Utopamine concentration is above 3 ppm, then an value-learner which observes both someone's Utopamine levels and facial expression and tries to predict their reported happiness on the basis of these features will notice that smiling is correlated with higher levels of reported happiness and thus erroneously believe that it is partially responsible for the happiness.

------------------
an IMPLICATION:
I have a picture of value learning where the AI learns via observation (since we don't want to give an unaligned AI access to actuators!).
But this makes it seem important to consider how to make an un unaligned AI safe-enough to perform value-learning relevant interventions.

## Against Amazement

5 20 September 2016 07:25PM

Time start: 20:48:35

I

The feelings of wonder, awe, amazement. It's a very human experience, and it is processed in the brain as a type of pleasure. If fact, if we look at the number of "5 photos you wouldn't believe" and similar clickbait on the Internet, it functions as a mildly addictive drug.

If I proposed that there is something wrong with those feelings, I would soon be drowned in voices of critique, pointing out that I'm suggesting we all become straw Vulcans, and that there is nothing wrong with subjective pleasure obtained cheaply and at no harm to anyone else.

I do not disagree with that. However, caution is required here, if one cares about epistemic purity of belief. Let's look at why.

II

Stories are supposed to be more memorable. Do you like stories? I'm sure you do. So consider a character, let's call him Jim.

Jim is very interested in technology and computers, and he is checking news sites every day when he comes to work in the morning. Also, Jim has read a number of articles on LessWrong, including the one about noticing confusion.

He cares about improving his thinking, so when he first read about the idea of noticing confusion on a 5 second level, he thought he wants to apply it in his life. He had a few successes, and while it's not perfect, he feels he is on the right track to notice having wrong models of the world more often.

A few days later, he opens his favorite news feed at work, and there he sees the following headline:

"AlphaGo wins 4-1 against Lee Sedol"

He goes on to read the article, and finds himself quite elated after he learns the details. 'It's amazing that this happened so soon! And most experts apparently thought it would happen in more than a decade, hah! Marvelous!'

Jim feels pride and wonder at the achievement of Google DeepMind engineers... and it is his human right to feel it, I guess.

But is Jim forgetting something?

III

Yes, I know that you know. Jim is feeling amazed, but... has he forgotten the lesson about noticing confusion?

There is a significant obstacle to Jim applying his "noticing confusion" in the situation described above: his internal experience has very little to do with feelings of confusion.

His world in this moment is dominated with awe, admiration etc., and those feelings are pleasant. It is not at all obvious that this inner experience corresponds to a innacurate model of the world he had before.

Even worse - improving his model's predictive power would result in less pleasant experiences of wonder and amazement in the future! (Or would it?) So if Jim decides to update, he is basically robbing himself of the pleasures of life, that are rightfully his. (Or is he?)

Time end: 21:09:50

(Speedwriting stats: 23 wpm, 128 cpm, previous: 30/167, 33/183)

## Seven Apocalypses

3 20 September 2016 02:59AM

## A Weird Trick To Manage Your Identity

1 19 September 2016 07:13PM

I’ve always been uncomfortable being labeled “American.” Though I’m a citizen of the United States, the term feels restrictive and confining. It obliges me to identify with aspects of the United States with which I am not thrilled. I have similar feelings of limitation with respect to other labels I assume. Some of these labels don’t feel completely true to who I truly am, or impose certain perspectives on me that diverge from my own.

These concerns are why it's useful to keep one's identity small, use identity carefully, and be strategic in choosing your identity.

Yet these pieces speak more to System 1 than to System 2. I recently came up with a weird trick that has made me more comfortable identifying with groups or movements that resonate with me while creating a System 1 visceral identity management strategy. The trick is to simply put the word “weird” before any identity category I think about.

I’m not an “American,” but a “weird American.” Once I started thinking about myself as a “weird American,” I was able to think calmly through which aspects of being American I identified with and which I did not, setting the latter aside from my identity. For example, I used the term “weird American” to describe myself when meeting a group of foreigners, and we had great conversations about what I meant and why I used the term. This subtle change enables my desire to identify with the label “American,” but allows me to separate myself from any aspects of the label I don’t support.

Beyond nationality, I’ve started using the term  “weird” in front of other identity categories. For example, I'm a professor at Ohio State. I used to become deeply  frustrated when students didn’t prepare adequately  for their classes with me. No matter how hard I tried, or whatever clever tactics I deployed, some students simply didn’t care. Instead of allowing that situation to keep bothering me, I started to think of myself as a “weird professor” - one who set up an environment that helped students succeed, but didn’t feel upset and frustrated by those who failed to make the most of it.

I’ve been applying the weird trick in my personal life, too. Thinking of myself as a “weird son” makes me feel more at ease when my mother and I don’t see eye-to-eye; thinking of myself as a “weird nice guy,” rather than just a nice guy, has helped me feel confident about my decisions to be firm when the occasion calls for it.

So, why does this weird trick work? It’s rooted in strategies of reframing and distancing, two research-based methods for changing our thought frameworks. Reframing involves changing one’s framework of thinking about a topic in order to create more beneficial modes of thinking. For instance, in reframing myself as a weird nice guy, I have been able to say “no” to requests people make of me, even though my intuitive nice guy tendency tells me I should say “yes.” Distancing refers to a method of emotional management through separating oneself from an emotionally tense situation and observing it from a third-person, external perspective. Thus, if I think of myself as a weird son, I don’t have nearly as much negative emotions during conflicts with my mom. It enables me to have space for calm and sound decision-making.

Thinking of myself as "weird" also applies to the context of rationality and effective altruism for me. Thinking of myself as a "weird" aspiring rationalist and EA helps me be more calm and at ease when I encounter criticisms of my approach to promoting rational thinking and effective giving. I can distance myself from the criticism better, and see what I can learn from the useful points in the criticism to update and be stronger going forward.

Overall, using the term “weird” before any identity category has freed me from confinements and restrictions associated with socially-imposed identity labels and allowed me to pick and choose which aspects of these labels best serve my own interests and needs. I hope being “weird” can help you manage your identity better as well!

## Open thread, Sep. 19 - Sep. 25, 2016

1 19 September 2016 06:34PM

If it's worth saying, but not worth its own post, then it goes here.

Notes for future OT posters:

2. Check if there is an active Open Thread before posting a new one. (Immediately before; refresh the list-of-threads page before posting.)

3. Open Threads should start on Monday, and end on Sunday.

4. Unflag the two options "Notify me of new top level comments on this article" and "

## Isomorphic agents with different preferences: any suggestions?

3 19 September 2016 01:15PM

In order to better understand how AI might succeed and fail at learning knowledge, I'll be trying to construct models of limited agents (with bias, knowledge, and preferences) that display identical behaviour in a wide range of circumstance (but not all). This means their preferences cannot be deduced merely/easily from observations.

Does anyone have any suggestions for possible agent models to use in this project?

## Article on IQ: The Inappropriately Excluded

5 19 September 2016 01:36AM

I saw an article on high IQ people being excluded from elite professions. Because the site seemed to have a particular agenda related to the article, I wanted to check here for other independent supporting evidence for the claim.

Their fundamental claim seems to be that P(elite profession|IQ) peaks at 133 and decreases thereafter, and goes do to 3% of peak at 150. If true, I'd find that pretty shocking.

They indicate this diminishing probability of "success" at the high tail of the IQ distribution as a known effect. Anyone got other studies on this?

The Inappropriately Excluded

By dividing the distribution function of the elite professions' IQ by that of the general population, we can calculate the relative probability that a person of any given IQ will enter and remain in an intellectually elite profession.  We find that the probability increases to about 133 and then begins to fall.  By 140 it has fallen by about 1/3 and by 150 it has fallen by about 97%.  In other words, for some reason, the 140s are really tough on one's prospects for joining an intellectually elite profession.  It seems that people with IQs over 140 are being systematically, and likely inappropriately, excluded.

## CrowdAnki comprehensive JSON representation of Anki Decks to facilitate collaboration

7 18 September 2016 10:59AM

Hi everyone :). I like Anki, find it quite useful and use it daily. There is one thing that constantly annoyed me about it, though - the state of shared decks and of infrastructure around them.

There is a lot of topics that are of common interest for a large number of people, and there is usually some shared decks available for these topics. The problem with them is that as they are usually decks created by individuals for their own purposes and uploaded to ankiweb. So they are often incomplete/of mediocre quality/etc and they are rarely supported or updated.

And there is no way to collaborate on the creation or improvement of such decks, as there is no infrastructure for it and the format of the decks won't allow you to use common collaboration infrastructure (e.g. Github). So I've been recently working on a plugin for Anki that will allow you to make a full-feature Import/Export to/from JSON. What I mean by full-feature is that it exports not just cards converted to JSON, but Notes, Decks, Models, Media etc. So you can do export, modify result, or merge changes from someone else and on Import, those changes would be reflected on your existing cards/decks and no information/metadata/etc would be lost.

The point is to provide a format that will enable collaboration using mentioned common collaboration infrastructure. So using it you can easily work with multiple people to create a deck, collaborating for example, via Github, and then deck could be updated and improved by contributions from other people.

I'm looking for early adopters and for feedback :).

The ankiweb page for plugin (that's where you can get the plugin): https://ankiweb.net/shared/info/1788670778

Some of my decks, on a Github (btw by using plugin, you can get decks directly from Github):

Deck based on article Twenty rules of formulating knowledge by Piotr Wozniak:

You're welcome to use this decks and contribute back the improvements.

## Weekly LW Meetups

2 16 September 2016 03:51PM

This summary was posted to LW Main on September 16th. The following week's summary is here.

Irregularly scheduled Less Wrong meetups are taking place in:

The remaining meetups take place in cities with regular scheduling, but involve a change in time or location, special meeting content, or simply a helpful reminder about the meetup:

Locations with regularly scheduled meetups: Austin, Berlin, Boston, Brussels, Buffalo, Canberra, Columbus, Denver,, London, Madison WI, Melbourne, Moscow, New Hampshire, New York, Philadelphia, Research Triangle NC, San Francisco Bay Area, Seattle, Sydney, Tel Aviv, Toronto, Vienna, Washington DC, and West Los Angeles. There's also a 24/7 online study hall for coworking LWers and a Slack channel for daily discussion and online meetups on Sunday night US time.

## The map of the methods of optimisation (types of intelligence)

4 15 September 2016 03:04PM
Optimisation process  is an ability to quickly search space of possible solution based on some criteria.
We live in the Universe full of different optimisation processes, but we take many of them for granted. The map is aimed to show full spectrum of all known and possible optimisation processes. It may be useful in our attempts to create AI.

The interesting thing about different optimisation processes if that they come to similar solution (bird and plane) using completely different paths. The main consequences of it is that dialog between different optimisation processes is not possible. They could interact but they could not understand each other.

The one thing which is clear from the map is that we don’t live in the empty world where only one type intelligence is slowly evolving. We live in the world which resulted from complex interaction of many optimisation processes. It also lowers chances of intelligence explosion, as it will have to compete with many different and very strong optimisation processes or results of their work.

But most of optimisation processes are evolving in synergy from the beginning of the universe and in general it looks like that many of them  are experiencing hyperbolic acceleration with fixed date of singularity around 2030-2040. (See my post and also ideas of J.Smart and Schmidhuber

While both model are centred around creation of AI and assume radical changes resulting from it in short time frame, the nature of them is different. In first case it is one-time phase transition starting in one point, and in second it is evolution of distributed net.

I add in red hypothetical optimisation processes which doesn’t exist or proved, but may be interesting to consider.  I mark in green my ideas.

The pdf of the map is here

## The Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (GCRI) seeks a media engagement volunteer/intern

5 14 September 2016 04:42PM

Volunteer/Intern Position: Media Engagement on Global Catastrophic Risk

The Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (GCRI) seeks a volunteer/intern to contribute on the topic of media engagement on global catastrophic risk, which is the risk of events that could harm or destroy global human civilization. The work would include two parts: (1) analysis of existing media coverage of global catastrophic risk and (2) formulation of strategy for media engagement by GCRI and our colleagues. The intern may also have opportunities to get involved in other aspects of GCRI.

All aspects of global catastrophic risk would be covered. Emphasis would be placed on GCRI’s areas of focus, including nuclear war and artificial intelligence. Additional emphasis could be placed on topics of personal interest to the intern, potentially including (but not limited to) climate change, other global environmental threats, pandemics, biotechnology risks, asteroid collision, etc.

The ideal candidate is a student or early-career professional seeking a career at the intersection of global catastrophic risk and the media. Career directions could include journalism, public relations, advertising, or academic research in related social science disciplines. Candidates seeking other career directions would also be considered, especially if they see value in media experience. However, we have a strong preference for candidates intending a career on global catastrophic risk.

The position is unpaid. The intern would receive opportunities for professional development, networking, and publication. GCRI is keen to see the intern benefit professionally from this position and will work with the intern to ensure that this happens. This is not a menial labor activity, but instead is one that offers many opportunities for enrichment.

A commitment of at least 10 hours per month is expected. Preference will be given to candidates able to make a larger time commitment. The position will begin during August-September 2016. The position will run for three months and may be extended pending satisfactory performance.

The position has no geographic constraint. The intern can work from anywhere in the world. GCRI has some preference for candidates from American time zones, but we regularly work with people from around the world. GCRI cannot provide any relocation assistance.

Candidates from underrepresented demographic groups are especially encouraged to apply.

Applications will be considered on an ongoing basis until 30 September, 2016.

To apply, please send the following to Robert de Neufville (robert [at] gcrinstitute.org):

* A cover letter introducing yourself and explaining your interest in the position. Please include a description of your intended career direction and how it would benefit from media experience on global catastrophic risk. Please also describe the time commitment you would be able to make.

* A resume or curriculum vitae.

* A writing sample (optional).

## Learning and Internalizing the Lessons from the Sequences

6 14 September 2016 02:40PM

I'm just beginning to go through Rationality: From AI to Zombies. I want to make the most of the lessons contained in the sequences. Usually when I read a book I simply take notes on what seems useful at the time, and a lot of it is forgotten a year later. Any thoughts on how best to internalize the lessons from the sequences?

## Learning values versus learning knowledge

4 14 September 2016 01:42PM

I just thought I'd clarify the difference between learning values and learning knowledge. There are some more complex posts
about the specific problems with learning values, but here I'll just clarify why there is a problem with learning values in the first place.

Consider the term "chocolate bar". Defining that concept crisply would be extremely difficult. But nevertheless it's a useful concept. An AI that interacted with humanity would probably learn that concept to a sufficient degree of detail. Sufficient to know what we meant when we asked it for "chocolate bars". Learning knowledge tends to be accurate.

Contrast this with the situation where the AI is programmed to "create chocolate bars", but with the definition of "chocolate bar" left underspecified, for it to learn. Now it is motivated by something else than accuracy. Before, knowing exactly what a "chocolate bar" was would have been solely to its advantage. But now it must act on its definition, so it has cause to modify the definition, to make these "chocolate bars" easier to create. This is basically the same as Goodhart's law - by making a definition part of a target, it will no longer remain an impartial definition.

What will likely happen is that the AI will have a concept of "chocolate bar", that it created itself, especially for ease of accomplishing its goals ("a chocolate bar is any collection of more than one atom, in any combinations"), and a second concept, "Schocolate bar" that it will use to internally designate genuine chocolate bars (which will still be useful for it to do). When we programmed it to "create chocolate bars, here's an incomplete definition D", what we really did was program it to find the easiest thing to create that is compatible with D, and designate them "chocolate bars".

This is the general counter to arguments like "if the AI is so smart, why would it do stuff we didn't mean?" and "why don't we just make it understand natural language and give it instructions in English?"

9 13 September 2016 05:22AM

In the second half of the interview we discussed several topics of importance to the LW community including cryonics, unfriendly AI, and eliminating mosquitoes.

## Neutralizing Physical Annoyances

12 12 September 2016 04:36PM

Once in a while, I learn something about a seemingly unrelated topic - such as freediving - and I take away some trick that is well known and "obvious" in that topic, but is generally useful and NOT known by many people outside. Case in point, you can use equalization techniques from diving to remove pressure in your ears when you descend in a plane or a fast lift. I also give some other examples.

Ears

Reading about a few equalization techniques took me maybe 5 minutes, and after reading this passage once I was able to successfully use the "Frenzel Maneuver":

The technique is to close off the vocal cords, as though you are about to lift a heavy weight. The nostrils are pinched closed and an effort is made to make a 'k' or a 'guh' sound. By doing this you raise the back of the tongue and the 'Adam's Apple' will elevate. This turns the tongue into a piston, pushing air up.

Hiccups

A few years ago, I started regularly doing deep relaxations after yoga. At some point, I learned how to relax my throat in such a way that the air can freely escape from the stomach. Since then, whenever I start hiccuping, I relax my throat and the hiccups stop immediately in all cases. I am now 100% hiccup-free.

Stiff Shoulders

I've spent a few hours with a friend who is doing massage, and they taught me some basics. After that, it became natural for me to self-massage my shoulders after I do a lot of sitting work etc. I can't imagine living without this anymore.

Other?

If you know more, please share!

## Open thread, Sep. 12 - Sep. 18, 2016

1 12 September 2016 06:49AM

If it's worth saying, but not worth its own post, then it goes here.

Notes for future OT posters:

2. Check if there is an active Open Thread before posting a new one. (Immediately before; refresh the list-of-threads page before posting.)

3. Open Threads should start on Monday, and end on Sunday.

4. Unflag the two options "Notify me of new top level comments on this article" and "

## The Extraordinary Link Between Deep Neural Networks and the Nature of the Universe

1 10 September 2016 07:13PM

"The answer is that the universe is governed by a tiny subset of all possible functions. In other words, when the laws of physics are written down mathematically, they can all be described by functions that have a remarkable set of simple properties."

“For reasons that are still not fully understood, our universe can be accurately described by polynomial Hamiltonians of low order.” These properties mean that neural networks do not need to approximate an infinitude of possible mathematical functions but only a tiny subset of the simplest ones."

Interesting article, and just diving into the paper now, but it looks like this is a big boost to the simulation argument. If the universe is built like a game engine, with stacked sets like Mandelbrots, then the simplicity itself becomes a driver in a fabricated reality.

# Why does deep and cheap learning work so well?

http://arxiv.org/abs/1608.08225

## 2016 LessWrong Diaspora Survey Analysis: Part Four (Politics, Calibration & Probability, Futurology, Charity & Effective Altruism)

9 10 September 2016 03:51AM

## Politics

The LessWrong survey has a very involved section dedicated to politics. In previous analysis the benefits of this weren't fully realized. In the 2016 analysis we can look at not just the political affiliation of a respondent, but what beliefs are associated with a certain affiliation. The charts below summarize most of the results.

### Miscellaneous Politics

There were also some other questions in this section which aren't covered by the above charts.

#### Voting

Did you vote in your country's last major national election? (LW Turnout Versus General Election Turnout By Country)
Group Turnout
LessWrong 68.9%
Austrailia 91%
Brazil 78.90%
Britain 66.4%
Finland 70.1%
France 79.48%
Germany 71.5%
India 66.3%
Israel 72%
New Zealand 77.90%
Russia 65.25%
United States 54.9%
Numbers taken from Wikipedia, accurate as of the last general election in each country listed at time of writing.

## Calibration And Probability Questions

### Calibration Questions

I just couldn't analyze these, sorry guys. I put many hours into trying to get them into a decent format I could even read and that sucked up an incredible amount of time. It's why this part of the survey took so long to get out. Thankfully another LessWrong user, Houshalter, has kindly done their own analysis.

All my calibration questions were meant to satisfy a few essential properties:

1. They should be 'self contained'. I.E, something you can reasonably answer or at least try to answer with a 5th grade science education and normal life experience.
2. They should, at least to a certain extent, be Fermi Estimable.
3. They should progressively scale in difficulty so you can see whether somebody understands basic probability or not. (eg. In an 'or' question do they put a probability of less than 50% of being right?)

At least one person requested a workbook, so I might write more in the future. I'll obviously write more for the survey.

### Probability Questions

Question Mean Median Mode Stdev
Please give the obvious answer to this question, so I can automatically throw away all surveys that don't follow the rules: What is the probability of a fair coin coming up heads? 49.821 50.0 50.0 3.033
What is the probability that the Many Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics is more or less correct? 44.599 50.0 50.0 29.193
What is the probability that non-human, non-Earthly intelligent life exists in the observable universe? 75.727 90.0 99.0 31.893
...in the Milky Way galaxy? 45.966 50.0 10.0 38.395
What is the probability that supernatural events (including God, ghosts, magic, etc) have occurred since the beginning of the universe? 13.575 1.0 1.0 27.576
What is the probability that there is a god, defined as a supernatural intelligent entity who created the universe? 15.474 1.0 1.0 27.891
What is the probability that any of humankind's revealed religions is more or less correct? 10.624 0.5 1.0 26.257
What is the probability that an average person cryonically frozen today will be successfully restored to life at some future time, conditional on no global catastrophe destroying civilization before then? 21.225 10.0 5.0 26.782
What is the probability that at least one person living at this moment will reach an age of one thousand years, conditional on no global catastrophe destroying civilization in that time? 25.263 10.0 1.0 30.510
What is the probability that our universe is a simulation? 25.256 10.0 50.0 28.404
What is the probability that significant global warming is occurring or will soon occur, and is primarily caused by human actions? 83.307 90.0 90.0 23.167
What is the probability that the human race will make it to 2100 without any catastrophe that wipes out more than 90% of humanity? 76.310 80.0 80.0 22.933

Probability questions is probably the area of the survey I put the least effort into. My plan for next year is to overhaul these sections entirely and try including some Tetlock-esque forecasting questions, a link to some advice on how to make good predictions, etc.

## Futurology

This section got a bit of a facelift this year. Including new cryonics questions, genetic engineering, and technological unemployment in addition to the previous years.

### Cryonics

Interestingly enough, of those who think it will work with enough confidence to say 'yes', only 14 are actually signed up for cryonics.

sqlite> select count(*) from data where CryonicsNow="Yes" and Cryonics="Yes - signed up or just finishing up paperwork";

14

sqlite> select count(*) from data where CryonicsNow="Yes" and (Cryonics="Yes - signed up or just finishing up paperwork" OR Cryonics="No - would like to sign up but unavailable in my area" OR "No - would like to sign up but haven't gotten around to it" OR "No - would like to sign up but can't afford it");

34

LessWrongers seem to be very bullish on the underlying physics of cryonics even if they're not as enthusiastic about current methods in use.

The Brain Preservation Foundation also did an analysis of cryonics responses to the LessWrong Survey.

### Singularity

#### SingularityYear

By what year do you think the Singularity will occur? Answer such that you think, conditional on the Singularity occurring, there is an even chance of the Singularity falling before or after this year. If you think a singularity is so unlikely you don't even want to condition on it, leave this question blank.

Mean: 8.110300081581755e+16

Median: 2080.0

Mode: 2100.0

Stdev: 2.847858859055733e+18

I didn't bother to filter out the silly answers for this.

Obviously it's a bit hard to see without filtering out the uber-large answers, but the median doesn't seem to have changed much from the 2014 survey.

### Genetic Engineering

Well that's fairly overwhelming.

I find it amusing how the strict "No" group shrinks considerably after this question.

This question is too important to just not have an answer to so I'll do it manually. Unfortunately I can't easily remove the 'excluded' entries so that we're dealing with the exact same distribution but only 13 or so responses are filtered out anyway.

sqlite> select count(*) from data where GeneticImprovement="Yes";

1100

>>> 1100 + 176 + 262 + 84
1622
>>> 1100 / 1622
0.6781750924784217

67.8% are willing to genetically engineer their children for improvements.

These numbers go about how you would expect, with people being progressively less interested the more 'shallow' a genetic change is seen as.

All three of these seem largely consistent with peoples personal preferences about modification. Were I inclined I could do a deeper analysis that actually takes survey respondents row by row and looks at correlation between preference for ones own children and preference for others.

### Technological Unemployment

#### LudditeFallacy

Do you think the Luddite's Fallacy is an actual fallacy?

Yes: 443 (30.936%)

No: 989 (69.064%)

We can use this as an overall measure of worry about technological unemployment, which would seem to be high among the LW demographic.

#### UnemploymentYear

By what year do you think the majority of people in your country will have trouble finding employment for automation related reasons? If you think this is something that will never happen leave this question blank.

Mean: 2102.9713740458014

Median: 2050.0

Mode: 2050.0

Stdev: 1180.2342850727339

Question is flawed because you can't distinguish answers of "never happen" from people who just didn't see it.

Interesting question that would be fun to take a look at in comparison to the estimates for the singularity.

#### EndOfWork

Do you think the "end of work" would be a good thing?

Yes: 1238 (81.287%)

No: 285 (18.713%)

Fairly overwhelming consensus, but with a significant minority of people who have a dissenting opinion.

#### EndOfWorkConcerns

If machines end all or almost all employment, what are your biggest worries? Pick two.

Question Count Percent
People will just idle about in destructive ways 513 16.71%
People need work to be fulfilled and if we eliminate work we'll all feel deep existential angst 543 17.687%
The rich are going to take all the resources for themselves and leave the rest of us to starve or live in poverty 1066 34.723%
The machines won't need us, and we'll starve to death or be otherwise liquidated 416 13.55%
Question is flawed because it demanded the user 'pick two' instead of up to two.

The plurality of worries are about elites who refuse to share their wealth.

### Existential Risk

#### XRiskType

Which disaster do you think is most likely to wipe out greater than 90% of humanity before the year 2100?

Nuclear war: +4.800% 326 (20.6%)

Asteroid strike: -0.200% 64 (4.1%)

Unfriendly AI: +1.000% 271 (17.2%)

Nanotech / grey goo: -2.000% 18 (1.1%)

Pandemic (natural): +0.100% 120 (7.6%)

Pandemic (bioengineered): +1.900% 355 (22.5%)

Environmental collapse (including global warming): +1.500% 252 (16.0%)

Economic / political collapse: -1.400% 136 (8.6%)

Other: 35 (2.217%)

Significantly more people worried about Nuclear War than last year. Effect of new respondents, or geopolitical situation? Who knows.

## Charity And Effective Altruism

### Charitable Giving

#### Income

What is your approximate annual income in US dollars (non-Americans: convert at www.xe.com)? Obviously you don't need to answer this question if you don't want to. Please don't include commas or dollar signs.

Sum: 66054140.47384

Mean: 64569.052271593355

Median: 40000.0

Mode: 30000.0

Stdev: 107297.53606321265

#### IncomeCharityPortion

How much money, in number of dollars, have you donated to charity over the past year? (non-Americans: convert to dollars at http://www.xe.com/ ). Please don't include commas or dollar signs in your answer. For example, 4000

Sum: 2389900.6530000004

Mean: 2914.5129914634144

Median: 353.0

Mode: 100.0

Stdev: 9471.962766896671

#### XriskCharity

How much money have you donated to charities aiming to reduce existential risk (other than MIRI/CFAR) in the past year?

Sum: 169300.89

Mean: 1991.7751764705883

Median: 200.0

Mode: 100.0

Stdev: 9219.941506342007

#### CharityDonations

How much have you donated in US dollars to the following charities in the past year? (Non-americans: convert to dollars at http://www.xe.com/) Please don't include commas or dollar signs in your answer. Options starting with "any" aren't the name of a charity but a category of charity.

Question Sum Mean Median Mode Stdev
Against Malaria Foundation 483935.027 1905.256 300.0 None 7216.020
Schistosomiasis Control Initiative 47908.0 840.491 200.0 1000.0 1618.785
Deworm the World Initiative 28820.0 565.098 150.0 500.0 1432.712
GiveDirectly 154410.177 1429.723 450.0 50.0 3472.082
Any kind of animal rights charity 83130.47 1093.821 154.235 500.0 2313.493
Any kind of bug rights charity 1083.0 270.75 157.5 None 353.396
Machine Intelligence Research Institute 141792.5 1417.925 100.0 100.0 5370.485
Any charity combating nuclear existential risk 491.0 81.833 75.0 100.0 68.060
Any charity combating global warming 13012.0 245.509 100.0 10.0 365.542
Center For Applied Rationality 127101.0 3177.525 150.0 100.0 12969.096
Strategies for Engineered Negligible Senescence Research Foundation 9429.0 554.647 100.0 20.0 1156.431
Wikipedia 12765.5 53.189 20.0 10.0 126.444
Internet Archive 2975.04 80.406 30.0 50.0 173.791
Any campaign for political office 38443.99 366.133 50.0 50.0 1374.305
Other 564890.46 1661.442 200.0 100.0 4670.805
"Bug Rights" charity was supposed to be a troll fakeout but apparently...

This table is interesting given the recent debates about how much money certain causes are 'taking up' in Effective Altruism.

### Effective Altruism

#### Vegetarian

Do you follow any dietary restrictions related to animal products?

Yes, I am vegan: 54 (3.4%)

Yes, I am vegetarian: 158 (10.0%)

Yes, I restrict meat some other way (pescetarian, flexitarian, try to only eat ethically sourced meat): 375 (23.7%)

No: 996 (62.9%)

#### EAKnowledge

Do you know what Effective Altruism is?

Yes: 1562 (89.3%)

No but I've heard of it: 114 (6.5%)

No: 74 (4.2%)

#### EAIdentity

Do you self-identify as an Effective Altruist?

Yes: 665 (39.233%)

No: 1030 (60.767%)

The distribution given by the 2014 survey results does not sum to one, so it's difficult to determine if Effective Altruism's membership actually went up or not but if we take the numbers at face value it experienced an 11.13% increase in membership.

#### EACommunity

Do you participate in the Effective Altruism community?

Yes: 314 (18.427%)

No: 1390 (81.573%)

Same issue as last, taking the numbers at face value community participation went up by 5.727%

Has Effective Altruism caused you to make donations you otherwise wouldn't?

Yes: 666 (39.269%)

No: 1030 (60.731%)

Wowza!

### Effective Altruist Anxiety

#### EAAnxiety

Have you ever had any kind of moral anxiety over Effective Altruism?

Yes: 501 (29.6%)

Yes but only because I worry about everything: 184 (10.9%)

No: 1008 (59.5%)

There's an ongoing debate in Effective Altruism about what kind of rhetorical strategy is best for getting people on board and whether Effective Altruism is causing people significant moral anxiety.

It certainly appears to be. But is moral anxiety effective? Let's look:

Sample Size: 244
Average amount of money donated by people anxious about EA who aren't EAs: 257.5409836065574

Sample Size: 679
Average amount of money donated by people who aren't anxious about EA who aren't EAs: 479.7501384388807

Sample Size: 249 Average amount of money donated by EAs anxious about EA: 1841.5292369477913

Sample Size: 314
Average amount of money donated by EAs not anxious about EA: 1837.8248407643312

It seems fairly conclusive that anxiety is not a good way to get people to donate more than they already are, but is it a good way to get people to become Effective Altruists?

Sample Size: 1685
P(Effective Altruist): 0.3940652818991098
P(EA Anxiety): 0.29554896142433235
P(Effective Altruist | EA Anxiety): 0.5

Maybe. There is of course an argument to be made that sufficient good done by causing people anxiety outweighs feeding into peoples scrupulosity, but it can be discussed after I get through explaining it on the phone to wealthy PR-conscious donors and telling the local all-kill shelter where I want my shipment of dead kittens.

#### EAOpinion

What's your overall opinion of Effective Altruism?

Positive: 809 (47.6%)

Mostly Positive: 535 (31.5%)

No strong opinion: 258 (15.2%)

Mostly Negative: 75 (4.4%)

Negative: 24 (1.4%)

EA appears to be doing a pretty good job of getting people to like them.

### Interesting Tables

Charity Donations By Political Affilation
Affiliation Income Charity Contributions % Income Donated To Charity Total Survey Charity % Sample Size
Anarchist 1677900.0 72386.0 4.314% 3.004% 50
Communist 298700.0 19190.0 6.425% 0.796% 13
Conservative 1963000.04 62945.04 3.207% 2.612% 38
Futarchist 1497494.1099999999 166254.0 11.102% 6.899% 31
Left-Libertarian 9681635.613839999 416084.0 4.298% 17.266% 245
Libertarian 11698523.0 214101.0 1.83% 8.885% 190
Moderate 3225475.0 90518.0 2.806% 3.756% 67
Neoreactionary 1383976.0 30890.0 2.232% 1.282% 28
Objectivist 399000.0 1310.0 0.328% 0.054% 10
Other 3150618.0 85272.0 2.707% 3.539% 132
Pragmatist 5087007.609999999 266836.0 5.245% 11.073% 131
Progressive 8455500.440000001 368742.78 4.361% 15.302% 217
Social Democrat 8000266.54 218052.5 2.726% 9.049% 237
Socialist 2621693.66 78484.0 2.994% 3.257% 126

Number Of Effective Altruists In The Diaspora Communities
Community Count % In Community Sample Size
LessWrong 136 38.418% 354
LessWrong Meetups 109 50.463% 216
LessWrong Facebook Group 83 48.256% 172
LessWrong Slack 22 39.286% 56
SlateStarCodex 343 40.98% 837
Rationalist Tumblr 175 49.716% 352
Effective Altruism Hub 86 86.869% 99
Good Judgement(TM) Open 23 74.194% 31
PredictionBook 31 51.667% 60
Hacker News 91 35.968% 253
#lesswrong on freenode 19 24.675% 77
#slatestarcodex on freenode 9 24.324% 37
#chapelperilous on freenode 2 18.182% 11
/r/rational 117 42.545% 275
/r/HPMOR 110 47.414% 232
/r/SlateStarCodex 93 37.959% 245
One or more private 'rationalist' groups 91 47.15% 193

Effective Altruist Donations By Political Affiliation
Affiliation EA Income EA Charity Sample Size
Anarchist 761000.0 57500.0 18
Futarchist 559850.0 114830.0 15
Left-Libertarian 5332856.0 361975.0 112
Libertarian 2725390.0 114732.0 53
Moderate 583247.0 56495.0 22
Other 1428978.0 69950.0 49
Pragmatist 1442211.0 43780.0 43
Progressive 4004097.0 304337.78 107
Social Democrat 3423487.45 149199.0 93
Socialist 678360.0 34751.0 41

## Brain Speed Test

-1 10 September 2016 03:01AM

I've been experimenting with various nootropics lately, and wanted some way to have a frame of reference as to whether they work or not. So I put together this little tool:

http://2pih.com/reactiontest/

It's pretty rudimentary for the time being, but I'm definitely open to feedback on 1. Ways to improve it, 2. Different tests you'd like to see.

## Weekly LW Meetups

0 09 September 2016 03:48PM

This summary was posted to LW Main on September 9th. The following week's summary is here.

Irregularly scheduled Less Wrong meetups are taking place in:

The remaining meetups take place in cities with regular scheduling, but involve a change in time or location, special meeting content, or simply a helpful reminder about the meetup:

Locations with regularly scheduled meetups: Austin, Berlin, Boston, Brussels, Buffalo, Canberra, Columbus, Denver,, London, Madison WI, Melbourne, Moscow, New Hampshire, New York, Philadelphia, Research Triangle NC, San Francisco Bay Area, Seattle, Sydney, Tel Aviv, Toronto, Vienna, Washington DC, and West Los Angeles. There's also a 24/7 online study hall for coworking LWers and a Slack channel for daily discussion and online meetups on Sunday night US time.

## [Link] How the Simulation Argument Dampens Future Fanaticism

6 09 September 2016 01:17PM

Very comprehensive analysis by Brian Tomasik on whether (and to what extent) the simulation argument should change our altruistic priorities. He concludes that the possibility of ancestor simulations somewhat increases the comparative importance of short-term helping relative to focusing on shaping the "far future".

Another important takeaway:

[...] rather than answering the question “Do I live in a simulation or not?,” a perhaps better way to think about it (in line with Stuart Armstrong's anthropic decision theory) is “Given that I’m deciding for all subjectively indistinguishable copies of myself, what fraction of my copies lives in a simulation and how many total copies are there?"

## [LINK] Collaborate on HPMOR blurbs; earn chance to win three-volume physical HPMOR

6 07 September 2016 02:21AM

I intend to print at least one high-quality physical HPMOR and release the files. There are printable texts which are being improved and a set of covers (based on e.b.'s) are underway. I have, however, been unable to find any blurbs I'd be remotely happy with.

I'd like to attempt to harness the hivemind to fix that. As a lure, if your ideas contribute significantly to the final version or you assist with other tasks aimed at making this book awesome, I'll put a proportionate number of tickets with your number on into the proverbial hat.

I do not guarantee there will be a winner and I reserve the right to arbitrarily modify this any point. For example, it's possible this leads to a disappointingly small amount of valuable feedback, that some unforeseen problem will sink or indefinitely delay the project, or that I'll expand this and let people earn a small number of tickets by sharing so more people become aware this is a thing quickly.

With that over, let's get to the fun part.

A blurb is needed for each of the three books. Desired characteristics:

* Not too heavy on ingroup signaling or over the top rhetoric.

* Non-spoilerish

* Not taking itself awkwardly seriously.

* Amusing / funny / witty.

* Attractive to the same kinds of people the tvtropes page is.

* Showcases HPMOR with fun, engaging, prose.

Try to put yourself in the mind of someone awesome deciding whether to read it while writing, but let your brain generate bad ideas before trimming back.

I expect that for each we'll want

* A shortish and awesome paragraph

* A short sentence tagline

* A quote or two from notable people

* Probably some other text? Get creative.

Please post blurb fragments or full blurbs here, one suggestion per top level comment. You are encouraged to remix each other's ideas, just add a credit line if you use it in a new top level comment. If you know which book your idea is for, please indicate with (B1) (B2) or (B3).

Other things that need doing, if you want to help in another way:

* The author's foreword from the physical copies of the first 17 chapters needs to be located or written up

* At least one links page for the end needs to be written up, possibly a second based on http://www.yudkowsky.net/other/fiction/

* Several changes need to be made to the text files, including merging in the final exam, adding appendices, and making the style of both consistent with the rest of the files. Contact me for current files and details if you want to claim this.

I wish to stay on topic and focused on creating these missing parts rather than going on a sidetrack to debate copyright. If you are an expert who genuinely has vital information about it, please message me or create a separate post about copyright rather than commenting here.

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