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Comment author: curi 21 November 2017 04:13:57AM 0 points [-]

you have openly stated your unwillingness to

1) do PF

2) discuss PF or other methodology

that's an impasse, created by you. you won't use the methodology i think is needed for making progress, and won't discuss the disagreement. a particular example issue is your hostility to the use of references.

the end.

I am very willing to have a conversation.

given your rules, including the impasse above.

Comment author: phonypapercut 21 November 2017 04:00:35AM 0 points [-]

Is English your first language?

Comment author: gjm 21 November 2017 03:29:29AM 0 points [-]

you haven't cared to [...]

Correct: I am not interested in jumping through the idiosyncratic set of hoops you choose to set up.

it's dishonest (or ignorant?) [...]

Why?

arguments you don't wish to learn

Don't wish to learn them? True enough. I don't see your relationship to me as being that of teacher to learner. I'd be interested to hear what they are, though, if you could drop the superior attitude and try having an actual discussion.

I don't see what your comment is supposed to accomplish.

It is supposed to point out some errors in things you wrote, and to answer some questions you raised.

you have 1.8 of your feet out the door.

Does that actually mean anything? If so, what?

you aren't really looking to have a conversation to resolve the matter.

I am very willing to have a conversation. I am not interested in straitjacketing that conversation with the arbitrary rules you keep trying to impose ("paths forward"), and I am not interested in replacing the (to me, potentially interesting) conservation about probability and science and reasoning and explanation and knowledge with the (to me, almost certainly boring and fruitless) conversation about "paths forward" that you keep trying to replace it with.

why speak at all?

See above. You said some things that I think are wrong, and you asked some questions I thought I could answer. It's not my problem that you're unable or unwilling to address any of the actual content of what I say and only interested in meta-issues.

Comment author: Raemon 20 November 2017 11:55:39PM 0 points [-]

Huh. So I notice that a) this is sort of thing I want to actually work, b) I totally don't think it's going to work, and had a major Pat Modesto flinch reaction to this (i.e. https://www.lesserwrong.com/posts/dhj9dhiwhq3DX6W8z/hero-licensing)

Comment author: curi 20 November 2017 10:18:05PM *  0 points [-]

you're mean and disruptive. at least you're demonstrating why credentials are a terrible way to address things, which is my point. you just assume the status of various credentials without being willing to think about them, let alone debate them (using more credentials (regress), or perhaps arguments? but if arguments, why not just use those in the first place?). so for you, like most people, using credentials = using bias.

Comment author: Lumifer 20 November 2017 10:15:44PM 0 points [-]

So my claims about QM are ... even better than SA's

ROFL

That's one of the main reasons I'm here instead of DD

And here I was, completely at loss as to why David Deutsch doesn't hang out at LW... But now we know.

Comment author: curi 20 November 2017 09:15:59PM *  0 points [-]

Here's a tricky example of judging authority (credentials). You say listen to SA about QM. Presumably also listen to David Deutsch (DD), who knows more about QM than SA does. But what about me? I have talked with DD about QM and other issues at great length and I have a very accurate understanding of what things I cay say about QM (and other matters) that are what DD would say, and when I don't know something or disagree with DD. (I have done things like debate physics, with physicists, many times, while being advised by DD and him checking all my statements so I find out when I have his views right or not.) So my claims about QM are about as good as DD's, when I make them – and are therefore even better than SA's, even though I'm not a physicist. Sorta, not exactly. Credentials are complicated and such a bad way to judge ideas.

What I find most people do is decide what they want to believe or listen to first, and then find an expert who says it second. So if someone doesn't want to listen, credentials won't help, they'll just find some credentials that go the other way. DD has had the same experience repeatedly – people aren't persuaded due to his credentials. That's one of the main reasons I'm here instead of DD – his credentials wouldn't actually help with getting people here to listen/understand. And, as I've been demonstrating and DD and I already knew, arguments aren't very effective here either (just like elsewhere).

And I, btw, didn't take things on authority from DD – I asked questions and brought up doubts and counter-arguments. His credentials didn't matter to me, but his arguments did. Which is why he liked talking with me!

Comment author: curi 20 November 2017 08:56:22PM 0 points [-]

"The amount of energy necessary to refute bullshit is an order of magnitude bigger than to produce it."

i think this is false, and is an indication of using the wrong methods to refute bullshit – the right methods reuse refutations of categories of bad ideas. do you have some comprehensive argument that it must be true?

i find it disturbing how much people here are in favor of judging ideas by sources instead of content – credentialism. that's pretty pure irrationality. also debating which credentials are worth how much is a bad way to approach discussions, but it's totally non-obvious and controversial which credentials are how good even for standard credentials like PhDs from different universities.

Comment author: Lumifer 20 November 2017 07:40:52PM 0 points [-]

(in particular they ignore legit advice to read way too frequently)

The context matters. If you are trying to figure out how X actually works you probably should go read or at least scan the relevant books even if no one is throwing references at you. On the other hand, if you're just procrastinating by engaging in a Yet Another Internet Argument with zero consequences for your life, going off to read the references is just a bigger waste of time.

Comment author: Lumifer 20 November 2017 03:50:14PM 0 points [-]

you aren't really looking to have a conversation to resolve the matter

Your understanding of "resolve the matter" is very peculiar -- as far as I can see it means "go read what I tell you to read so that you will agree with me".

I notice that you show considerable lack of flexibility: you follow a certain pattern of interaction which, to no great surprise, tends to end up in the same place, you get nowhere and accuse people of bad faith and unwillingness to learn.

You've been hanging around the place for a few weeks by now -- how about you, did you learn anything? Or this is strictly a bring-civilization-to-the-savages expedition from your point of view?

Comment author: IlyaShpitser 20 November 2017 03:49:36PM *  1 point [-]

Throwing books at someone is generally known as "courtier's reply".

The issue here also is Brandolini's law:

"The amount of energy necessary to refute bullshit is an order of magnitude bigger than to produce it."


The problem with the "courtier's reply" is you could always appeal to it, even if Scott Aaronson is trying to explain something about quantum mechanics to you, and you need some background (found in references 1, 2, and 3) to understand what he is saying.


There is a type 1 / type 2 error tradeoff here. Ignoring legit expert advice is bad, but being cowed by an idiot throwing references at you is also bad.

As usual with tradeoffs like these, one has to decide on a policy that is willing to tolerate some of one type of error to keep the error you care about to some desired level.


I think a good heuristic for deciding who is an expert and who is an idiot with references is credentialism. But credentialism has a bad brand here, due to a "love affair with amateurism" LW has. One of the consequences of this love affair is a lot of folks here make the above trade off badly (in particular they ignore legit advice to read way too frequently).

Comment author: curi 20 November 2017 03:57:00AM 0 points [-]

you haven't cared to try to write down, with permalink, any errors in CR that you think could survive critical scrutiny.

by study i mean look at it enough to find something wrong with it – a reason not to look further – or else keep going if you see no errors. and then write down what the problem is, ala Paths Forward.

the claims made by some c.r. proponents

it's dishonest (or ignorant?) to refer to Popper, Deutsch and myself (as well as Miller, Bartley, and more or less everyone else) as "some c.r. proponents".

you refuse to try to quantify how error-prone any particular judgement is.

no. i have tried and found it's impossible, and found out why (arguments u don't wish to learn).

anyway i don't see what your comment is supposed to accomplish. you have 1.8 of your feet out the door. you aren't really looking to have a conversation to resolve the matter. why speak at all?

Comment author: gjm 20 November 2017 03:18:13AM 2 points [-]

If you're already aware that your system doesn't work, due to this regress problem,

That isn't what Viliam said, and I suggest that here you're playing rhetorical games rather than arguing in good faith. It's as if someone took your fallibilism and your rejection of probability, and said "Since you admit that you could well be wrong and you have no idea how likely it is that you're wrong, why should we take any notice of what you say?".

why does no one here study the philosophy which has a solution to this problem?

You mean "the philosophy which claims to have a solution to this problem". (Perhaps it really does, perhaps not; but all someone can know in advance of studying it is that it claims to have one.)

Anyway, I think the answer depends on what you mean by "study". If you mean "investigate at all" then the answer is that several people here have considered some version of Popperian "critical rationalism", so your question has a false premise. If you mean "study in depth" then the answer is that by and large those who've considered "critical rationalism" have decided after a quick investigation that its claim to have the One True Answer to the problem of induction is not credible enough for it to be worth much further study.

My own epistemic state on this matter, which I mention not because I have any particular importance but because I know my own mind much better than anyone else's, is that I've read a couple of Deutsch's books and some of his other writings and given Deutch's version of "critical rationalism" hours, but not weeks, of thought, and that since you turned up here I've given some further attention to your version; that c.r. seems to me to contain some insights and some outright errors; that I do not find it credible that c.r. "solves" the problem of getting information from observations in any strong sense; that I find the claims made by some c.r. proponents that (e.g.) there is no such thing as induction, or that it is a mistake to assign probabilities to statements that aren't explicitly about random events, even less credible; that the "return on investment" of further in-depth investigation of Popper's or Deutsch's ideas is likely worse than that of other things I could do with the same resources of time and brainpower, not because they're all bad ideas but because I think I already grasp them well enough for my purposes.

the epistemology issues [...] are prior to the physics issues, and don't involve that kind of measurement error issue.

A good epistemology needs to deal with the fact that observations have errors in them, and it makes no sense to try to "resolve epistemology" in a way that ignores such errors. (Perhaps that isn't what you meant by "we can talk about measurement error after resolving epistemology", in which case some clarification would be a good idea.)

What we have, knowledge, is something else which is (contra over 2000 years of philosophical tradition) different than certainty.

You say that as if you expect it to be a new idea around here, but it isn't. See e.g. this old LW article. For the avoidance of doubt, I'm not claiming that what that says about knowledge and certainty is the same as you would say -- it isn't -- nor that what it says is original to its author -- it isn't. Just that distinguishing knowledge from certainty is something we're already comfortable with.

I do not value certainty as a feeling.

You would equally not be entitled to a 100% certainty, or have any other sort of 100% certainty you might regard as more objective and less dependent on feelings. (Because in the epistemic situation Viliam describes, it would be very likely that at least one error had been made.)

Of course, in principle you admit exactly this: after all, you call yourself a fallibilist. But, while you admit the possibility of error and no doubt actually change your mind sometimes, you refuse to try to quantify how error-prone any particular judgement is. I think this is "obviously" a mistake (i.e., obviously when you look at things rightly, which may not be an easy thing to do) and I think Viliam probably thinks the same.

(And when you complain above of an infinite regress, it's precisely about what happens when one tries to quantify these propensities-to-error, and your approach avoids this regress not by actually handling it any better but by simply declaring that you aren't going to try to quantify. That might be OK if your approach handled such uncertainties just as well by other means, but it doesn't seem to me that it does.)

Comment author: curi 20 November 2017 01:41:40AM 0 points [-]

Does it make sense to say that the probability of making the mistake in the judgment B is higher than the probability of making the mistake in the judgment A?

It may or may not make sense, depending on terminology and nuances of what you mean, for some types of mistakes. Some categories of error have some level of predictability b/c you're already familiar with them. However, it does not make sense for all types of mistakes. There are some mistakes which are simply unpredictable, which you know nothing about in advance. Perhaps you can partly, in some way, see some mistakes coming – but that doesn't work in all cases. So you can't figure out any overall probability of some judgement being a mistake, because at most you have a probability which addresses some sources of mistakes but others are just unknown (and you can't combine "unknown" and "90%" to get an overall probability).

I am a fallibilist who thinks we can have neither 100% certainty nor 90% certainty nor 50% certainty. There's always framework questions too – e.g. you may say according to your framework, given your context, then you're unlikely (20%) to be mistaken (btw my main objections remain the same if you stop quantifying certainty with numbers). But you wouldn't know the probability your framework has a mistake, so you can't get an overall probability this way.

Difficult to do, and even more difficult to justify in a debate.

if you're already aware that your system doesn't really work, due to this regress problem, why does no one here study the philosophy which has a solution to this problem? (i had the same kind of issue in discussions with others here – they admitted their viewpoint has known flaws but stuck to it anyway. knowing they're wrong in some way wasn't enough to interest them in studying an alternative which claims not to be wrong in any known way – a claim they didn't care to refute.)

This may even be a hard limit on human certainty.

the hard limit is we don't have certainty, we're fallible. that's it. what we have, knowledge, is something else which is (contra over 2000 years of philosophical tradition) different than certainty.

Suppose the theory predicts that an energy of a particle is 0.04 whatever units, and my measurement detected 0.041 units. Does this falsify the theory? Does 0.043, or 0.05, or 0.08? Even when you specify the confidence interval, it is ultimately a probabilistic answer. (And saying "p<0.05" is also just an arbitrary number; why not "p<0.001"?)

you have to make a decision about what standards of evidence you will use for what purpose, and why that's the right thing to do, and expose that meta decision to criticism.

the epistemology issues we're talking about are prior to the physics issues, and don't involve that kind of measurement error issue. we can talk about measurement error after resolving epistemology. (the big picture is that probabilities and statistics have some use in life, but they aren't probabilities of truth/knowledge/certainty, and their use is governed by non-probabilistic judgements/arguments/epistemology.)

see http://curi.us/2067-empiricism-and-instrumentalism and https://yesornophilosophy.com

You can have a "binary" solution only as long as you remain in the realm of words.

no, a problem can and should specify criteria of what the bar is for a solution to it. lots of the problems ppl have are due to badly formulated (ambiguous) problems.

which means you wouldn't feel a 100% certainty after the first reading

i do not value certainty as a feeling. i'm after objective knowledge, not feelings.

Comment author: Viliam 20 November 2017 01:09:29AM *  0 points [-]

I think there's something really wrong when your reaction to disagreement is to think there's no point in further discussion.

It's like you believe "A" and "A implies B" and "B implies C", while I believe "non-A" and "non-A implies Q". The point we should debate is whether "A" or "non-A" is correct; because as long as we disagree on this, of course each of us is going to believe a different chain of things (one starting with "A", the other starting with "non-A").

I mean, if I hypothetically would believe that absolute certainty is possible and relatively simple to achieve, of course I would consider the probabilistic reasoning to be interesting but inferior form of reasoning. We wouldn't have this debate. And if you would accept that certainty is impossible (even certainty of refutation), then probability would probably seem like the next best thing.

When you make a judgement, there is no way to know some probability that your judgement is correct.

Okay, imagine this: I make a judgment that feels completely correct to me, and I am not aware of any possible mistakes. But of course I am a fallible human, maybe I actually made a mistake somewhere, maybe even an embarassing one.

Scenario A: I made this judgement at 10 AM, after having a good night of sleep.

Scenario B: I made this judgement at 2 AM, tired and sleep deprived.

Does it make sense to say that the probability of making the mistake in the judgment B is higher than the probability of making the mistake in the judgment A? In both cases I believe at the moment that the judgment is correct. But in the latter case my ability to notice the possible mistake is smaller.

So while I couldn't make an exact calculation like "the probability of the mistake is exactly 4.25%", I can still be aware that there is some probability of the mistake, and sometimes even estimate that the probability in one situation is greater than in another situation. Which suggests that there is a number, I just don't know it. (But if we could somehow repeat the whole situation million times, and observe that I was wrong in 42500 cases, that would suggest that the probability of the mistake is about 4.25%. Unlikely in real life, but possible as a hypothesis.)

Also, if judgements need probabilities, won't your judgement of the probability of a mistake have its own probability?

It definitely will. Notice that those are two different things: (a) the probability that I am wrong, and (b) my estimate of the probability that I am wrong.

Yes, what you point out is a very real and very difficult problem. Estimating probabilities in a situation where everything (including our knowledge of ourselves, and even our knowledge of math itself) is... complicated. Difficult to do, and even more difficult to justify in a debate.

This may even be a hard limit on human certainty. For example, if at every moment of time there is a 0.000000000001 probability that you will go insane, that would mean you can never be sure about anything with probability greater than 0.999999999999, because there is always the chance that however logical and reasonable something sounds to you at the moment, it's merely because you have become insane at this very moment. (The cause of insanity could be e.g. a random tumor or a blood vessel breaking in your brain.) Even if you would make a system more reliable than a human, for example a system maintained by hundred humans, where if anyone goes insane, the remaining ones will notice it and fix the mistake, the system itself could achieve higher certainty, but you, as an individual, reading its output, could not. Because there would always be the chance that you just got insane, and what you believe you are reading isn't actually there.

Relevant LW article: "Confidence levels inside and outside an argument".

And you can, when being precise, formulate all problems in a binary way (a given thing either does or doesn't solve it) and consider criticisms binarily (a criticism either explains why a solution fails to solve the binary problem, or doesn't).

Suppose the theory predicts that an energy of a particle is 0.04 whatever units, and my measurement detected 0.041 units. Does this falsify the theory? Does 0.043, or 0.05, or 0.08? Even when you specify the confidence interval, it is ultimately a probabilistic answer. (And saying "p<0.05" is also just an arbitrary number; why not "p<0.001"?)

You can have a "binary" solution only as long as you remain in the realm of words. ("Socrates is a human. All humans are mortal. Therefore Socrates is mortal. Certainty of argument: 100%.") Even there, the longer chain of words you produce, the greater chance that you made a mistake somewhere. I mean, if you imagine a syllogism going over thousand pages, ultimately proving something, you would probably want to check the whole book at least two or three times; which means you wouldn't feel a 100% certainty after the first reading. But the greater problems will appear on the boundary between the words and reality. (Theory: "the energy of the particle X is 0.04 units"; the experimental device displays 0.041. Also, the experimental devices sometimes break, and your assistant sometimes records the numbers incorrectly.)

it's highly problematic when they already have thousands of pages worth of misconceptions

Fair point.

(BTW, I'm going offline for a week now; for reasons unrelated to LW or this debate.)

EDIT:

For the record: Of course there are things where I consider the probability to be so high or so low that I treat them for all practical purposes as 100% or 0%. If you ask me e.g. whether gravity exists, I will simply say "yes"; I am not going to role-play Spock and give you a number with 15 decimal places. I wouldn't even know exactly how many nines are there after the decimal dot. (But again, there is a difference between "believing there is a probability" and "being able to tell the exact number".)

The most obvious impact of probabilistic reasoning on my behavior is that I generally don't trust long chains of words. Give me 1000 pages of syllogisms that allegedly prove something, and my reaction will be "the probability that somewhere in that chain is an error is so high that the conclusion is completely unreliable". (For example, I am not even trying to understand Hegel. Yeah, there are also other reasons to distrust him specifically, but I would not trust such long chain of logic without experimental confirmation of intermediate results from any author.)

Comment author: curi 20 November 2017 12:28:18AM 0 points [-]

I believe that your belief in "refutation by criticism" as something that either is or isn't, but doesn't have "gradation of certainty", is so fundamentally wrong that it doesn't make sense to debate further.

I think there's something really wrong when your reaction to disagreement is to think there's no point in further discussion. That leaves me thinking you're a bad person to discuss with. Am I mistaken?

Making mistakes isn't random or probabilistic. When you make a judgement, there is no way to know some probability that your judgement is correct. Also, if judgements need probabilities, won't your judgement of the probability of a mistake have its own probability? And won't that judgement also have a probability, causing an infinite regress of probability assignments?

Mistakes are unpredictable. At least some of them are. So you can't predict (even probabilistically) whether you made one of the unpredictable types of mistakes.

What you can do, fallibly and tentatively, is make judgements about whether a critical argument is correct or not. And you can, when being precise, formulate all problems in a binary way (a given thing either does or doesn't solve it) and consider criticisms binarily (a criticism either explains why a solution fails to solve the binary problem, or doesn't).

So let me ask you; is Popper's argument against induction the kind of knowledge that cannot be explained to an a intelligent adult person using less than 1 page of text; not even in a simplified form?

That'd work fine if they knew everything or nothing about induction. However, it's highly problematic when they already have thousands of pages worth of misconceptions about induction (some of which vary from the next guy's misconceptions). The misconceptions include vague parts they don't realize are vague, non sequiturs they don't realize are non sequiturs, confusion about what induction is, and other mistakes plus cover up (rationalizations, dishonesty, irrationality).

Induction would be way easier to explain to a 10 year old in a page than to anyone at LW, due to lack of bias and prior misconceptions. I could also do quantum physics in a page for a ten year old. QM is easy to explain at a variety of levels of detail, if you don't have to include anything to preemptively address pre-existing misconceptions, objections, etc. E.g., in a sentence: "Science has discovered there are many things your eyes can't see, including trillions of other universes with copies of you, me, the Earth, the sun, everything."

Comment author: MaryCh 19 November 2017 07:47:47PM 0 points [-]

alright, then: at what earliest point do people start reading their predictions for another year?

Comment author: Viliam 19 November 2017 03:55:12PM 0 points [-]

In the linked article, you seem to treat "refutation by criticism" as something absolute. Either something is refuted by criticism, or it isn't refuted by criticism; and in either case you have 100% certainty about which one of these two options it is.

There seems to be no space for situations like "I've read a quite convincing refutation of something, but I still think there is a small probability there was a mistake in this clever verbal construction". It either "was refuted" or it "wasn't refuted"; and as long as you are willing to admit some probability, I guess it by default goes to the "wasn't refuted" basket.

In other words, if you imagine a variable containing value "X was refuted by criticism", the value of this variable at some moment switches from 0 to 1, without any intermediate values. I mean, if you reject gradations of certainty, then you are left with a black-and-white situation where either you have the certainty, or you don't; but nothing in between.

If this is more or less correct, then I am curious about what exactly happens in the moment where the variable actually switches from 0 to 1. Imagine that you are doing some experiments, reading some verbal arguments, and thinking about them. At some moment, the variable is at 0 (the hypothesis was not refuted by criticism yet), and at the very next moment the variable is at 1 (the hypothesis was refuted by criticism). What exactly happened during that last fraction of a second? Some mental action, I guess, like connecting two pieces of a puzzle together, or something like this. But isn't there some probability that you actually connected those two pieces incorrectly, and maybe you will notice this only a few seconds (or hours, days, years) later? In other words, isn't the "refutation by criticism" conditional on the probability that you actually understood everything correctly?

If, as I incorrectly said in previous comments, one experiment doesn't constitute refutation of a hypothesis (because the experiment may be measured or interpreted incorrectly), then what exactly does? Two experiments? Seven experiments? Thirteen experiments and twenty four pages of peer-reviewed scientific articles? Because if you refute "gradations of certainty", then it must be that at some moment the certainty is not there, and at another moment there is... and I am curious about where and why is that moment.

your refusal to use outside sources is asking me to rewrite material. why?

Throwing books at someone is generally known as "courtier's reply". The more text you throw at me, the smaller probability that I would read them. (Similarly, I could tell you to read Korzybski's Science and Sanity, and only come back after you mastered it, because I believe -- and I truly do -- that it is related to some mistakes you are making. Would you?)

There are some situations when things cannot be explained by a short text. For example, if a 10-years old kid would ask me to explain him quantum physics in less than 1 page of text, I would give up. -- So let me ask you; is Popper's argument against induction the kind of knowledge that cannot be explained to an a intelligent adult person using less than 1 page of text; not even in a simplified form?

Sometimes the original form of the argument is not the best one. For example, Gödel spent hundreds of pages proving something that kids today could express as "any mathematical theorem can be stored on computer as a text file, which is kinda a big integer in base 256". (Took him hundreds of pages, because people didn't have computers back then.) So maybe the book where Popper explained his idea is similarly not the most efficient way to explain the idea. Also, if an idea cannot be explained without pointing to the original source, that is a bit suspicious. On the other hand, of course, not everyone is skilled at explaining, so sometimes the text written by a skilled author has this advantage.

Summary:

I believe that your belief in "refutation by criticism" as something that either is or isn't, but doesn't have "gradation of certainty", is so fundamentally wrong that it doesn't make sense to debate further. Because this is the whole point of why probabilistic reasoning, Bayes theorem, etc. is so popular on LW. (Because probabilities is what you use when you don't have absolute certainty, and I find it quite ironic that I am explaining this to someone who read orders of magnitude more of Popper than I did.)

In response to Log-odds (or logits)
Comment author: Jach 19 November 2017 02:55:33PM 1 point [-]

Sorry for the necro -- the linked article is 404'd. I uploaded a backup here. I didn't find it on the author's site but did find a copy through Web Archive; still, maybe my link will save someone else the hassle.

Comment author: Elo 19 November 2017 02:36:14PM 1 point [-]

Welcome!

how you apply rationality?

I manage my goals and my time using some systems I built myself. I manage my mental health using methods I built myself. I fix bugs as I go. I have lots of little things that are hard to detail but if you ask something more specific I probably have ideas.

Comment author: LodewijkvanderMeer 19 November 2017 08:14:55AM 1 point [-]

Hey!

I am a Dutch Liberal Arts & Sciences student (political philosophy, law and economics). Last semester I started studying Game Theory and only very recently I discovered the world of rationalists and this site. I am an absolute newbie when it comes to the themes discussed at LW, but I am completely fascinated.

I am now reading the sequences and will probably not post too much, because I will mostly be learning.

What I am very interested in, is how LW users actually apply rationality to their own lives. In terms of habit-formation, work/life/sleep-schedule, nurishment etc. What do you guys do and why do you do it? What (online) tools do you use? What life rules do you live up to?

Comment author: morganism 18 November 2017 08:20:12PM 0 points [-]

there are volunteer openings. They just launched a cubesatt to ISS, so they want to be considered a space-faring nation by the UN.

Vacancies in the Civics Division

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BydyXO59FB2GdngwSVI2azc2aG8/view

Comment author: morganism 18 November 2017 08:09:34PM *  1 point [-]

Hibernating ground squirrels provide clues to new stroke treatments.

" A treatment to help brain cells survive a stroke-induced lack of oxygen and glucose could dramatically improve patient outcomes, but no such neuroprotective agents for stroke patients exist."

"ebselen - was found to both boost SUMOylation in rat cells and keep them alive in the absence of oxygen and glucose."

http://www.sciencecodex.com/hibernating-ground-squirrels-provide-clues-new-stroke-treatments-617126

This is also important for space travel to the Belt and beyond. There is some research on-going on hibernation for humans.

and this, reverses brain trauma injury in mice.

https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2017/11/171117195341.htm

Comment author: curi 18 November 2017 08:08:29PM 0 points [-]

I have a low opinion of academic philosophers and philosophy journals. I was hoping to find a little intelligence somewhere. I have tried a lot of places. If you have better suggestions than philosophy journals or LW, let me know.

Comment author: IlyaShpitser 18 November 2017 08:00:26PM 0 points [-]

Everything you say in your post, about Popper issues, demonstrates huge ignorance.

Do you even know the name of Popper's philosophy?

It seems that you're completely out of your depth.

The reason you have trouble applying reason is b/c u understand reason badly.


I have a thought. Since you are a philosopher, would your valuable time not be better spent doing activities philosophers engage in, such as writing papers for philosophy journals?

Rather than arguing with people on the internet?


If you are here because you are fishing for people to go join your forum, may I suggest that this place is an inefficient use of your time? It's mostly dead now, and will be fully dead soon.

Comment author: curi 18 November 2017 07:18:31PM *  0 points [-]

(b) what you believe are LW beliefs about induction,

when i asked for references to canonical LW beliefs, i was told that would make it a cult, and LW does not have beliefs about anything. since no pro-LW ppl could/would state or link to LW's beliefs about induction – and were hostile to the idea – i think it's unreasonable to ask me to. individual ppl at LW vary in beliefs, so how am i supposed to write a one-size-fits-all criticism? LW ppl offer neither a one-size-fits-all pro-induction explanation nor do any of them offer it individually. e.g. you have not said how you think induction works. it's your job, not mine, to come up with some version of induction which you think actually works – and to do that while being aware of known issues that make that a difficult project.

again, there are methodology issues. unless LW gives targets for criticism – written beliefs anyone will take responsibility for the correctness of (you can do this individually, but you don't want to – you're busy, you don't care, whatever) – then we're kinda stuck (given also the unwillingness to address CR).

your refusal to use outside sources is asking me to rewrite material. why? some attempt to save time on your part. is that the right way to save time? no. could we talk about the right ways to save time? if you wanted to. but my comments about the right way to save time are in outside sources, primarily written by me, which you therefore won't read (e.g. the Paths Forward stuff, and i could do the Popper stuff linking only to my own stuff, which i have tons of, but that's still an outside source. i could copy/paste my own stuff here, but that's stupid. it's also awkward b/c i've intentionally not rewritten essays already written by my colleagues, b/c why do that? so i don't have all the right material written by myself personally, on purpose, b/c i avoid duplication.). so we're kinda stuck there. i don't want to repeat myself for literally more than the 50th time, for you personally (who hasn't offered me anything – not even much sign you'll pay attention, care, keep replying next week, anything), b/c you won't read 1) Popper 2) Deutsch 3) my own links to myself 4) my recent discussions with other LW ppl where i already rewrote a bunch of anti-induction arguments and wasn't answered.

as one example of many links to myself that you categorically don't want to address:

http://curi.us/1917-rejecting-gradations-of-certainty (including the comments)

Comment author: Elo 18 November 2017 07:01:27PM 0 points [-]

No. But they are probably not each as important as each other. And you can update without writing down the beliefs.

Comment author: MaryCh 18 November 2017 06:00:09PM 0 points [-]

but surely a normal person who makes a list of about 50 items can't update daily? they have stuff to do.

Comment author: Elo 18 November 2017 05:39:21PM 0 points [-]

Superforecasers (book) suggests updating regularly. Like daily if you think your predictions change.

Comment author: MaryCh 18 November 2017 05:37:03PM *  0 points [-]

(I think it is going to be useful, but I don't know yet.) I have a problem: lack of body mass, no set lunch break at work and things to do besides dinner that is yet to be made when I get home, which is about 7 pm. It's especially bad during "The Season" (middle August - middle October), the time when many people come to us to buy textbooks and we have time to maybe drink a cup of tea, if we remember to do it during a lull. Sometimes, I even took something with me and just forgot to take it out. Then we get home, eat whatever and go to sleep.

Recently, The Season ended & I tried eating just before I leave for home, so that when I do get home I have time to cook something that doesn't take much time, and/or uses ingredients from yesterday. Unfortunately, if I cook larger portions, we lose the food in the fridge. Now crossing fingers to keep this up.

Comment author: MaryCh 18 November 2017 05:09:43PM 0 points [-]

(btw, just thought to ask the people here who have thought about logging their predictions about the year 2018 around the end of December: How do you decide how much time you need before you settle on a prediction? I mean, if making a list on December, 31st is just a common point in time when to state your current state of knowledge, you have 364 days to come to it, but nobody takes so long.)

Comment author: Viliam 18 November 2017 03:53:25PM 1 point [-]

It seems that you're completely out of your depth, can't answer me, and don't want to make the effort to learn.

I generally agree with your judgment (assuming that the "effort to learn" refers strictly to Popper).

But before I leave this debate, I would like to point out that you (and Ilya) were able to make this (correct) judgment only because I put my cards on the table. I wrote, relatively shortly and without obfuscation, what I believe. Which allowed you to read it and conclude (correctly) "he is just an uneducated idiot". This allowed a quick resolution; and as a side effect I learned something.

This may or may not be ironically related to the idea of falsification, but at this moment I feel unworthy to comment on that.

Now I see two possible futures, and it is more or less your choice which one will happen:

Option 1:

You may try to describe (a) your beliefs about induction, (b) what you believe are LW beliefs about induction, and (c) why exactly are the supposed LW beliefs wrong, preferably with a specific example of a situation where following the LW beliefs would result in an obvious error.

This is the "high risk / high reward" scenario. It will cost you more time and work, and there is a chance that someone will say "oh, I didn't realize this before, but now I see this guy has a point; I should probably read more of what he says", but there is also a chance that someone will say "oh, he got Popper or LW completely wrong; I knew it was not worth debating him". Which is not necessarily a bad thing, but will probably feel so.

Yeah, there is also the chance that people will read your text and ignore it, but speaking for myself, there are two typical reasons why I would do that: either is text is written in a way that makes it difficult for me to decipher what exactly the author was actually trying to say; or the text depends on links to outside sources but my daily time budget for browsing internet is already spent. (That is why I selfishly urge you to write a self-contained article using your own words.) But other people may have other preferences. Maybe the best would be to add footnotes with references to sources, but make them optional for understanding the gist of the article.

Option 2:

You will keep saying: "guys, you are so confused about induction; you should definitely read Popper", and people at LW will keep thinking: "this guy is so confused about induction or about our beliefs about induction; he should definitely read the Sequences", and both sides will be frustrated about how the other side is unwilling to spend the energy necessary to resolve the situation. This is the "play it safe, win nothing" scenario. Also the more likely one.

Last note: Any valid argument made by Popper should be possible to explain without using the word "Popper" in text. Just like Pythagorean theorem is not about the person called Pythagoras, but about squares on triangles, and would be equally valid if instead it would be discovered or popularized by a completely different person; you could simply call it "squares-on-triangles theorem" and it would work equally well. (Related in Sequences: "Guessing the teacher's password"; "Argument Screens Off Authority".) If something is true about induction, it is true regardless of whether Popper did or didn't believe it.

Comment author: morganism 17 November 2017 11:18:00PM 0 points [-]
Ask HN: How can I use my web development skills for space exploration/tech?

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=15725849

Hate to just post up HN, but there are some good employment ideas in this post. You can also go out to the Mojave Space Port if you have mech skills.

Comment author: morganism 17 November 2017 09:41:41PM 0 points [-]

and how to do low budget Sci-Fi right

The Drift

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f3XjJWqSNDg

Comment author: Elo 17 November 2017 09:36:00PM 1 point [-]

No. That's your interpretation. You have agency too to interpret what I say with clarity. You also value bold conjecture. So that's again your problem to work out what I mean and how to apply it.

Comment author: morganism 17 November 2017 09:17:45PM 1 point [-]

Pulse - 1988

A movie "loosely" based on the 84 story by John Varley called " Press Enter []". X Files also did a take-off on it, but all i remember was a "defense" satellite targeting a hide out trailer. I believe both of those were based on an un-freindly AI, but the Pulse movie was just a bit o' evil in the lines.

Some fabulous macro photog of electronic components overheating,and the play out of circuit boards to city streets is reminiscent of Tron.

An exemplary display of how important music and audio are to make suspenseful and tense tableau. Acting just adequate, and decent S.E. of elect discharge don't date it to bad.

Press Enter [] , Hugo and Nebula for Novella story, originally in Asimov's SF mag.

http://www.isfdb.org/cgi-bin/title.cgi?41040

Pulse - http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0095924/

Pulse - Utube- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g231VBvcZ5s

Comment author: curi 17 November 2017 09:05:21PM *  1 point [-]

What happened to NVC (Non-Violent Communication)? Your comments are purely intended to hurt me.

Comment author: Elo 17 November 2017 08:30:22PM 2 points [-]

a. virtue of silence

b. it's your job to work that out.

Comment author: curi 17 November 2017 08:03:44PM 0 points [-]

Why?

Comment author: IlyaShpitser 17 November 2017 07:26:47PM 2 points [-]

I don't think you and I have much to talk about.

Comment author: Elo 17 November 2017 06:58:27PM 0 points [-]

The virtue of silence is one of our 12 virtues here. That you don't know speaks to ignorance on your part. And perhaps on taking your own advice you might not have made this post at all. And maybe you would have learnt something instead.

Comment author: curi 17 November 2017 06:55:40PM *  0 points [-]

I don't even know what the abbreviation is supposed to mean. Seriously.

Do you even know the name of Popper's philosophy? Did you read the discussions about this that already happened on LW?

It seems that you're completely out of your depth, can't answer me, and don't want to make the effort to learn. You can't answer Popper, don't know of anyone or any writing that can, and are content with that. Your fellows here are the same way. So Popper goes unanswered and you guys stay wrong.

FYI Popper has lots of self-contained writing. Many of his book chapters are adapted from lectures, as you would know if you'd looked. I have written recommendations of which specific parts of Popper are best to read with brief comments on what they are about:

http://fallibleideas.com/books#popper

If you include links to other pages, I guess most people will not click them.

Everything you say in your post, about Popper issues, demonstrates huge ignorance, but there are no Paths Forward for you to get better ideas about this. The methodology dispute needs to be settled first, but people (including you) don't want to do that.

Comment author: curi 17 November 2017 06:43:18PM *  0 points [-]

Yeah, good points in both comments. Why don't you come to my forum where we'll appreciate them? :)

https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/fallible-ideas/info

Comment author: IlyaShpitser 17 November 2017 02:45:21PM *  2 points [-]

If you have a job and a family, and don't have time to get into what Popper actually said, maybe don't offer your opinion on what Popper actually said? That's just introducing bad stuff into a discussion for no reason.

Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen.


"The virtue of silence."

Comment author: Viliam 17 November 2017 10:31:11AM 0 points [-]

You guys still do that whole "virtue of scholarship" thing, or what?

Well, this specific guy has a job and a family, and studying "what Popper believed" is quite low on his list of priorities. If you want to provide a more educated answer to curi, go ahead.

Comment author: morganism 17 November 2017 06:41:41AM *  0 points [-]

3d app that brings galleries into your living room

http://www.artpassport.com/

https://www.theguardian.com/small-business-network/2017/nov/16/brave-new-art-world-the-app-that-brings-galleries-into-your-living-room

The app, called ArtPassport, also provides detailed information about individual artists and their works for newcomers to the art world. They’ve provided virtual tours of recent exhibitions including Haroon Mirza and Jake and Dinos Chapman at the Frieze art fair in London this year."

Comment author: morganism 17 November 2017 05:46:59AM 0 points [-]

The Effect of Cold Showering on Health and Work: A Randomized Controlled Trial

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5025014/

Looks like it makes you feel tougher, but didn't affect illness days.

Wonder if this is the same folks that did the sauna protects from alzheimers and heart failure....

Comment author: IlyaShpitser 17 November 2017 01:18:45AM *  3 points [-]

You should probably actually read Popper before putting words in his mouth.

According to Popper, not matter how much scientific evidence we have in favor of e.g. theory of relativity, all it needs is one experiment that will falsify it, and then all good scientists should stop believing in it.

You found this claim in a book of his? Or did you read some Wikipedia, or what?

For example, this is a quote from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

Popper has always drawn a clear distinction between the logic of falsifiability and its applied methodology. The logic of his theory is utterly simple: if a single ferrous metal is unaffected by a magnetic field it cannot be the case that all ferrous metals are affected by magnetic fields. Logically speaking, a scientific law is conclusively falsifiable although it is not conclusively verifiable. Methodologically, however, the situation is much more complex: no observation is free from the possibility of error—consequently we may question whether our experimental result was what it appeared to be.

Thus, while advocating falsifiability as the criterion of demarcation for science, Popper explicitly allows for the fact that in practice a single conflicting or counter-instance is never sufficient methodologically to falsify a theory, and that scientific theories are often retained even though much of the available evidence conflicts with them, or is anomalous with respect to them.

You guys still do that whole "virtue of scholarship" thing, or what?

Comment author: Viliam 16 November 2017 11:58:02PM *  2 points [-]

if i were to provide an anti-induction article, what properties should it have?

Regardless of the topic, I would say that the article should be easy to read, and relatively self-contained. For example, instead of "go read this book by Popper to understand how he defines X" you could define X using your own words, preferably giving an example (of course it's okay to also give a quote from Popper's book).

one question is whether it should assume the reader has background knowledge of CR.

I don't even know what the abbreviation is supposed to mean. Seriously.

Generally, I think that the greatest risk is people not even understanding what you are trying to say. If you include links to other pages, I guess most people will not click them. Aim to explain, not to convince, because a failure in explaining is automatically also a failure in convincing.

Maybe it would make sense for you to look at the articles that I believe (with my very unclear understanding of what you are trying to say) may be most relevant to your topic:
1) "Infinite Certainty" (and its mathy sequel "0 And 1 Are Not Probabilities"), and
2) "Scientific Evidence, Legal Evidence, Rational Evidence".

Because it seems to me that the thing about Popper and induction is approximately this...

Simplicio: "Can science be 100% sure about something?"
Popper: "Nope, that would mean that scientists would never change their minds. But they sometimes do, and that is an accepted part of science. Therefore, scientists are never 100% sure of their theories."
Simplicio: "Well, if they can't prove anything with 100% certainty, why don't we just ignore them completely? It's just another opinion, right?"
Popper: "Uhm... wait a minute... scientists cannot prove anything, but they can... uhm... disprove things! Yeah, that's what they do; they make many theories, they disprove most of them, and the one that keeps surviving is the official winner, for the moment. So it's not like the scientists proved e.g. the theory of relativity, but rather that they disproved all known competing theories, and failed to disprove the theory of relativity (yet)."

To which I would give the following objection:

1) How exactly could it be impossible to prove "X", and yet possible to disprove "not X"? If scientists are able to falsify e.g. the hypothesis that "two plus two does not equal four", isn't it the same as proving the hypothesis that "two plus two equals four"?

I imagine that the typical situation Popper had in mind included a few explicit hypotheses, e.g. A, B, C, and then a remaining option "something else that we did not consider". So he is essentially saying that scientists can experimentally disprove e.g. B and C, but that's not the same as proving A. Instead, they proved "either A, or something else that we did not consider, but definitely neither B nor C". Shortly: B and C were falsified, but A wasn't proven. And as long as there remains an unspecified category "things we did not consider", there is always a chance that A is merely an approximate solution, and the real solution is still unknown.

But it doesn't always have to be like this. Especially in math. But also in real life. Consider this:

According to Popper, not matter how much scientific evidence we have in favor of e.g. theory of relativity, all it needs is one experiment that will falsify it, and then all good scientists should stop believing in it. And recently, theory of relativity was indeed falsified by an experiment. Does it mean we should stop teaching the theory of relativity, because now it was properly falsified?

With the benefit of hindsight, now we know there was a mistake in the experiment. But... that's exactly my point. The concepts of "proving" and "falsifying" are actually much closer than Popper probably imagined. You may have a hypothesis "H", and an experiment "E", but if you say that you falsified "H", it means you have a hypothesis "F" = "the experiment E is correct and falsifies the theory H". To falsify H by E is to prove F; therefore if F cannot be scientifically proven, then H cannot be scientifically falsified. Proof and falsification are not two fundamentally different processes; they are actually two sides of the same coin. To claim that the experiment E falsifies the hypothesis H, is to claim that you have a proof that "the experiment E falsifies the hypothesis H"... and the usual interpretation of Popper is that there are no proofs in science.

The answer generally accepted on LessWrong, I guess, is that what really happens in science is that people believe theories with greater and greater probability. Never 100%. But sometimes with a very high probability instead, and for most practical purposes such high probability works almost like certainty. Popper may insist that science is unable to actually prove that moon is not made of cheese, but the fact is that most scientists will behave as if they already had such proof; they are not going to keep an open mind about it.

.

Short version: Popper was right about inability to prove things with 100% certainty, but then he (or maybe just people who quote him) made a mistake of imagining that disproving things is a process fundamentally different from proving things, so you can at least disprove things with 100% certainty. My answer is that you can't even disprove things with probability 100%, but that's okay, because the "100%" part was just a red herring anyway; what actually happens in science is that things are believed with greater probability.

Comment author: SquirrelInHell 16 November 2017 10:39:07PM 0 points [-]

I have no idea why people don't love this post.

Comment author: jmh 16 November 2017 07:20:24PM 0 points [-]

While not addressing the question of a role for AI I often find myself thinking we should get away for the frequent trading of financial assets and make them a bit more like the trading of mutual funds. Does all the intra-day trades really give more information or just add noise and the opportunity for the insiders to make money off retail (and even some institutional) investors?

Seem like designing the market to work a bit more like the one often used in the Econ 101 theory -- that Walrasian Auctioneer -- we could have more stable markets that do better at pricing capital assets than today. In other words, take all the order flow see that the prices are to clear and then all trade occurs at that price.

I suspect you'd still see some gaming the system with fake orders (a bit like the algos have been accused of in today's markets) but all systems get gamed.

Comment author: morganism 16 November 2017 09:21:58AM 0 points [-]

What is the computational power of the universe?

" Jordan does not imagine what we could learn if humanity somehow converted the entire cosmos into a vast computing device, he asks, now that the universe has undergone billions of years of change in accordance with the laws of nature, can we use what we see through our telescopes to gain insights into difficult computational problems? "

https://journals.aps.org/prd/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevD.96.103512

https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2017-11/nios-wit111517.php

Comment author: MaryCh 15 November 2017 07:17:42PM 0 points [-]

It is also very annoying that I know damn right what I mean by любой, and so does любой with whom I speak.

Sometimes, it seems to me that English is just too precise. Or maybe it's just me.

In Ukrainian, we have жодний, which means "none of the above" or smth like it... now that's a word worth having!

Comment author: IlyaShpitser 15 November 2017 07:09:29PM *  0 points [-]

It is very annoying that

любой is translated both as "any" and "every."

какой-либо is closer to formal logical "there exists" or "any."

Comment author: MaryCh 15 November 2017 07:04:17PM 0 points [-]

Русская киевлянка, первые 4 класса училась в Казани. Татарский, говорят, сильно отличается от крымско-татарского.

Comment author: IlyaShpitser 15 November 2017 07:00:13PM *  0 points [-]

Крымская tатарка?

Я одессит, родился в Крыму.

Comment author: MaryCh 15 November 2017 06:58:02PM 0 points [-]

And then, Ukrainian too has всяк/усякий (всякий) that is different from кожен (каждый)... If I were to translate усякий into English distinctly from both "every" and "any", I would probably have to say "of all kinds", but how do you say that about one thing?! anyway, this is silly.

(а мой "исходный" язык - русский + татарский + украинский. Даже не помню, что там в татарском делается.)

Comment author: MaryCh 15 November 2017 06:46:42PM 0 points [-]

What cases?

Comment author: entirelyuseless 15 November 2017 03:15:51PM 0 points [-]

unless you count cases where a child spent a few days in their company

There are many cases where the child's behavior is far more assimilated to the behavior of the animals than would be a credible result of merely a few days.

Comment author: IlyaShpitser 15 November 2017 02:30:23PM *  1 point [-]

It is possible to say that, but the work is being done by "combination." You can also say "for every permutation of n" and that means something different.

Typically when you say "for every x out of 30, property(x) holds" it means something like:

"every poster on lesswrong is a human being" (or more formally, "for every poster on lesswrong, that poster is a human being." (Note, this statement is meaningful but probably evaluates to false.)


Quantification is always over a set. If you are talking about permutations, you are first making a set of all permutations of 30 things (of which there are 30 factorial), and then saying "for every permutation in this set of permutations some property holds").


edit: realized your native language might be Ukrainian: I think a similar issue exists in Ukrainian quantifier adjectives.

Comment author: CronoDAS 15 November 2017 01:08:30PM 0 points [-]

Wasn’t the crash of 1987 at least partially attributed to “program trading” that was telling everyone to sell at once?

Comment author: MaryCh 15 November 2017 12:32:57PM 0 points [-]

It is still too improbable. Any kid in the wild is a free gift to the predator. Not just a baby, or a toddler.

My friend who studies wolves is quite adamant that it is simply impossible, unless you count cases where a child spent a few days in their company, because wolves often leave their toys for later.

Comment author: JenniferRM 15 November 2017 12:27:55PM 1 point [-]

If you just Google around there are a lot that hit the keyword that seem well attested.

Most of them are either cases of monstrous parental abuse (plus sometimes proximity to pets of the parent) or else the child was already at least a toddler (and often aged 3-7) when they went into the wild.

It is less surprising when you remember that in typical hunter gatherer societies the age at which children became roughly "calorie self sufficient" (not necessarily good nutrition, but able to gather enough not to starve) was around 4 or 5.

Parental neglect cases often have trouble walking, which is moderate evidence that "walking is cultural" in the sense that we might not have reliable instincts for learning to do it without having any positive examples and/or encouragement. Also these stories tend to support the idea of critical periods in language acquisition.

The ones that are usually hoaxes or gross exaggerations of real facts tend to be stories of very young children (like 0-18 month old babies) being literally raised by animals from scratch with no human input at all.

Comment author: MaryCh 15 November 2017 06:27:17AM 0 points [-]

(Still confused.) Then it is possible to say, in principle, "for every combination of n out of the whole set of n, property(x) hold)" and mean ordered combinations? Is there any other meaning for "every 30 out of 30"?

(yes, it is probably because of my language background. I don't even use the Russian analogues all that often!)

Comment author: fortyeridania 15 November 2017 02:18:41AM 0 points [-]

Introduction:

Artificial intelligence (AI) is useful for optimally controlling an existing system, one with clearly understood risks. It excels at pattern matching and control mechanisms. Given enough observations and a strong signal, it can identify deep dynamic structures much more robustly than any human can and is far superior in areas that require the statistical evaluation of large quantities of data. It can do so without human intervention.

We can leave an AI machine in the day-to-day charge of such a system, automatically self-correcting and learning from mistakes and meeting the objectives of its human masters.

This means that risk management and micro-prudential supervision are well suited for AI. The underlying technical issues are clearly defined, as are both the high- and low-level objectives.

However, the very same qualities that make AI so useful for the micro-prudential authorities are also why it could destabilise the financial system and increase systemic risk, as discussed in Danielsson et al. (2017).

Conclusion:

Artificial intelligence is useful in preventing historical failures from repeating and will increasingly take over financial supervision and risk management functions. We get more coherent rules and automatic compliance, all with much lower costs than current arrangements. The main obstacle is political and social, not technological.

From the point of view of financial stability, the opposite conclusion holds.

We may miss out on the most dangerous type of risk-taking. Even worse, AI can make it easier to game the system. There may be no solutions to this, whatever the future trajectory of technology. The computational problem facing an AI engine will always be much higher than that of those who seek to undermine it, not the least because of endogenous complexity.

Meanwhile, the very formality and efficiency of the risk management/supervisory machine also increases homogeneity in belief and response, further amplifying pro-cyclicality and systemic risk.

The end result of the use of AI for managing financial risk and supervision is likely to be lower volatility but fatter tails; that is, lower day-to-day risk but more systemic risk.

Comment author: IlyaShpitser 14 November 2017 11:09:40PM *  2 points [-]

"Every" doesn't need an order.

"For every x, property(x) holds" means "it is not the case that for any x, property(x) does not hold."

"For any x, property(x) holds" means "it is not the case that for every x, property(x) does not hold."

In Russian, quantifier adjectives are often implicit, which could be a part of the problem here. Native Russian speakers (like me) often have problems with this, also with definite vs indefinite articles in English.

edit: not only implicit but ambiguous when explicit, too!


Person below is right, "every" is sort of like an infinite "AND" and "any" is sort of like an infinite "OR."

Comment author: Lark 14 November 2017 10:52:58PM 1 point [-]

A quick thought; It seems like 'any' is related to the logic function of 'OR' and 'every' is related to the logic function of 'AND'. But likely I'm not totally grokking your question.

Does this thread elucidate anything? https://math.stackexchange.com/questions/49369/proper-way-to-read-forall-for-all-or-for-every

Comment author: curi 14 November 2017 07:38:24PM 0 points [-]

Stop making hostile assumptions, I wasn't even talking about Justin.

Comment author: MaryCh 14 November 2017 06:43:48PM *  0 points [-]

what does "any" mean, then?

(yes, I agree that of course it usually means the same in practice, that's why this is a stupid question:) I just... I guess I see "any" as a potentiality, and "every" as realisation... anyway, do you think we can talk about this structures in some more complex way than simple "any one thing out of the collection" and "every one thing..."? What would it mean? I imagine the "[every 2 out of 4] out of [every 30 out of 30]" like something like walked paths.

Edit to add: I just want to know what piece of math it corresponds to, mostly. (Combinatorics,obviously.) And what can be done next to this thing to make it more complicated and still exist, kind of. Like combining "anies" with "everies" in different ways, and, if I were to go crazy all the way, dividing things?

Comment author: MaryCh 14 November 2017 06:38:08PM 0 points [-]

then what story do you think was not made up?

Comment author: Lumifer 14 November 2017 05:20:39PM 0 points [-]

just threatened my friend

Justin used to be merely "a member of the FI forum. he followed one of my links". But now it turns out you're a team?

the reason you have trouble applying reason is b/c u understand reason badly

Mirrors. They are a thing, you should look into one.

why should everything be repeated ... is not productive ... people ... are unserious

Clearly, your valuable time is wasted here. You probably should go find emptier vessels to fill with your wisdom.

first, is give me a pro-induction article you endorse

I described to you my approach to induction. Were there any fatal flaws you noticed but didn't mention?

and no i don't give ideas probabilities

Yes, we understand your approach has problems :-P

Comment author: Elo 14 November 2017 04:42:16PM 1 point [-]

(this may not help). It is the difference between, "each of..." and, "all of...".

"if we go through each of the set, one at a time..." "if we go through all of the set"

They can be made to mean the same.

Comment author: entirelyuseless 14 November 2017 02:20:04PM 0 points [-]

I thought you were saying that feral children never existed and all the stories about them are completely made up. If so, I think you are clearly wrong.

Comment author: username2 14 November 2017 11:42:29AM 0 points [-]

Please keep posting here. Your powers of persuasion are amazing.

Comment author: MaryCh 14 November 2017 09:32:09AM 0 points [-]

I don't quite get the difference between "any" and "every" (in the more interesting cases.) Does "every 2 out of 30 [things have this property]" mean the set of ordered twos as a whole thing (unlike "any 2 two out of 30", which is talking about any one combination of two things but not all possible combinations taken at once?

And if "every" needs some kind of order, even if we don't know which, and some kind of "presented-togetherness", then we can, for example, say, "[every two out of four] out of [every thirty out of thirty]", but I don't quite understand what it would say...

I mean, it doesn't have to be something trivial like "every apple out of thirty apples has a spot on its side", it can be something like "every node out of thirty is connected to another node". But even this second case does not quite fit. Are there even objects for which "every 2 out of 30" and "every 1 out of 30" are two distinct things?

(and negation is even worse.)

Comment author: MaryCh 14 November 2017 09:17:19AM 0 points [-]

The moral was that it is wrong to use an obviously false claim to prove wrong something nobody believes in anyway... by NE, I mean "something so awfully outside of everyday experience that either it is totally made up, or a scientifically-minded person should look into it and see where it leads".

Comment author: MaryCh 14 November 2017 09:13:04AM 0 points [-]

well, yes, my friends biologists think this is the only possible explanation. everybody was laughing when we heard about the Antelope Boy who could run at 50 mph and lived among ruminants (in college! second year of college!) The professor didn't understand why.

Comment author: curi 14 November 2017 04:25:18AM 0 points [-]

if i were to provide an anti-induction article, what properties should it have?

apparently it should be different in some way than the ones already provided by Popper and DD, as individual book chapters.

one question is whether it should assume the reader has background knowledge of CR.

if so, it's easy, it'll be short ... and people here won't understand it.

if not, it'll be long and very hard to understand, and will repeat a lot of content from Popper's books.

what about a short logical argument about a key point, which doesn't explain the bigger picture? possible, but people hate those. they don't respond well to them. they don't just want their view destroyed without understanding any alternative. and anyway their own views are too vague to to criticize in a quick, logical way b/c whatever part you criticize, they can do without. there is no clear, essential, philosophical core they are attached to. if advocates of induction actually knew their own position, in exacting detail, inside and out, then you could quickly point out a logical flaw and they'd go "omg, that makes everything fall apart". but when you deal with people who aren't very clear on their own position, and who actually think all their beliefs are full of errors and you just have to muddle through and do your best ... then what kind of short argument will work?

Comment author: curi 14 November 2017 03:28:53AM *  0 points [-]

the moderators here actually just threatened my friend with a ban for posting a link to one of my articles about our philosophical disagreements, and deleted the thread. it was this one about empiricism and instrumentalism (not quite induction, but closely related): http://curi.us/2067-empiricism-and-instrumentalism

the reason you have trouble applying reason is b/c u understand reason badly. it's easy if u understand it well enuf. the idea/action gap is a matter of flaws in the ideas – both having the wrong ideas and also having incomplete ideas. ideas are what you need. nothing but ideas can help/save you.

insight porn sucks because its ideas aren't good enough, and are designed to impress people with standard memes, not to be useful. it's a trap which you shouldn't mix up with real philosophy.

also you ask about posting an anti-induction article. i wrote a number of anti-induction arguments both on the forums and in slack, which have not been answered. i also gave references to more, which have not been answered. why should everything be repeated for each individual who comes along and doesn't want to read references?

repeating arguments for people unwilling to look at the literature is not productive. it takes so much effort to understand philosophy that the effort of doing some reading is table stakes. people who don't want to do that are unserious. and you only have to read until the first mistake, and then comment. and if you're wrong about that first mistake, you can look for the second one and also take the matter more seriously. and by the 5th incorrect mistake i expect your full attention.

the methodology disagreements need to come before the induction disagreement or we won't be discussing induction using the same rules of discussion.

and you ask me to define induction so we're on the same page. that's part of the problem. ppl are LW are not on the same page, and want to all be addressed individually – which is too much work, and anyway none of them take responsibility for finding the truth, they all just quit after a small amount of discussion, as i expect you to as well. if you want to learn, join FI ( http://fallibleideas.com/discussion-info ) and ask and ppl will help you. or read. http://fallibleideas.com/books or look through the discussions i already had here (both recently and years ago) and answer the points that others did not. you can find logs of the slack chats at https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/fallible-ideas/info

more broadly, inductivists vary so much – and most barely know anything about induction. so there's no really short one-size-fits-all way to address the issue. it's a big topic. hence lots of important arguments – and, perhaps more importantly, extensive explanation of the alternative.

if you really want an anti-induction article, one of the best things you could do, first, is give me a pro-induction article you endorse, and stand behind, and take responsibility for. shouldn't that come first? but when i asked for canonical LW material that would be appropriate to respond to, and that anyone would care if it was mistaken ... i was flamed. lay out your positive claims in a serious way – stick your neck out as CR has – before asking for refutation of your unspecified positive claims.

and no i don't give ideas probabilities. https://yesornophilosophy.com

Comment author: Elo 14 November 2017 02:54:20AM 0 points [-]

An alternative theory is that they were mentally damaged and were dumped after a few years when the parents decided they didn't want to raise them.

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