of course, it really shouldn't, there are better alternatives
I share this intuition as well and sometimes bring it up during discussions with SIAI people about cryonics. Can you explain your reasoning further? My arguments were like "All the resources an FAI would need to upload cryonics patients would be enough for years and years and years of simulated fun theory agents or whatever an FAI would use computronium for."
In general I guess I just assume that post-Singularity computronium (if the FAI doesn't just hack out of any matrixes it can) (and without considering acausal trade) would be used for things we can't really anticipate; probably not lots of happy brain emulations. But others think this 'identity' thing is really important to humanity and we're likely to hold onto it even through volition extrapolation. In response I'm often reminded of Wei's 'Complexity of Value != Complexity of Outcome'.
What are your thoughts on the matter?
I antipredict that "people get reanimated", but it doesn't follow that preserving people's minds using cryonics is morally irrelevant, or less so than the corresponding chance of saving human life. By preserving one's mind, you give the future additional information that it can use to produce more value, even if that's done not in the status quo manner (by reanimating).
Giulio Prisco made a blog post giving permission to use the data in his Gmail account to reconstruct an uploaded copy of him.
Ben Goertzel copied the post and gave the same permission on his own blog. I made some substantial changes, such as adding a caveat to exclude the possibility of torture worlds (unlikely I know, but can't hurt), and likewise gave permission in my blog. Anders Sandberg comments on the thing.