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RichardKennaway comments on Pascal's Mugging as an epistemic problem - Less Wrong Discussion

3 [deleted] 04 October 2010 05:52PM

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Comment author: RichardKennaway 05 October 2010 03:45:44PM *  0 points [-]

The counter-counter argument is then that you should indeed assign a zero probability to anyone's ability to produce arbitrary amounts of utility.

Yes, I know it is rhetorically claimed that 0 and 1 are not probabilities. I suggest that this example refutes that claim. You must assign zero probability to such things, otherwise you get money-pumped, and lose.

Comment author: [deleted] 05 October 2010 05:02:47PM 0 points [-]

Well, as someone else suggested, you could just ignore all probabilities below a certain noise floor. You don't necessarily have to assign 0 probability to those things, you could just make it a heuristic to ignore them.

Comment author: RichardKennaway 06 October 2010 08:31:00AM 0 points [-]

All that does is adopt a different decision theory but not call it that, sidestepping the requirement to formalise and justify it. It's a patch, not a solution, like solving FAI by saying we can just keep the AI in a box.