If we don't assume Laplace's demon to be located within the universe, can't we believe it's possible in principle without rejecting QM? As best I can tell, QM assuming MWI is still a deterministic system, it just appears otherwise to observers within the system because of the problems with subjective experience and entanglement.
Perhaps I should say: I believe it's impossible for Laplace's demon to exist, but I believe that if it did exist it would work (perfect information -> perfect predictions).
Since there is no handy toll to create polls on LW, please post comments on your position.
As which of the following would you identify yourself? (I am not good at rationalist taboo, thus please excuse me for ambiguous terms.)
Strong ontological reductionst
See defintion on Wikipedia. Someone who believes that mental phenomena can be fully reduced to physics and that physics can be fully reduced to mathematics. That is, desires and electrons don't have any fundamental qualities, but are in the end mathematical objects. And nothing exists outside the mathematical realm.
Weak ontological reductionist
Someone who believes that mental phenomena don't have any qualities outside the domain of physics. Every aspect of mental phenomena can be fully reduced to physical phenomena. But physical phenomena are not necessarily mathematical objects.
Strong scientific reductionist
Someone who believes that quantum mechanics is wrong and Laplace's demon can exist in principle (if unrestricted by physical limitations).
Weak scientific reductionist
Someone who concedes that it is impossible in principle to predict complicated physical systems, but that the concepts and theories in chemistry and biology are mere approximations and simplifications of complicated physical computations to sidestep the (faster-than-)exponential wall. That is, chemical and biological models are not fundamental, but are reducible to physical theories (if we had the theoretical computational power to simulate the models).
Please also comment if you are not a reductionist and explain what kind of reductionist you are not.