Nope, it looks more like this:

"Given our observations so far, either many worlds or Copenhagen interpretations could be the 'right'(1) program. Since MWI is simpler to write down(2), we should assign it a higher probability of being 'right.'"

I'm not entirely sure what 1 means for programs that output the same bit strings for all possible measurements (e.g. Hamiltonian vs. Lagrangian formulation, but not evolution vs. God did it, since those make different predictions). But we can use JGWeissman's idea of the simpler one contributing more probability to a hypothesis, and therefore being "more important" rather than "right."

2 is a little more problematic, since it seems pretty tough to prove. "Just look at them!" is not a very good method, you would actually need to write the computer programs down, barring some elegant argument that involves deep knowledge of how the computer programs would turn out.

EDIT: Actually, that's not really an application of Occam's razor, which is pretty vague, but rather an application of the more specific Solomonoff prior.