I think that the more general problem is that if the absolute value of the utility that you attach to a world-state increases faster than does its complexity decreases given the current situation then the very possibility of that world-state existing will cause it to hijack the entirety of your utility function
Yes, that's exactly the problem.
We often call such things a 'problem' yet by very definition it is exactly how it should be. If your utility function genuinely represents your preferences (including preferences with respect to risk) then rejoice in the opportunity to devote all your resources to the possibility in question! If it doesn't then the only 'problem' is that your 'utility function', well, isn't your actual utility function. It's the same problem that you get when you think you like carrots when you really like peaches.
Voluntary dedication is not 'hijacking'.
(Response primarily directed to quoted text and only a response to the parent in as much as it follows the problem frame.)
If it doesn't then the only 'problem' is that your 'utility function', well, isn't your actual utility function. It's the same problem that you get when you think you like carrots when you really like peaches.
For background, see here.
In a comment on the original Pascal's mugging post, Nick Tarleton writes:
Coming across this again recently, it occurred to me that there might be a way to generalize Vassar's suggestion in such a way as to deal with Tarleton's more abstract formulation of the problem. I'm curious about the extent to which folks have thought about this. (Looking further through the comments on the original post, I found essentially the same idea in a comment by g, but it wasn't discussed further.)
The idea is that the Kolmogorov complexity of "3^^^^3 units of disutility" should be much higher than the Kolmogorov complexity of the number 3^^^^3. That is, the utility function should grow only according to the complexity of the scenario being evaluated, and not (say) linearly in the number of people involved. Furthermore, the domain of the utility function should consist of low-level descriptions of the state of the world, which won't refer directly to words uttered by muggers, in such a way that a mere discussion of "3^^^^3 units of disutility" by a mugger will not typically be (anywhere near) enough evidence to promote an actual "3^^^^3-disutilon" hypothesis to attention.
This seems to imply that the intuition responsible for the problem is a kind of fake simplicity, ignoring the complexity of value (negative value in this case). A confusion of levels also appears implicated (talking about utility does not itself significantly affect utility; you don't suddenly make 3^^^^3-disutilon scenarios probable by talking about "3^^^^3 disutilons").
What do folks think of this? Any obvious problems?