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Larks comments on Discussion for Eliezer Yudkowsky's paper: Timeless Decision Theory - Less Wrong Discussion
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Comments (61)
No reason to precommit to AVOID gum.
Gum is beneficial, so you don't want to precommit against it. Nonetheless, it is evidence of a bad thing.
I don't follow. Chewing gum is strictly better, so I'll precommit to it. Precommitting to picking only box B is better than precomitting to picking box A and B, so if I had to precommit I would choose to do so for box B.
That has been debunked.
I guess I am just following the parallels between the two problems.
Yes, you might want to precommit to it. But you don't want to precommit against it, which is Eliezer's point. In the parallel example (Newcombe's box), you do want to precommit against the thing which seems to strictly dominate, and the difference between the two cases is the justification for treating time-invariance as important.
Ok, hah, I don't think we disagree on anything here. I think I made a mistake in reading "has no reason to precommit himself to avoiding gum" as "has no reason to precommit himself [to anything]". My bad. Thanks for helping out!
That would be quite important! =)
Does he need to precommit to chew gum? I haven't read the doc. in months, but I don't recall their being any danger of temporal inconsistancy in that case.
No he doesn't. Eliezer compares this version of Solomon's problem to the Newcomb's problem, where precommitment actually makes a difference.