Alexei comments on Discussion for Eliezer Yudkowsky's paper: Timeless Decision Theory - Less Wrong Discussion
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Ok, hah, I don't think we disagree on anything here. I think I made a mistake in reading "has no reason to precommit himself to avoiding gum" as "has no reason to precommit himself [to anything]". My bad. Thanks for helping out!
That would be quite important! =)
Does he need to precommit to chew gum? I haven't read the doc. in months, but I don't recall their being any danger of temporal inconsistancy in that case.
No he doesn't. Eliezer compares this version of Solomon's problem to the Newcomb's problem, where precommitment actually makes a difference.