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Vaniver comments on Discussion for Eliezer Yudkowsky's paper: Timeless Decision Theory - Less Wrong Discussion

10 Post author: Alexei 06 January 2011 12:28AM

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Comment author: Vaniver 07 January 2011 06:59:01PM *  1 point [-]

Basically, the problem with your second paragraph is that actions do not uniquely determine preferences.

Why is this a problem? [edit] To be clearer, I get why actions to do not uniquely determine preferences, but I don't yet get why I should care.

Comment author: SilasBarta 11 February 2011 06:18:50PM 0 points [-]

Sorry for the thread necromancy, but this has an easy answer: read the rest of my comment, after the part you quoted.