Inspired by Don't Plan For the Future.
For the purposes of discussion on this site, a Friendly AI is assumed to be one that shares our terminal values. It's a safe genie that doesn't need to be told what to do, but anticipates how to best serve the interests of its creators. Since our terminal values are a function of our evolutionary history, it seems reasonable to assume that an FAI created by one intelligent species would not necessarily be friendly to other intelligent species, and that being subsumed by another species' FAI would be fairly catastrophic.
Except.... doesn't that seem kind of bad? Supposing I were able to create a strong AI, and it created a sound fun-theoretic utopia for human beings, but then proceeded to expand and subsume extraterrestrial intelligences, and subject them to something they considered a fate worse than death, I would have to regard that as a major failing of my design. My utility function assigns value to the desires of beings whose values conflict with my own. I can't allow other values to supersede mine, but absent other considerations, I have to assign negative utility in my own function for creating negative utility in the functions of other existing beings. I'm skeptical that an AI that would impose catastrophe on other thinking beings is really maximizing my utility.
It seems to me that to truly maximize my utility, an AI would need to have consideration for the utility of other beings. Secondary consideration, perhaps, but it could not maximize my utility simply by treating them as raw material with which to tile the universe with my utopian civilization.
Perhaps my utility function gives more value than most to beings that don't share my values (full disclosure, I prefer the "false" ending of Three Worlds Collide, although I don't consider it ideal.) However, if an AI imposes truly catastrophic fates on other intelligent beings, my own utility function takes such a hit that I cannot consider it friendly. A true Friendly AI would need to be at least passably friendly to other intelligences to satisfy me.
I don't know if I've finally come to terms with Eliezer's understanding of how hard Friendly AI is, or made it much, much harder, but it gives me a somewhat humbling perspective of the true scope of the problem.
If I am completely and consistently aware of what I actually value, then yes, my desires are equivalent to my values and it makes no sense to talk about satisfying one while challenging the other (modulo cases of values-in-tension, as you say, which isn't what I'm talking about).
My experience is that people are not completely and consistently aware of what they actually value, and it would astonish me if I turned out to be the fortunate exception.
Humans frequently treat instrumental goals as though they were terminal. Indeed, I suspect that's all we ever do.
But even if I'm wrong, and it turns out that there really are terminal values in there somewhere, then I expect that most humans aren't aware of them and if some external system starts optimizing for them, and is willing to trade arbitrary amounts of a merely instrumental good in exchange for the terminal good it serves as a proxy for (as well it should), we'll experience that as emotionally unpleasant and challenging.
Solid answer, as far as I can see right now.