Marcus Hutter once wrote:
Another problem connected, but possibly not limited to embodied agents, especially if they are rewarded by humans, is the following: Sufficiently intelligent agents may increase their rewards by psychologically manipulating their human “teachers”, or by threatening them. This is a general sociological problem which successful AI will cause, which has nothing specifically to do with AIXI.
These days, one might say: "this is a general sociological problem which pure reinforcement learning agents will cause - which illustrates why we should not build them."
Link: physicsandcake.wordpress.com/2011/01/22/pavlovs-ai-what-did-it-mean/
Suzanne Gildert basically argues that any AGI that can considerably self-improve would simply alter its reward function directly. I'm not sure how she arrives at the conclusion that such an AGI would likely switch itself off. Even if an abstract general intelligence would tend to alter its reward function, wouldn't it do so indefinitely rather than switching itself off?
If it wants to maximize its reward by increasing a numerical value, why wouldn't it consume the universe doing so? Maybe she had something in mind along the lines of an argument by Katja Grace:
Link: meteuphoric.wordpress.com/2010/02/06/cheap-goals-not-explosive/
I am not sure if that argument would apply here. I suppose the AI might hit diminishing returns but could again alter its reward function to prevent that, though what would be the incentive for doing so?
ETA:
I left a comment over there:
ETA #2:
What else I wrote: