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Stuart_Armstrong comments on Revisiting the anthropic trilemma I: intuitions and contradictions - Less Wrong Discussion

0 Post author: Stuart_Armstrong 15 February 2011 11:18AM

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Comment author: Stuart_Armstrong 16 February 2011 12:26:57AM 0 points [-]

I'd actually defined the utility of a universe as the average utility of my copies therein, so, depending on what utility I give to universes empty of copies of me, the suicide idea might not be a good one to follow.

But I freely admit my utility is sub-par, and doesn't work. But the more severe problem is not that it leads to crazy answers; the problem is that it allows money pumping. Crazy answers can be patched, but vulnerabilities to constantly losing utility is a great hole in the theory.

Comment author: JGWeissman 16 February 2011 12:42:12AM 1 point [-]

I'd actually defined the utility of a universe as the average utility of my copies therein

Why not the sum?

Comment author: Stuart_Armstrong 16 February 2011 07:40:33AM 0 points [-]

Because I get to say what my intuitions are :-) And they are that if I have a hundred copies all getting exactly the same nice experience, then this is just one positive experience. However, in my next post, I don't get to define my utility based on my intuitions, I have to follow some assumptions, and so I don't end up in the same place...

Comment author: rwallace 16 February 2011 12:50:28AM 0 points [-]

Right, the fact that dividing by the number of copies of you sometimes gives division by zero is another good reason for not doing it :-)

But your assessment of problem importance is interesting. I would've said it the other way around. In practice, we tend to quickly notice when we are being money pumped, and apply a patch on the fly, so at worst we only end up losing a bit of money, which is recoverable. Crazy policies on the other hand... usually do little damage because we compartmentalize, but when we fail to compartmentalize, the resulting loss may not be recoverable.

Comment author: Stuart_Armstrong 16 February 2011 07:44:51AM *  0 points [-]

This is a valid point for humans (who are not utilitarians at all). but when thinking of an ideal, AI-safe ethics, money pumps are a great falw: because the AI will get pumped again, again, and again, and lose utility. Alternately, the AI will patch its system on the fly; and if we don't know how it does this, it could end up with a crazy policy - its unpredictable.

Comment author: rwallace 16 February 2011 09:34:16AM 0 points [-]

Maybe; honestly, nobody knows yet. We're still too far from being able to build an AI for which ethics would be a relevant concept, to be able to say what such an ethics should look like. For all we really know, perhaps if and when we get to that point, it might become apparent that a system of supervisor modules to perform on-the-fly patching to reliably keep things within sensible bounds is a better solution than trying for logically perfect ethics, for any mind operating under physically realistic constraints of data and computing power.