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JoshuaZ comments on The non-painless upload - Less Wrong Discussion

1 Post author: Prismattic 15 February 2011 04:23AM

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Comment author: JoshuaZ 15 February 2011 05:16:07AM 2 points [-]

I don't think you are interpreting the hypothetical as Prismatic intended. You split into two versions, one of which is an upload of you right before the pain starts. The other version (your brain undergoing something like very slow deconstruction) experiences a thousand years of agony.

Comment author: Dreaded_Anomaly 15 February 2011 05:26:35AM 2 points [-]

Oh, I see. That does challenge my usual conception of identity more than my initial interpretation.

In essence, then, this is asking if I would choose to sacrifice myself in order to preserve myself. I believe that I like myself enough to do that. If my exact brain-state continues onward while the "original" experiences the pain, my identity does diverge, but it does so after I make the choice to press the button. In that sense, my identity continues, while also being tortured. The continuation, given its time span, seems ultimately more important when considering the alternative of ceasing to exist altogether.