You are entirely justified in not swallowing your alienation to ugly, pointless, embarrassing, aggravating behavior like what you describe those folks engaging in.
Rejecting that doesn't make you screwed up.
But the conversation you describe doesn't suddenly become less ugly, pointless, embarrassing, or aggravating if these people had instead been being arguing the same way about, say, hypothetically losing billions of dollars, or hypothetically moving from Beverly Hills to Bangladesh, or hypothetically swimming the English Channel.
That is, I don't think the event you're describing justifies the conclusion you're trying to use it to justify.
That said, I also don't think you actually care about that.
I have been trying to absorb the Lesswrong near-consensus on cryonics/quantum mechanics/uploading, and I confess to being unpersuaded by it. I'm not hostile to cryonics; just indifferent, and having a bit of trouble articulating why the insights on identity that I have been picking up from the quantum mechanics sequence aren't compelling to me. I offer the following thought experiment in hopes that others may be able to present the argument more effectively if they understand the objection here.
Suppose that Omega appears before you and says, “All life on Earth is going to be destroyed tomorrow by [insert cataclysmic event of your choice here]. I offer you the chance to push this button, which will upload your consciousness to a safe place out of reach of the cataclysmic event, preserving all of your memories, etc. up to the moment you pushed the button and optimizing you such that you will be effectively immortal. However, the uploading process is painful, and because it interferes with your normal perception of time, your original mind/body will subjectively experience the time after you pushed the button but before the process is complete as a thousand years of the most intense agony. Additionally, I can tell you that a sufficient number of other people will choose to push the button that your uploaded existence will not be lonely.”
Do you push the button?
My understanding of the Lesswrong consensus on this issue is that my uploaded consciousness is me, not just a copy of me. I'm hoping the above hypothetical illustrates why I'm having trouble accepting that.