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TheOtherDave comments on The non-painless upload - Less Wrong Discussion
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Hm.
I can imagine myself agreeing to be tortured in exchange for someone I love being allowed to go free. I expect that, if that offer were accepted, shortly thereafter I would agree to let my loved one be tortured in my stead if that will only make the pain stop. I expect that, if that request were granted, I would regret that choice and might in fact even agree to be tortured again.
It would not surprise me to discover that I could toggle between those states several times until I eventually had a nervous breakdown.
It's really unclear to me how I'm supposed to account for these future selves' expressed preferences, in that case.
It's really unclear to me how I'm supposed to account for these future selves' expressed preferences, in that case.
In the case that the tortured-you would make the same decision all over again, my intuition (I think) agrees with yours. My objection is basically to splitting off "selves" and subjecting them to things that the post-split self would never consent to.
(nods) That's reasonable.
OTOH, I do think I can consent now to consequences that my future self will have to suffer, even if my future self will at that point -- when the benefits are past, and the costs are current -- withdraw that consent.