It's as though there were a separate subfield of mathematics devoted entirely to proposing axioms and definitions, and someone was defending that subfield against criticisms that it doesn't produce "results" simply by listing some of the definitions that have become standard.
Of course definitions are important, but this kind of exercise seems futile.
Number 8 is a case in point. It may as well simply state "Kripke's theory of alethic modal operators and natural kinds has become standard". Which is true, and Kripke's theory is interesting in many ways, but sometimes it's more of a hindrance than a help: There's this theory of "2 dimensional semantics" whose entire purpose (as far as I can tell) is to allow philosophers to pay lip service to Kripke's theory while ignoring it in practice.
(To fit the pieces together, follow the link above, substituting "cats" for "water" and "animals" for "H2O"; and also read Richard Chappell's post.)
Philosophy is notorious for not answering the questions it tackles. Plato posed most of the central questions more than two millennia ago, and philosophers still haven't come to much consensus about them. Or at least, whenever philosophical questions begin to admit of answers, we start calling them scientific questions. (Astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology all began as branches of philosophy.)
A common attitude on Less Wrong is "Too slow! Solve the problem and move on." The free will sequence argues that the free will problem has been solved.
I, for one, am bold enough to claim that some philosophical problems have been solved. Here they are: