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Matt_Simpson comments on Non-personal preferences of never-existed people - Less Wrong Discussion

12 Post author: Stuart_Armstrong 10 March 2011 07:54PM

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Comment author: Matt_Simpson 10 March 2011 09:10:15PM 3 points [-]

Some people see never-existed people as moral agents, and claim that we can talk about their preferences. Generally this means their personal preference in existing versus non-existing. Formulations such "it is better for someone to have existed than not" reflect this way of thinking.

It might just reflect the speaker's preference for people to exist rather than not exist rather than referencing the preferences of the potentially hypothetical person.

Comment author: Stuart_Armstrong 11 March 2011 10:47:38AM 0 points [-]

Well yes, it does, in my opinion. But it's not often phrased honestly.

Comment author: Nisan 11 March 2011 03:44:09PM 0 points [-]

What might be going on is that people are tempted to use a person's preference for existing as a proxy for the value of their life, in the same way that a person's preferences for birthday presents can inform us about what kinds of birthday presents will make them happier.

I would certainly think twice about having a child if I knew the child would grow up to express a wish to never have been born. And I'm not even a preference utilitarian. But this approach seems problematic, and it's probably better to just ask ourselves what kind of people we want to bring into existence.

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