The Law of Karma would need to determine which events are concordant with Cosmic Justice and which are not. I suppose your hypothetical friend would agree that the Law of Karma behaves as if there were a god with a sense of Cosmic Justice. So their cosmology is a theist's cosmology except with the "exists" tag removed from all gods.
I'm not sure what Richard Carrier's definition makes of this.
ETA: Looking a second time at this post, it seems clear that Richard Carrier would regard a Law of Karma as a mental property of the universe, even if there is no mind controlling it. Eliezer's interpretation of this definition is more clear.
I guess so?
I mean, I'm really not sure what it means for something to be theism except without any gods, but I suppose that describes my hypothetical friend's cosmology.
Then again, I suppose it describes my cosmology as well.
I mean, I believe the universe is arranged in such a way that (for example) particles attract one another with a force that is proportional to their mass and inversely proportional to the square of their distance, but I suppose I would agree (albeit queasily) that the Law of Gravitation behaves as if there were a god with the desire to cause things to attract one another in this way.
I guess.
I suspect I've altogether missed your point.
The term "supernatural" is frequently used in discussions related to skepticism. I am trying to establish the category that people refer to with this term.
All uses of this term appear to imply a separation of concepts and events into two disjoint categories: "natural" and "supernatural". Some examples of things typically classified into "supernatural": God, ghosts, telepathy, telekinesis, aura. Things typically classified as "natural": animals, rocks, talking, earthquake, body temperature.
I will try to follow the advice given in Similarity Clusters and try to establish some verbal hints as to what causes a concept to be classified into either similarity cluster.
One idea I had is the following: anything we expect to be able to experience, if the necessary prerequisites are met, is "natural"; anything we expect to fail to experience even if we try hard is "supernatural". This seems to work quite well on the concepts mentioned above. This works for unlikely events too: a plane crash is not "supernatural" because if I'm at the right place and the right time then I expect to be able to experience it.
It's still a bit weak for exceedingly unlikely events. For example, proton decay has never been witnessed, and we don't know if it can even occur. But "proton decay" is not classified as "supernatural"; rather as a "hypothesis". Telepathy, however, might for all we know be as rare as proton decay (thus being exceedingly hard to confirm experimentally), and yet it's classified into "supernatural". Something is missing from this verbal hint.
But what?
Approaching this from a different perspective, it appears that one can classify "supernatural" as having the property of being "outside of the universe". On further thought, however, this isn't helpful at all: the latter is not so much a verbal hint as a label in itself.
If taken literally, one might argue that all supernatural things therefore don't exist. They are said to be outside the universe, but we can only experience things within the universe, because anything we can experience must be part of the universe, and thus "inside" it. This is quite useless, however, in my opinion: as used by actual people, the category "supernatural" isn't intended to preclude existence. So this doesn't work.
Could it be that the category "supernatural" is actually completely useless, by offering so little information about the things that belong to it that knowing that something is classified as "supernatural" doesn't tell us very much at all?
Thinking about this led me to the idea that perhaps "supernatural" simply means "something that science has shown false or doesn't accept as a valid theory". That is certainly a property I infer about P when told that P belongs to "supernatural".
This is still quite unsatisfactory. It can't be the only property. People explain away God's undetectability by being "supernatural", intending it as a convincing argument - but even those who do things like this wouldn't claim that "not a valid theory" is an argument in favour of God. They must mean something else.
But what?