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Desrtopa comments on Bayesian Epistemology vs Popper - Less Wrong Discussion

-1 Post author: curi 06 April 2011 11:50PM

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Comment author: Desrtopa 07 April 2011 01:58:08AM 4 points [-]

Using my epistemology I have learned not to do that kind of thing. Would that serve as an example of a practical benefit of it, and a substantive difference? You learned Bayesian stuff but it apparently didn't solve your problem, whereas my epistemology did solve mine.

It doesn't take Popperian epistemology to learn social fluency. I've learned to limit conflict and improve the productivity of my discussions, and I am (to the best of my ability) Bayesian in my epistemology.

If you want to credit a particular skill to your epistemology, you should first see whether it's more likely to arise among those who share your epistemology than those who don't.

Comment author: JoshuaZ 07 April 2011 02:07:05AM 2 points [-]

If you want to credit a particular skill to your epistemology, you should first see whether it's more likely to arise among those who share your epistemology than those who don't.

That's a claim that only makes sense in certain epistemological systems...

Comment author: curi 07 April 2011 02:09:13AM * 3 points [-]

I don't have a problem with the main substance of that argument, which I agree with. Your implication that we would reject this idea is mistaken.

Comment author: JoshuaZ 07 April 2011 02:36:12AM 0 points [-]

I don't have a problem with the main substance of that argument, which I agree with. Your implication that we would reject this idea is mistaken.

Hmm? I'm not sure who you mean by we? If you mean that someone supporting a Popperian approach to epistemology would probably find this idea reasonable than I agree with you (at least empirically, people claiming to support some form of Popperian approach seem ok with this sort of thing. That's not to say I understand how they think it is implied/ok in a Popperian framework).

Comment author: curi comment score below threshold [+] (16 children)

Comment author: Desrtopa 07 April 2011 02:15:42AM * 2 points [-]

If I don't understand your explanation and am interested in it, I'm prepared to do the research in order to understand it, but if you can only assert why your epistemology should result in better social learning and not demonstrate that it does so for people in general, I confess that I will probably not be interested enough to follow up.

I will note though, that stating the assumption that another does not understand, but leaving them free to correct you, strikes me as a markedly worse way to minimize conflict and aggression than asking if they have the familiarity necessary to understand the explanation.

Comment author: curi 07 April 2011 02:25:58AM 1 point [-]

You could begin by reading

http://fallibleideas.com/emotions

And the rest of the site. If you don't understand any connections between it and Popperian epistemology, feel free to ask.

I'm not asking you to be interested in this, but I do think you should have some interest in rival epistemologies.

Comment author: Desrtopa 07 April 2011 03:00:48AM 2 points [-]

I studied philosophy as part of a double major (which I eventually dropped because of the amount of confusion and sophistry I was being expected to humor,) and my acquaintance with Popper, although not as deep as yours, I'm sure, precedes my acquaintance with Bayes. Although it may be that others who I have not read better presented and refined his ideas, Popper's philosophy did not particularly impress me, whereas the ideas presented by Bayesianism immediately struck me as deserving of further investigation. It's possible that I haven't given Popper his fair shakes, but it's not for lack of interest in other epistemologies that I've come to identify as Bayesian.

I wouldn't describe the link as unhelpful, exactly, but I also wouldn't say that it's among the best advice for controlling one's emotions that I've received (this was a process I put quite a bit of effort into learning, and I've received a fair amount,) so I don't see how it functions as a demonstration of the superiority of Popperian epistemology.

Comment author: curi 07 April 2011 03:05:54AM 3 points [-]

You say Popper didn't impress you. Why not? Did you have any criticism of his ideas? Any substantive argument against them?

Do you have any criticism of the linked ideas? You just said it doesn't seem that good to you, but you didn't give any kind of substantive argument.

Comment author: Desrtopa 07 April 2011 03:38:56AM 1 point [-]

With regards to the link, it's simply that it's less in depth than other advice I've received. There are techniques that it doesn't cover in meaningful detail, like manipulation of cognitive dissonance (habitually behaving in certain ways to convince yourself to feel certain ways,) or recognition of various cognitive biases which will alter our feelings. It's not that bad as an introduction, but it could do a better job opening up connections to specific techniques to practice or biases to be aware of.

Popper didn't impress me because it simply wasn't apparent to me that he was establishing any meaningful improvements to how we go about reasoning and gaining information. Critical rationalism appeared to me to be a way of looking at how we go about the pursuit of knowledge, but to quote Feynman, "Philosophy of science is about as useful to scientists as ornithology is to birds." It wasn't apparent to me that trying to become more Popperian should improve the work of scientists at all; indeed, in practice it is my observation that those who try to think of theories more in the light of the criticism they have withstood than their probability in light of the available evidence are more likely to make significant blunders.

Attempting to become more Bayesian in one's epistemology, on the other hand, had immediately apparent benefits with regards to conducting science well (which are are discussed extensively on this site.)

I had criticisms of Popper's arguments to offer, and could probably refresh my memory of them by revisiting his writings, but the deciding factor which kept me from bothering to read further was that, like other philosophers of science I had encountered, it simply wasn't apparent that he had anything useful to offer, whereas it was immediately clear that Bayesianism did.

Comment author: curi 07 April 2011 03:47:39AM 2 points [-]

Feynman meant normal philosophers of science. Including, I think, Bayesians. He didn't mean Popper, who he read and appreciated. Feynman himself engaged in philosophy of science, and published it. It's academic philosophers, of the dominant type, that he loathed.

that those who try to think of theories more in the light of the criticism they have withstood than their probability in light of the available evidence

That's not really what Popperian epistemology is about. But also: the concept of evidence for theories is a mistake that doesn't actually make sense, as Popper explained. If you doubt this, do what no one else on this site has yet managed: tell me what "support" means (like in the phrase "supporting evidence") and tell me how support differs from consistency.

The biggest thing Popper has to offer is the solution to justificationism which has plagued almost everyone's thinking since Aristotle. You won't know quite what that is because it's an unconscious bias for most people. In short it is the idea that theories should be supported/justified/verified/proven, or whatever, whether probabilistically or not. A fraction of this is: he solved the problem of induction. Genuinely solved it, rather than simply giving up and accepting regress/foundations/circularly/whatever.

Comment author: Desrtopa 07 April 2011 03:59:01AM * 1 point [-]

That's not really what Popperian epistemology is about. But also: the concept of evidence for theories is a mistake that doesn't actually make sense, as Popper explained. If you doubt this, do what no one else on this site has yet managed: tell me what "support" means (like in the phrase "supporting evidence") and tell me how support differs from consistency.

I've read his arguments for this, I simply wasn't convinced that accepting it in any way improved scientific conduct.

"Support" would be data in light of which the subjective likelihood of a hypothesis is increased. If consistency does not meaningfully differ from this with respect to how we respond to data, can you explain why it is is more practical to think about data in terms of consistency than support?

I'd also like to add that I do know what justificationism is, and your tendency to openly assume deficiencies in the knowledge of others is rather irritating. I normally wouldn't bother to remark upon it, but given that you posed a superior grasp of socially effective debate conduct as evidence of the strength of your epistemology, I feel the need to point out that I don't feel like you're meeting the standards of etiquette I would expect of most members of Less Wrong.

Comment author: curi 07 April 2011 04:08:17AM 1 point [-]

I've read his arguments for this, I simply wasn't convinced that accepting it in any way improved scientific conduct.

Yet again you disagree with no substantive argument. If you don't have anything to say, why are you posting?

can you explain why it is is more practical to think about data in terms of consistency than support?

Well, consistency is good as far as it goes. If we see 10 white swans, we should reject "all swans are black" (yes, even this much depends on some other stuff). Consistency does the job without anything extraneous or misleading.

The support idea claims that sometimes evidence supports one idea it is consistent with more than another. This isn't true, except in special cases which aren't important.

The way Popper improves on this is by noting that there are always many hypotheses consistent with the data. Saying their likelihood increases is pointless. It does not help deal with the problem of differentiating between them. Something else, not support, is needed. This leaves the concept of support with nothing useful to do, except be badly abused in sloppy arguments (I have in mind arguments I've seen elsewhere. Lots of them. What people do is they find some evidence, and some theory it is consistent with, and they say the theory is supported so now they have a strong argument or whatever. And they are totally selective about this. You try to tell them, "well, theory is also consistent with the data. so it's supported just as much. right?" and they say no, theirs fits the data better, so it's supported more. but you ask what the difference is, and they can't tell you because there is no answer. the idea that a theory can fit the data better than another, when both are consistent with the data, is a mistake (again there are some special cases that don't matter in practice).)

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Comment author: FAWS 07 April 2011 04:13:12AM -1 points [-]

tell me what "support" means (like in the phrase "supporting evidence") and tell me how support differs from consistency.

Support is the same thing as more consistent with that hypothesis than with the alternatives (P(E|H) >P(E|~H)).

Comment author: curi 07 April 2011 04:17:51AM 3 points [-]

What is "more consistent"?

Consistent = does not contradict. But you can't not-contradict more. It's a boolean issue.

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