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calef comments on Bayesian Epistemology vs Popper - Less Wrong Discussion

-1 Post author: curi 06 April 2011 11:50PM

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Comment author: calef 07 April 2011 05:40:16AM 0 points [-]

Where don't you like it? I don't think anyone actually argues for your first definition, because, like I said, it's silly. I think curi's point is that fallibilism is predicated on your second definition not (ever?) being a valid claim.

My point is that the things we are "certain" about (as per your second definition) probably coincide almost exactly with "statements without criticism" as per curi's definition(s).

Comment author: endoself 07 April 2011 06:01:44AM 2 points [-]

It is a silly definition, but people are silly enough that I hear it often enough to be wary of it.

My point is that the things we are "certain" about (as per your second definition) probably coincide almost exactly with "statements without criticism" as per curi's definition(s).

I interpreted this as the first definition. I guess we should see what curi says.

Comment author: Peterdjones 12 April 2011 08:34:02PM 1 point [-]

people genrally try to have their cake and eat it: they want certainty to mean "cannot be wrong", but only on the basis that they feel sure.