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timtyler comments on Bayesian Epistemology vs Popper - Less Wrong Discussion

-1 Post author: curi 06 April 2011 11:50PM

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Comment author: timtyler 07 April 2011 12:48:52PM *  1 point [-]

what you're doing here is conflating Bayes' theorem (which is about probability, and which is a matter of logic, and which is correct) with Bayesian epistemology (the application of Bayes' theorem to epistemological problems, rather than to the math behind betting).

That's because to a Bayesian, these things are the same thing. Epistemology is all about probability - and visa versa. Bayes's theorem includes induction and confirmation. You can't accept Bayes's theorem and reject induction without crazy inconsistency - and Bayes's theorem is just the math of probability theory.

Comment author: [deleted] 07 April 2011 01:05:19PM 0 points [-]

If I understand correctly, I think curi is saying that there's no reason for probability and epistemology to be the same thing. That said, I don't entirely understand his/her argument in this thread, as some of the criticisms he/she mentions are vague. For example, what are these "epistemological problems" that Popper solves but Bayes doesn't?