Eight questions for computationalists

dfranke

This post is a followup to "We are not living in a simulation" and intended to help me (and you) better understand the claims of those who took a computationalist position in that thread. The questions below are aimed at you if you think the following statement both a) makes sense, and b) is true:

"Consciousness is really just computation"

I've made it no secret that I think this statement is hogwash, but I've done my best to make these questions as non-leading as possible: you should be able to answer them without having to dismantle them first. Of course, I could be wrong, and "the question is confused" is always a valid answer. So is "I don't know".

As it is used in the sentence "consciousness is really just computation", is computation:
a) Something that an abstract machine does, as in "No oracle Turing machine can compute a decision to its own halting problem"?
b) Something that a concrete machine does, as in "My calculator computed 2+2"?
c) Or, is this distinction nonsensical or irrelevant?
If you answered "a" or "c" to question 1: is there any particular model, or particular class of models, of computation, such as Turing machines, register machines, lambda calculus, etc., that needs to be used in order to explain what makes us conscious? Or, is any Turing-equivalent model equally valid?
If you answered "b" or "c" to question 1: unpack what "the machine computed 2+2" means. What is that saying about the physical state of the machine before, during, and after the computation?
Are you able to make any sense of the concept of "computing red"? If so, what does this mean?
As far as consciousness goes, what matters in a computation: functions, or algorithms? That is, does any computation that give the same outputs for the same inputs feel the same from the inside (this is the "functions" answer), or do the intermediate steps matter (this is the "algorithms" answer)?
Would an axiomatization (as opposed to a complete exposition of the implications of these axioms) of a Theory of Everything that can explain consciousness include definitions of any computational devices, such as "and gate"?
Would an axiomatization of a Theory of Everything that can explain consciousness mention qualia?
Are all computations in some sense conscious, or only certain kinds?

ETA: By the way, I probably won't engage right away with individual commenters on this thread except to answer requests for clarification. In a few days I'll write another post analyzing the points that are brought up.

"Consciousness is really just computation"

As it is used in the sentence "consciousness is really just computation", is computation:
a) Something that an abstract machine does, as in "No oracle Turing machine can compute a decision to its own halting problem"?
b) Something that a concrete machine does, as in "My calculator computed 2+2"?
c) Or, is this distinction nonsensical or irrelevant?
If you answered "a" or "c" to question 1: is there any particular model, or particular class of models, of computation, such as Turing machines, register machines, lambda calculus, etc., that needs to be used in order to explain what makes us conscious? Or, is any Turing-equivalent model equally valid?
If you answered "b" or "c" to question 1: unpack what "the machine computed 2+2" means. What is that saying about the physical state of the machine before, during, and after the computation?
Are you able to make any sense of the concept of "computing red"? If so, what does this mean?
As far as consciousness goes, what matters in a computation: functions, or algorithms? That is, does any computation that give the same outputs for the same inputs feel the same from the inside (this is the "functions" answer), or do the intermediate steps matter (this is the "algorithms" answer)?
Would an axiomatization (as opposed to a complete exposition of the implications of these axioms) of a Theory of Everything that can explain consciousness include definitions of any computational devices, such as "and gate"?
Would an axiomatization of a Theory of Everything that can explain consciousness mention qualia?
Are all computations in some sense conscious, or only certain kinds?

(b) Consciousness is something that a concrete machine does, as in "My calculator computed 2+2".
Instructed to skip.
Unpack what "the machine computed 2+2" means. (I'll try.) A machine computes 2+2 if it has an algorithm (perhaps a subroutine) that accepts two inputs a and b (where a and b are some set of numbers containing at least the natural numbers through 5) and generally (almost always) outputs the sum a+b. The machine may output a+b by any means whatsoever -- even just using a look up table or appending two strings of symbols. (In contrast, an algorithm that always outputs '4' does not compute 2+2.)
Unpack what 'computing red' means. At the first level, computing red means identifying that a set of wavelengths are within a certain range. At the subjective, qualia level, computing red means identifying the range of wavelengths "red" with a network of information about that range (possibly including past experience with that range). The experience of the quale is observing the association of the range of wavelengths with the network of related associations; it is the observation that "red" is passed through a node and redirected to a set of other nodes. (This is why consciousness is required to experience qualia.) I observe that I have a little bit of control over what associations red is passed to (different subsets of the network of associations) and asking myself 'what does red feel like?' or 'what is red?' is an exercise in lingering around this locus of control; associating, pulling back, reassociating, etc. When I actually look at something red, the shape and texture dominate my associations so I don't think 'red' is a very strong quale for me, or not a very good way to divide up my experience of it.
At this level of questioning, I'm not sure what 'feel' means. Feelings about mental processes depend upon associations with physical feelings, including immediate or remembered physical sensations that the brain produces while thinking, whatever those are. So if I'm on drugs, thinking should feel different ... is this functional or algorithmic?
Don't think so..
No, I don't imagine qualia are an essential ingredient of consciousness.
I agree with RobinZ, consciousness requires self-reflective behavior -- which I see as an algorithm modeling itself to some unspecified extent, though not necessarily containing any component of self-awareness.

I just remembered that I wrote up my thoughts about consciousness is this post titled Hypotheses for Dualism. There are likely to be some comments relevant to this discussion there.

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Eight questions for computationalists

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Eight questions for computationalists

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