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gwern comments on Eight questions for computationalists - Less Wrong Discussion

16 Post author: dfranke 13 April 2011 12:46PM

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Comment author: gwern 24 August 2012 10:36:02PM 3 points [-]

Maybe not with humans, but definitely for octopuses!

(More seriously, depending on how seriously you take embodied cognition, there may be some small loss. I mean, we know that your gut bacteria influence your mood via the nerves to the gut; so there are connections. And once there are connections, it becomes much more plausible that cut connections may decrease consciousness. After a few weeks in a float tank, how conscious would you be? Not very...)

Comment author: shminux 24 August 2012 11:22:26PM 0 points [-]

I'm pretty sure that you agree that none of this means that a human brain in a vat with proper connections to the environment, real or simulated, is inherently less conscious than one attached to a body.

Comment author: gwern 25 August 2012 12:24:00AM 0 points [-]

I don't take embodiment that far, no, but a simulated amputation in a simulation would seem as problematic as a real amputation in the real-world barring extraordinary intervention on the part of the simulation.