Oh I totally agree. But satisfying my utility function is still based on my own subjective experiences.

The original comment, which I agreed with, wasn't framing things in terms of "do I care more about myself or about saving the world." It was about "do I care about PERSONALLY having experiences or about other people who happen to be similar/identical to me having those experiences?"

If there are multiple copies of me, and one of them dies, I didn't get smaller. One of them died. If I get uploaded to a server and then continue on my life, periodically hearing about how another copy of me is having transhuman sex with every Hollywood celebrity at the same time, I didn't get to have that experience. And if a clone of me saves the world, I didn't get to actually save the world.

I would rather save the world than have a clone do it. (But that preference is not so strong that I'd rather have the world saved less than optimally if it meant I got to do it instead of a clone)