Your comment seems to be a response to lukeprog's questions, rather than to my question.
You said most of those questions make no sense to you so I tried to make sense of them myself and thought I could as well write down my thoughts.
Regarding your own questions. I believe that there are some genetically hard-coded intuitions about how to approach and respond to other primates. Why would we want to wrap that into some confusing terminology like moral philosophy?
You further say that you cannot easily change those intuitions. That is correct, but do we want to change them? Does it even make sense to ask if we want to have different intuitions?
I...
lukeprog gave a list of metaethics questions here:
Most of these questions make no sense to me. I imagine that the moral intuitions in my brain come from a special black box within it, a "morality core" whose outputs I cannot easily change. (Explaining how my "morality core" ended up a certain way is a task for evo psych, not philosophy.) Or I can be more enlightened and adopt Nesov's idea that the "morality core" doesn't exist as a unified device, only as an umbrella name for all the diverse "reasons for action" that my brain can fire. Either perspective can be implemented as a computer program pretty easily, so I don't feel there's any philosophical mystery left over. All we have is factual questions about how people's "morality cores" vary in time and from person to person, how compelling their voices are, finding patterns in their outputs, etc. Can someone explain what problem metaethics is supposed to solve?