What does moral language mean?
What do words like good, bad, right, wrong, and should mean?
Do moral facts exist?
Are statements like, Murder is wrong, propositions that can be true or false?
If so, what are they like, and are they reducible to natural facts?
If yes, can we explain this within the framework of naturalism?
Is there a connection between making a moral judgment and being motivated to abide by it?
This has to do with the feeling we get when we know the Good but don't do it.
Are moral judgments objective or subjective, relative or absolute?
The sun revolves around the earth. Humans thought this was true for thousands of years. But humans were wrong. Are statements like, Murder is wrong, the sort of thing we can be wrong about?
lukeprog gave a list of metaethics questions here:
Most of these questions make no sense to me. I imagine that the moral intuitions in my brain come from a special black box within it, a "morality core" whose outputs I cannot easily change. (Explaining how my "morality core" ended up a certain way is a task for evo psych, not philosophy.) Or I can be more enlightened and adopt Nesov's idea that the "morality core" doesn't exist as a unified device, only as an umbrella name for all the diverse "reasons for action" that my brain can fire. Either perspective can be implemented as a computer program pretty easily, so I don't feel there's any philosophical mystery left over. All we have is factual questions about how people's "morality cores" vary in time and from person to person, how compelling their voices are, finding patterns in their outputs, etc. Can someone explain what problem metaethics is supposed to solve?